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A CASE STUDY IN CONTEMPORARY APOLOGIA:
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CHAPTER I
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SELF-DEFENSE 
RHETORIC OF RICHARD NIXON
Within the last three decades, Richard Nixon,
Adlai Stevenson, Harry Truman, and Edward Kennedy 
stood trial before the bar of public opinion regarding 
the propriety of some public or private action; each 
chose to take his case to the people in the form 
of an apologia, the speech of self-defense.^
Ware and Linkugel (1973) refer to the speech of self-
defense as a "custom of Occidental culture firmly established
by Socrates, Martin Luther, Robert Emmet, and thousands of
lesser men."^ Although the rhetorical ritual of apologia has
been used since ancient Greece, the study of the apologetic
genre has been limited. In this study I propose to (1) establish
L. Ware and Wil A. Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense 
of Themselves; On the Generic Criticism of Apologia," Quar­
terly Journal of Speech. 59 (October 1973), 273.
^Ware and Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense," p. 273.
the importance of the apologetic genre, (2) identify Richard 
Nixon as the most appropriate case study in contemporary 
apologia, and (3) examine a useful analytic method to apply 
to the apologetic genre.
In the many examples of apologia throughout history, 
there is one common element, that is, in each case the accused 
chose to face his/her accusers and to speak in defense of 
himself/herself. The witnesses to such self-defenses seem 
satisfied only with the most personal of responses by the 
accused, ''.'ne actual speech of self-defense is thus defined 
by Ware and Linkugel as a "personalized defense by an indivi- 
dual of his morality, motives, and reputation." Other scholars 
concur with this definition. Butler (1972) refers to the apolo­
gia as speakers' attempts to "repair their ethos."4 Kruse 
(1981) concluded that apologetic discourses are "similarly 
structured in that logos and pathos function principally to 
support ethos."5
3ware and Linkugel,"They Spoke in Defense," p. 274.
4Sherry Devereaux Butler, "The Apologia, 1971 Genre," 
Southern Speech Communication Journal. 37 (Spring 1972), 287.
^Noreen Wales Kruse, "The Scope of Apologetic Dis­
course: Establishing Generic Parameters," Southern Speech
Communication Journal. 46 (Spring 1981), 290.
Isolated public utterances of Richard Nixon provide 
an excellent focal point for the study of the contemporary 
apologetic genre. Considering the critical rhetorical demands 
of the apologetic situation, Nixon is certainly a rhetor capable 
of "rising to the occasion." Jablonski (1979) regarded Nixon 
as having a reputation for being "unflaggingly combative in 
crisis situations,..."6 Gibson and Felkins (1974) concluded 
that Nixon's "concem through life has been to master the panic 
stirred within him by crisis, to be, when the moment arrived, 
calm, balanced, objective."^ In deference to his mastery of 
crisis rhetoric. Hart (1976) went so far as to refer to Nixon 
as "one of the coolest rhetorical customers this nation has 
known."® I contend that Nixon is as well equipped an apologist 
as one will view in recent history, and his reliance on the
®Carol J. Jablonski, "Richard Nixon's Irish Wake: A
Case of Generic Transference," Central States Speech Journal. 
30 (Summer 1979), 164.
^James w. Gibson and Patricia Felkins, "A Nixon Lexi­
con, " Western Speech, 38 (Summer 1974), 190.
^Roderick P. Hart, "Absolutism and Situation: Prole­
gomena to a Rhetorical Biography of Richard M. Nixon," Com­
munication Monographs. 43 (August 1976), 226.
a
apology was, perhaps, unsurpassed in modern politics. Con­
sequently. selected self-defense discourses of Richard Nixon 
are analyzed for the primary concern of examining contemporary 
apologia. The purpose of this study is to analyse modern 
apologia and to illustrate its various strategies. The self- 
defense rhetoric of Richard Nixon thus serves as a case study 
in contemporary apologia.
Apologia as a Rhetorical Genre 
The speech of self-defense indeed has been an important 
concern of past as well as contemporary society. The recurrent 
theme of accusation followed by apology is certainly prevalent 
in the history of public address.^0 In fact, the apology 
played a large part in Greek oratory. Examples of the ancient 
art of self-defense in the "Golden Age of Greece" are apparent 
in Socrates' "Apology"; Isocrates' "On the Antidoses"; and 
Demosthenes' "On the C r o w n . A s  Kruse (1981) noted, "the
^Jackson Harrell, B. L. Ware, and Wil A. Linkugel, 
"Failure of Apology in American Politics: Nixon on Watergate,"
Speech Monographs, 42 (November 1975), 245.
lOware and Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense," pp. 274-74.
^^George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Prince­
ton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 149,
181, and 229.
apologia as a genus is as ancient as rhetoric itself.
Some contemporary examples of the ritual of self-defense are 
the following discourses: Douglas MacArthur's "Address to
Congress"; Harry S. Truman's "Television Address on Harry 
Dexter White"; Adlai Stevenson's "The Hiss Case"; and Edward 
Kennedy's "Chappaquiddick Address.
The traditional rhetorical form of the apology as it 
was used by the ancients has not significantly deviated in the 
contemporary practice of apologia. Specifically, the four 
following rhetorical tasks are often undertaken by the ancient 
as well as the contemporary apologist:
1. A statement of the case at hand is given
2. Then, a refutation of the charges and often a 
counterattack are advanced
3. The self-defense explanation unfolds, particularly 
stressing the rhetor's fine character
4. Finally, a summation/conclusion is given reasserting 
the apologist's own moral i n t e g r i t y . 14
Although the rhetorical critic's interest in apologia 
has been considerable. Ware and Linkugel's (1973) article was
Ip
Kruse, "The Scope of Apologetic Discourse," p. 279. 
l^Ware and Linkugel,"They Spoke in Defense," p. 275. 
^^Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece, p. 151.
the first contemporary scholarly endeavor to both grant apologia 
a generic status and detail its common e l e m e n t s . since Ware 
and Linkugel's self-defense criteria constitute the method of 
analysis employed in this study, their system will be examined 
in a forthcoming section of this chapter. Following Ware and 
Linkugel's study, several journal articles addressed the rami­
fications of apologia as a rhetorical genre.
Kruse (1977) pursued an expanded definition of apologia 
focusing on underlying motivational f a c t o r s . S h e  conceptu­
alized apologia as "Public discourse produced whenever a 
prominent person attempts to repair his character if it has 
been directly or indirectly damaged by overt charges, or rumors
and allegations, which negatively value his behavior and/or
l 7his judgment." Kruse concluded that the critic must understand
^^Ware and Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense," pp. 273-73 
Examples of criticism of apologetic rhetoric include James H. 
Jackson, "Plea in Defense of Himself," Western Speech, 20 
(Fall, 1959), 185-95; Bower Aly, "The Gallows Speech," Southern 
Speech Journal, 34 (Spring 1969), 204-213; and David A. Ling,
"A Pentadic Analysis of Senator Edward Kennedy's Address 'To 
the People of Massachusetts,' July 25, 1969," Central States 
Speech Journal. 21 (Summer 1970), 81-86.
^^Noreen W. Kruse, "Motivational Factors in Non-Denial 
Apologia, Central States Speech Journal. 28 (Spring 1977),
13-23.
^^Kruse, "Motivational Factors," p. 13.
both the rhetorical situation of apologia and the motives of 
18the apologist.
Crable (1978) examined the basis of the genre of apol-
Iq
ogia. He stated, "The history of questions of accountability 
is a study of the ways in which people-as-political constitu­
ents argue the extence of impropriety and the ways in which 
politicians-as-people argue the propriety of their conduct."
According to Crable, ethics, law, politics, and communication
21are all involved in this clash. Utilizing Burkeian concepts,
he pointed out that the essence of accountability through
apologia is the fact that the actor/politician has exercised
his own moral choice in his conduct, and that such conduct
22may at any time become the subject of ethical challenge.
^^Kruse, "Motivational Factors,"p. 23
l^Richard E. Crable, "Ethical Codes, Accountability, 
and Argumentation," QuarterIv Journal of Speech. 54 (February 
1978), 23-32.
Crable, "Ethical Codes," pp. 23-24,
^^Crable, "Ethical Codes," p. 24.
^^Crable, "Ethical Codes," pp. 25-26.
In sum, Crable paraphrased Burke and stated, "Politics above
23
all is drama, and the enactment of roles can be judged."
Finally, Gold (1978) believed that recent presidential
campaigns are particularly reliant of the type of character
24defense inherent in apologia. As a result of the Watergate 
scandal. Ford and Carter in their 1976 presidential campaign 
clearly stressed the integrity of their character. In light 
of the Chappaquiddick incident, Edward Kennedy was faced with 
a similar character defense in his 1980 campaign for the presi­
dency. Gold's view of the exigencies that require apologia 
are worth noting. She stated, "Any attack casting suspicion 
upon one's moral character may hinder one's ability to achieve 
goals and, unless deflected, may destroy the ability to func­
tion as a public l e a d e r . G o l d  thus stressed that contemporary 
practice is such that the aspirant's personal qualities are
23Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literarv Form 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1941), p. 310, 
quoted in Crable, "Ethical Codes," p. 26.
^^Ellen Reid Gold, "Political Apologia: The Ritual 
of Self-Defense," Communication Monographs, 45 (November 1978), 
306-316.
^^Gold, "Political Apologia," p. 307.
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greatly emphasized and the media's interest in exploring these
personal attributes only heightens this emphasis. Hence,
apologetic strategies can serve to sustain a candidacy. As
a final observation Gold stated, "Aspiring Presidents can
literally be made or broken on their ability to practice the
26
ritual of self-defense."
In review of these studies by Kruse, Crable, and Gold, 
several observations can be made concerning the present status 
of generic criticism of apologia. Clearly, the critic of self- 
defense rhetoric needs to be concerned with motivational fac­
tors or what really prompted the apologia. Since one's moral 
choices can be challenged, the essence of apologia is conflict 
generally between public sentiment and the apologist's conduct. 
Such a conflict often involves ethical, legal, political, and 
communicative considerations. Finally, as a result of recent 
political scandals and the media’s ability and interest in 
revealing them, the ritual of apologia is often critical to 
the contemporary political scene.
^^Gold, "Political Apologia," p. 316.
Nixon as a Subject for Rhetorical Study
The rhetoric of Richard Nixon lends itself well to
2 7rhetorical scrutiny: (1) he was a well-schooled rhetor;
(2) rhetoric, particularly self-defense rhetoric, was instru­
mental to his political career;^® and (3) the longevity of his
national political career provides "ample opportunity for ob-
29
serving his discourse in varying rhetorical situations," 
Nixon's use and awareness of rhetoric were quite apparent 
even at an early age. One of his biographers, David Abrahara- 
sen, noted the emergence of Nixon's speech skills at an early 
age:
Even as a little boy talking to his classmates,
Richard was trying to impress others with his 
knowledge of politics, although he was too young 
and inexperienced to speak with authority. Still, 
he enjoyed observing the dramatic impact of his 
rhetoric on his young peers. With rhetoric, an
2 7 David Abrahamsen, Nixon vs. Nixon (New York: Farrar,
Strauss and Giroux, 1976), p. 70.
^®Hart, "Absolutism and Situation," p, 205.
o q
Donald P. Cushman, "The Effects of Richard Nixon's 
Rhetorical Style on the Climate of the Controversies in Which 
He Participates," paper delivered at the annual Convention of 
the Speech Communication Association, Chicago, Illinois, 1974,
p. 1.
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insecure (and poor) boy would wield a great 
deal of power; he was more powerful than his peers 
because he could confront them and persuade them.
That he was able to arouse their interest meant he 
was also able to mobilize their feelings and win 
them over.^0
Another biographer, William Costello, observed Nixon’s
unusual talent in debate :
Richard's shyness in boyhood gave way to a new self- 
confidence when he acquired what was to be a life­
long interest in debating. From the first he was 
outstanding....
His high-school debating coach, Mrs. Norman Vincent, 
remembers she used to feel 'disturbed' at his 
superiority over his teammates. 'He had this 
ability,' she said, 'to kind of slide round an 
argument instead of meeting it head on, and he 
could take any side of a debate.'
In high school and in college, Nixon won numerous
32awards in oratory, extemporaneous speaking, and debate.
As an undergraduate at Whittier College from 1930 to 1934 he
did well as a student majoring in history; however, his special
33distinction was that of being a top-notch debater. Thus, years
^^Abrahamsen, Nixon vs. Nixon, p. 58.
^^William Costello, The Facts About Nixon (New York; 
The Viking Press, Inc., 1960), pp. 23-24.
^^Abrahamsen, Nixon vs. Nixon, p. 70.
qo
Costello, The Facts About Nixon, p. 23.
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before Nixon's political career was launched in 1946, he 
demonstrated considerable ability in public speaking. How­
ever, Washington Post journalist Lou Cannon concluded that
there were substantive flaws in Nixon's speaking style:
Debate developed both Dick Nixon's education and 
his career, but it broadened him rather thai.
deepening him. He developed a quickness, a
facility, an ability to argue both sides of every 
question. He also developed the dozen little 
debater's tricks that still mar his speeches, 
especially the ability to plausibly refute an 
argument his opponent has never made.^^
The analyses by Nixon's more favorable biographers
should also be noted. Earl Mazo and Stephen Hess evaluated
Nixon's rhetorical style as reflective of a good debater:
Nixon's public style is that of the college 
debater. He debates well, controlling his 
material and his environment as a good debater 
must. Like most good debaters, he learned the 
techniques young, and its habits are almost 
impossible to shake. The debater strives for 
points, not images.
^^Lou Cannon, "The Forces That Forged the Future: 
'He Didn't Want to Stay in Yorba Linda,'" in The Fail of a 
President, ed. Haynes Johnson (New York: Delacorte Press,
1974), p. 44.
^^Earl Mazo and Stephen Hess, Nixon: A Political
Portrait (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 7.
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Nixon himself valued his debate training;
College debating in those days was a serious 
pursuit and a highly developed art, and it 
provided me not only experience with techniques 
of argument but also an intensive introduction 
to the substance of some issues I would deal 
with in later years.
Although judgments about Nixon's actual skills in 
public speaking are subject to much interpretation, all 
evaluations indicate that Nixon used rhetoric at an early 
age, was fairly well-schooled in the art of persuasion, and 
was most aware early in life of the potential impact of 
rhetoric.
In a personal letter to me, Nixon staff assistant 
Kenneth L. Khachigian indicated that Nixon definitely con­
sidered his skill in public speaking a significant factor 
contributing to his political career (see Appendix A).
^Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon
(New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), p. 17. Although Nixon
was obviously aware of the importance of his speech back­
ground, he made only brief references to his speech training 
in his first two books (i.e., his 1962 book. Six Crises and 
his 1978 memoirs). In the former publication, Nixon's only 
reference to his background in speech was as follows: "I won
my share of scholarships, and of speaking and debating prizes 
in school, not because I was smarter but because I worked 
longer and harder than some of my more gifted colleagues." 
Richard M. Nixon, Six Crises (New York: Doubleday and Com­
pany, Inc., 1962), p. 295.
13
In reference to Nixon's first political election, his 1946
Congressional campaign, Khachigian made the observation that
Nixon's debate skills were crucial to his election;
In his first political campaign, it was the debates 
with his better-known opponent that were so impor­
tant to President Nixon's victory. His presenta­
tion was sharp, concise, and reflected substantial 
preparation. His opponent's presentation was 
methodical, plodding, technical and much more boring.
The difference between the challenger's abilities 
and the experienced five-term incumbent's less 
effective presentation was telling.
Khachigian stated that the following speech situations 
were also examples which revealed that Nixon's skill as a 
public speaker was a crucial factor in his political success:
(1) his speeches in his 1950 Senate campaign against Helen 
Douglas, (2) his famous 1952 Fund speech, (3) his speech in 
1952 before the New York State Republican dinner, and (4) his 
speeches leading to his political comeback in 1968. In addition.
0-7
Letter received from Kenneth L. Khachigian, 10 
August 1978. After Nixon left office in 1974, Khachigian was 
frequently a spokesman for Nixon in the press, lived at San 
Clemente with the Nixon family, and was noted as a principal 
assistant in the writing of Nixon's memoirs. See, for example, 
Nixon's acknowledgement of Khachigian's aid in RN: The Memoirs
of Richard Nixon, p. xii.
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Khachigian disclosed that Nixon had a formulated theory of 
rhetoric that dominated his political speaking. He stated 
that Nixon found the six following components essential to 
a good speech: (1) preparation, (2) addressing the audience,
(3) brevity, (4) anecdotes, quotations, and stories, (5) news­
worthiness, and (5) the peroration.
It is my contention that Nixon is a particularly signi­
ficant subject for rhetorical study because his use of rhetoric
38had such a strong influence on his political career. Roderick
Hart indeed argues that Nixon's entire political career was
shaped by his use of rhetoric:
The sheer quantity of Nixon's rhetorical efforts 
reveals how deeply he depended upon public suasion.
He rose to prominence because of his savage rhetoric 
(in 1946) and avoided political limbo because of his 
melancholic rhetoric (in 1952). He first tasted 
defeat because of his mediated rhetoric (in 1960), 
regained momentum because of his tireless rhetoric 
(in 1964), and gathered in the garlands because 
of his managed rhetoric (in 1968). Until the 
summer of 1974, his was a career which spun 
dizzingly on the fulcrum of public discourse.^9
Rhetoric, particularly self-defense rhetoric or
apologia, was crucial to the political career of Richard
Nixon, and his long and influential national political career
3ftSee Cushman, "The Effects of Richard Nixon’s Rhetori­
cal Style,"p. 1.
^^Hart, "Absolutism and Situation," p. 205.
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was clearly affected by the successes and failures of his 
self-defense discourses. Referring to Nixon's 1952 apologia, 
the "Checkers" speech, Lawrence Rosenfield (1968) stated that 
"with a single speech Richard Nixon won a decisive initiative 
for his p a r t y . I n  1957, Barnet Baskerville observed that 
Nixon was regarded by many as the best political speaker in 
America. Furthermore, Baskerville believed that Nixon's 
popularity— or lack of it— was based largely on his speaking 
a b i l i t y . T h e o d o r e  White (1975) advanced a somewhat more 
critical evaluation of Nixon’s rhetoric, when he stated, 
"Already by the late fifties his stump ferocity had made him
A O
an object of hatred to millions of liberals." In reference 
to much later in Nixon's political career, Harrell, Ware, and 
Linkugel (1975) implied that if anyone could conceive of a 
successful apologia for Watergate it would be Nixon, "who
4®L. W. Rosenfield, "A Case Study in Speech Criticism; 
The Nixon-Truman Analog," Speech Monographs. 35 (November 
1968), 436.
^Igarnet Baskerville, "The New Nixon," in "Rhetoric 
and the Campaign of 1956," ed. Donald C. Bryant, Quarterly 
Journal of Speech, 43 (February 1957), p. 41.
4^Theodore H, White, Breach of Faith (New York; Dell 
Publishing Co., Inc., 1975), p. 89.
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used apologia on a scale unprecedented in the history of 
American p o l i t i c s . A n  analysis of Nixon's rhetoric in 
terms of critical self-defense situations could prove revealing 
to the art of apologia in modern politics.
Method of Analysis 
There are obviously a number of analytic methods to 
chose from when undertaking the task of rhetorical criticism. 
For example, traditional methods can be applied to the rhetori­
cal genre in question, such as an application of the Aristo­
telian modes of proof— ethos, pathos, and logos— or the 
Ciceronian canons— invention, organization, style, and deliv­
ery. Although these are the most familiar and at one time 
the classic standards applied to persuasive discourse, these 
traditional categories lack operationalized definitions which 
are necessary for the generic criticism of apologia. Thus, 
the traditional canon of invention, for example, has taken on 
a multitude of meanings such that the critic lacks a discrete 
definition of that concept.
^^Harrell, Ware, and Linkugel, "Failure of Apology,"
245.
17
A number of nontraditicnal critical methods could be
used in this study. An example of a nontraditional approach
is Stephen Toulmin ' s modal which can be easily applied to
44argumentative speeches. In Toulmin's scheme there are six 
elements contributing to any argument: the evidence, the war­
rant, the claim, the support for the warrant, the reservation, 
and the qualifier. While this method can be used effectively 
in dissecting the logical framework of argumentative dis­
courses, it does not account for the ethical appeals which, 
by definition, constitute the important foundation of the 
critical system actually used in this study.
Another popular nontraditional method of analysis is 
Kenneth Burke's Dramatistic Pentad focusing on five key ele­
ments of the rhetorical situation; scene, act, agent, agency, 
45
and purpose. Although Burke's Dramatistic Pentad does well 
in examining motivational factors and subsequent enactment of 
roles in rhetorical situations, it does not provide sufficient
Stephen Toulmin. The Uses of Argument (London: Cam­
bridge University Press, 1958).
45Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1969).
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focus on the strategies that distinguish the apologetic 
genre.
The method of analysis employed in this study is the
self-defense criteria explicated by Ware and Linkugel (1973)
While there are a number of available analytic tools, this
method is specifically tailored for the genre of apologia.
As previously noted. Ware and Linkugel define apologia as a
personalized defense by an individual of his morality, motives,
and r e p u t a t i o n . I n  their own words, their critical system
attempts to accomplish two goals: "to discover those factors
which characterize the apologetic form" and "to discover the
subgenres or the types of discourses within the genre.
Ware and Linkugel acknowledge that they borrow concepts and
terminology from Robert P. Abelson's (1959) psychological
49
theory pertaining to the resolution of belief dilemmas.
However, they note that they freely adapted Abelson's meanings 
and terms for better usage in speech criticism.
^^Ware and Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense," pp. 273-
283.
^^Ware and Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defens," p. 274.
4.0
Ware and Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense," p. 274.
49Robert P. Abelson, "Modes of Resolution of Belief 
Dilemmas," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 3 (December, 1959), 
343-352, cited in Ware and Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense,"
p. 275.
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Ware and Linkugel posit that four primary "factors" 
or strategies consistently appear in self-defense rhetoric: 
denial, bolstering, differentiation, and transcendence. The 
denial strategy amounts to a disavowal by the speaker of any 
participation in, relationship to, or positive sentiment 
toward that which has repelled the audience. Bolstering 
efforts are the speaker's attempts to identify himself with 
something viewed favorably by the audience. The differentia­
tion strategy is the speaker's particularization of the charges 
at hand— moving the audience toward a new and less abstract 
perspective. Finally, transcendence is the speaker’s means 
of moving the audience away from the particulars of the charges 
at hand and toward a more abstract and general view of his 
character. Identifying these strategies and noting their 
frequency and implications in selected apologia thus consti­
tutes the foundation of this analysis.
Ware and Linkugel assert that the self-defense rhetor 
combines reformative and transformative strategies in his 
discourse. Reformative strategies involve merely revising 
the cognitions of the listener. Conversely, transformative
50.See Figure 1 for a detailed examination of these 
four strategies of apologia.
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FIGURE 1
FOUR "FACTORS" OR STRATEGIES THAT CHARACTERIZE THE APOLOGETIC FORM*
Denial
Overall Attempts to negate
goal charges (divisive)
Bolstering
Seeks identification 
(cohesive)--obverse of 
of denial
Differentiation
Makes a distinction 
(divisive)
Transcendence
Joins elements 
(cohesive)--obverse 
of differentiation
Tactics Denies alleged facts,
used sentiments, objects, or
relationships
Strategic Useful strategy if
utility negations do not dis­
tort reality or conflict 
with audience's beliefs
Reinforces the existence 
of a fact, sentiment, 
object, or relationship
Useful strategy if 
speaker has an especially 
strong means of identi­
fication
Separates some fact, sen­
timent, object, or rela­
tionship from larger 
context
Joins some fact, 
sentiment, object, 
or relationship with 
some larger object
Useful strategy if the Useful strategy
old and new meanings lend 
themselves to radically 
different interpreta­
tions by audience
if the manipulated 
attribute(s) proves 
to be congruent with 
the new context in 
the minds of the 
audience
Speaker's 
task
Impact on 
audience
Speaker disavowals any 
participation in, rela­
tionship to, or positive 
sentiment toward that 
which has repelled 
audience
This is a "reformative" 
strategy since it merely 
revises or amends 
audience's cognitions
Speaker identifies him­
self with something 
viewed favorably by the 
audience
Speaker particularizes . 
the charges at hand- 
moving the audience 
toward the less abstract 
and placing repelling 
aspects of accused in a 
new perspective
This is a "reformative" This is a "transformative"
strategy since the speaker strategy since the old
does not invent identi- context is divided into
fication but is limited two or more new construc-
to the reality the audi- tions of reality and
ence perceives results in a change of the
audience's meaning
Speaker moves audi­
ence away from the 
particulars of the 
charge at hand and 
toward some more 
abstract, general 
view of his character
This is a "transfor­
mative" strategy 
since it attempts to 
change audience's 
cognitive identifi­
cation and meaning
Examples Marcus Garvey's 1923
"Address to the Jury" 
was a denial of intent
Edward Kennedy's 1969 
"Chappaquiddick" address 
used bolstering as he
(versus a denial of actior* attempted to reinforce 
as he did not deny that the a feeling of belonging 
people were defrauded but between the public and 
stated that his inten- the Kennedy family 
tions were good
Edward Kennedy (1969) 
used differentiation 
between his normal and 
crisis self (regenera­
tion)
Eugene Debs' 1918 
"Speech tc the 
Jury" used trans­
cendence as he jus­
tified his opposi­
tion to WWI by iden­
tifying the attacks 
against him with 
opposition to Ameri­
can people and their 
Constitution. 
Clarence Darrow's 
"They Tried to Get 
Me" speech used this 
as he represented 
himself as a hero, 
his accusers as 
wicked
1
♦This chart represents my synthesis of some of the concepts discussed in the following article: B. L. Ware
and Wil A. Linkugel, "They Spoke ia Defense of Themselves: On the Generic Criticism of Apologia," Quarterly 
Journal of Speech. 59 (October 1973), 273-73. The examples of historical speeches used here are taken directly 
from this article. Ware and Linkugel acknowledge (on page 275) that they borrow concepts and terminology from 
Robert P. Abelson's psychological theory pertaining to the resolution of belief dilemmas. However, they note 
that they have freely adapted Abelson's meanings and terms for better usage in speech criticism. Robert P. 
Abelson, "Modes of Resolution of Belief Dilemmas," Journal of Conflict Resolution. 3 (December 1959), 343-352.
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strategies attempt to change the cognitions of the listener. 
The two reformative strategies of apologia are denial and 
bolstering. The two transformative strategies are differen­
tiation and transcendence. Ware and Linkugel believe that 
the speech of self-defense needs to contain both reformative 
and transformative elements and thus results in any combina­
tion of one strategy from each category.Consequently, this 
method of analysis requires that the rhetorical critic discern 
the most crucial reformative and transformative strategies 
operating in the selected apologia.
Ware and Linkugel further contend that these combined 
strategies result in four "subgenres" or types of discourses 
within the genre of apologia; (1) absolution— combining 
primarily denial and differentiation strategies, (2) vindica­
tion— using essentially denial and transcendental strategies,
(3) explanation— highly dependent upon bolstering and differ­
entiation strategies, and (4) justification— based mostly on
52bolstering and transcendental strategies. In the address 
of absolution, the speaker seeks acquittal from those charges
p. 252.
^H/are and Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense," p. 282. 
5 2 Harrell, Ware, and Linkugel, "Failure of Apology,"
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levied against his character. The rhetor in the speech of 
vindication seeks to preserve his reputation especially rela­
tive to the worth of his accusers. In the address of explana­
tion, the speaker seeks to eliminate condemnation by pro­
viding the audience with a clearer understanding of the 
situation. Finally, in the speech of justification, the rhetor 
seeks the audience's understanding and approval for what he
has done. Thus, categorizing selected apologia into specific
53"subgenres" is another task of this analysis.
While Ware and Linkugel's system was published rela­
tively recently, their four strategies of apologetic rhetoric 
have definite historical roots. In the Rhetoric. Aristotle 
discusses four strategies of proof in demonstrative speeches 
which became the basis of the classical stasis system:
The duty of the Arguments is to attempt demon­
strative proofs. These proofs must bear directly 
upon the question in dispute, which must fall under 
one of four heads, (1) If you maintain that the act 
was not committed, your main task in court is to 
prove this. (2) If you maintain that the act did 
no harm, prove this. If you maintain the (3) act 
was less than is alleged, or (4) justified, prove 
these facts, just as you would prove the act not 
to have been committed if you were maintaining that
^^See Figure 2 for a detailed examination of these 
four subgenres of apologia.
54Aristotle, Rhetoric, trans. by W. Rhys Roberts, 
Poetics, trans. by Ingram Bywater (New York: The Modern 
Library, 1954), p. 1417b,
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FIGURE 2
FOUR "SUBGENRES" OR TYPES OF DISCOURSES FOUND WITHIN THE GENRE OF APOLOGIA*
Absolution Vindication Explanation Justification
Speaker's Speaker seeks acquittal
task from those charges levied
against his character 
More specific than vin­
dicative address
Speaker seeks to preserve Speaker seeks to eliminate Speaker seeks audi- 
his reputation, and also, condemnation by providing ence'a understanding 
his greater worth relative audience with a clearer and approval for 
to the worth of his accu- understanding of the situ- what he has done 
sers ation More defensive than
justification address
Key Resulting from the union
strategies of primarily "denial"
and "differentiation" 
factors
Resulting from the union Resulting from the union 
of "denial" and especially of "bolstering" and
“transcendental" factors "differentiation"
factors
Resulting from the 
union of "bolster­
ing" and "transcen­
dental" factors
Appropriate Could involve legal,
forum  extra-judicial, or public
opinion proceedings 
Used by S. Houston,
M. Garvey, and R. Nixon
Could involve a multi­
tude of public proceed­
ings
Used by Socrates and 
Hi S. Truman
Could involve a multi­
tude of public proceed­
ings
Used by M. Luther and 
A . Stevenson
could involve a mul­
titude of public 
proceedings 
used by S. B. 
Anthony and D. Mac- 
Arthur
Tactics Accused denies any wrong-
used doing and differentiates
any personal attribute in 
question from that which 
repels audience
Accused is permitted 
greater ease in going 
beyond the specifics of 
a given charge
Accused assumes that if 
audience understands his 
motives, beliefs, or what­
ever, they will not be 
able to condemn him
Accused often alludes 
to some "higher 
ethic" as he attempts 
to gain understand­
ing and approval
Overall Concern here is essen-
qoal tially "clearing one's
name" by focusing upon 
the particulars of the 
charge
Concern here is not 
only on the preservation 
of the accused's reputa­
tion, but also his 
greater worth as a human 
being relative to his 
accusers
Concern here is in in- concern here is not 
creasing audience's under- only in increasing 
standing and consequently audience's under­
lessening condemnation of standing of the 
accused individual situation, but also
gaining their 
approval
Examples Example of this was
Robert Emmet's 1803 
"My Country Was My 
Idol" when he consi­
dered the nature of 
treason in great depth
Example of this was 
Clarence Darrow's "They 
Tried to Get He" when he 
used transcendental 
strategies in comparing 
his character with his 
persecutors'
Example of this was 
Edward Kennedy's 1969 
"Chappaquiddick" 
address as he sought 
to disclose further 
details to his audience
Example of this 
was Eugene Debs' 
1918 "Speech to 
the Jury" as he 
sought to establish 
the basis of his 
own actions as con­
cerned with human 
dignity and rights
•This chart represents my synthesis of the four types of discourses found within the genre of apologia 
as discussed by Ware and Linkugel (1973) . The examples of historical speeches used here are taken directly 
from this article. After examining some twenty-seven examples of self-defense rhetoric. Ware and Linkugel 
concluded that two "factors" (see Figure 1) were generally combined to produce one of the above "subgenres" 
or "subcategories" of apologia.
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The Aristotelian concept of stasis thus represents the 
turning point of an issue or the central point being disputed, 
consisting of one or more of these four points; (1) act not 
committed, (2) act not harmful, (3) harm less than reward, 
and/or (4) act j u s t i f i e d . T o  a large extent, these four 
points correspond with Ware and Linkugel's four apologetic 
strategies: (1) denial, (2) bolstering, (3) differentiation,
and (4) transcendence.
Dieter (1950) observed that the term stasis actually 
evolved from Aristotle's physical philosophy and was concep­
tualized as the anti-thesis of "kinesis" to "stand still.
As previously noted, in Aristotle's Rhetoric the term referred
57
to "the turning point of an issue." Finally, the Roman 
definition of stasis was essentially "the main question in
5 0
debate." Accordingly, the status of any case could be deter­
mined by asking certain questions: (1) whether a thing is
(fact), (2) what it is (definition), (3) of what kind it
James L. Golden, Goodwin F. Berquist, and William
E. Coleman, The Rhetoric of Western Thought. 2nd ed. (Dubuque, 
Iowa : Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1978), p. 62.
^^Otto Alvin Loeb Dieter, "Stasis," Speech Monographs. 
17 (November 1950), 369.
57Golden, Berquist, and Coleman, The Rhetoric of Wes­
tern Thought, p. 62.
58
Dieter, "Stasis," p. 369.
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is (quality) , and (4) is it before the proper tribunal
/I \ 59 (place).
In sum, the Aristotelian notion of stasis represents 
the classical foundation of Ware and Linkugel's critical 
system. Aware of the contemporary theorist's indebtedness 
to classical rhetorical theory, I use Ware and Linkugel's 
system because of its apparent applicability to apologia in 
modern politics. Moreover, it is the only detailed method of 
analysis relative to the genre of apologia in contemporary 
politics. As noted, a number of previous studies have 
analyzed instances of self-defense rhetoric, but none has 
formulated a classificatory schema beyond classical rhetorical 
t h e o r y . W a r e  and Linkugel's system offers critics an oppor­
tunity to assess modern self-defense rhetoric in accordance 
to developed standards of apologia. Additionally, their 
system has been used quite effectively in subsequent apologia 
criticism.Finally, my own initial/exploratory use of
59Golden, Berquist, and Coleman, The Rhetoric of 
Western Thought, p. 68.
^^Ware and Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense," pp. 273-74.
®^See, for example: Harrell, Ware, and Linkugel,
"Failure of Apology," pp. 245-261; Kruse, "Motivational 
Factors," pp. 13-23; and Gold, "Political Apologia," pp. 306- 
316.
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this system on Nixon's apologia appeared to produce insight­
ful analysis.
Thus, the method of analysis employed in this study 
is a three-fold process : (1) the four key strategies of
apologia are noted, (2) the most crucial reformative and 
transformative strategies are pinpointed, and (3) the self- 
defense discourse is categorized into one of four subgenres.
Selection of Speeches
Four critical rhetorical situations in the national 
political career of Richard Nixon produced noteworthy examples 
of self-defense rhetoric. These speeches were the following: 
"My Side of the Story" (1952), "A Vietnam Plan" (1969), "Cam­
bodia" (1970), and "The Watergate Affair" (1973). Although 
a number of rhetorical analyses have been done on each of 
these famous speeches, developed self-defense criteria have 
not been applied to them to note patterns and recurring apolo­
getic strategies. A brief rationale for using each of these 
self-defense discourses will follow.
"My Side of the Story" was delivered by Nixon on 
September 23, 1952, and is often referred to as the "Checkers"
27
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or Fund speech. In this famous speech Nixon, then the
Republican Vice-Presidential candidate, explained his use
of an $18,000 special campaign fund, Rosenfield (1968)
labeled this apologia "one of the most controversial public
addresses of modern American h i s t o r y , N i x o n  went so far
as to refer to this self-defense as the event which made
64possible his election as vice president. This discourse 
was quite successful in ending the controversy at hand, and 
represents a classic example of effective apologia. Moreover, 
it reveals a number of detailed strategies to cope with 
exigences of the moment. Thus, this early address will pro­
vide a good starting point for assessing the contemporary 
practice of apologia,
Nixon's "A Vietnam Plan" was delivered on November 3, 
1969, and has been labeled the "silent majority" speech.
Richard M, Nixon, "My Side of the Story," Vital 
Speeches of the Dav. 19 (October 15, 1952), 11-15. See Appen­
dix B for a complete text of this address.
^^Rosenfield, "A Case Study," p. 435,
^^Richard M. Nixon, Six Crises (New York : Doubleday
and Company, Inc,, 1962), pp. 125-29, cited in Rosenfield,
"A Case Study," pp. 446-47,
Richard M. Nixon, "A Vietnam Plan," Vital Speeches 
of the Dav. 36 (November 15, 1969), 66-70, See Appendix C 
for a complete text of this address.
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VJhen Nixon delivered this speech, he had been in office for 
approximately ten months and as Newman (1970) pointed out,
"the political honeymoon was o v e r . C o n g r e s s i o n a l  criticism 
and the antiwar sentiment of the public were beginning to close 
in on Nixon. Hence, his promised "plan for peace" was being 
awaited rather impatiently. Nixon believed that this address 
was an overwheIming success in terms of the polls and subse­
quent congressional support for his Vietnam policies. In 
fact, he stated in his memoirs that this address was one of
the very few speeches that actually influenced the course of
67
history. Critics have viewed this speech as one of Nixon's 
most revealing addresses relative to his handling or mishandling 
of the Vietnam Nar.^^ I would thus argue that this discourse 
offers an excellent view of Nixon's Vietnam War apologia.
Nixon's address on "Cambodia" was delivered on April 30, 
1970, and was necessitated by the "incursion" of American and 
South Vietnamese troops across the Cambodian border.
Robert P. Newman, "Under the Veneer : Nixon's Viet­
nam Speech of November 3, 1969," Quarterly Journal of Speech.
56 (April 1970), 169.
^^Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon
(New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), pp. 409-410.
^^Newman, "Under the Veneer," p. 169.
^^Richard M. Nixon, "Cambodia," Vital Speeches of the Dav, 
36(May 15, 1970, 450-52. See Appendix D for a complete text 
of this address.)
29
Since Nixon had actually made this decision prior to deliver­
ing this speech; his rhetorical task was one of providing a 
rationale for his a c t i o n . C o n s i d e r i n g  Ware and Linkugel's 
actual definition of apologia as a personalized defense by 
an individual of his morality, motives, and reputation,
I would justify the apologetic nature of this discourse— as 
well as the Vietnam speech— with two arguments. First, the 
nature of this war was such that it was, in fact, a moral 
issue. Specifically, America's continued involvement in this
72
"undeclared" war became a very unpopular and moralistic issue.
Second, Nixon had so personalized the Presidency that his
critical war rhetoric became a personal defense of his mili-
73tary policy decisions. That is, the personalized tone of
^^Richard B. Gregg and Gerard A. Hauser, "Richard Nixon's 
April 30, 1970 Address on Cambodia: The 'Ceremony' of Confron­
tation," Speech Monographs, 40 (August 1973), 169.
^^Ware and Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense," p. 274.
7 2 J. Anthony Lucas, Nightmare: The Underside of the
Nixon Years (New York: The Viking Press, 1976), p. 12.
73
See, for example, Ruth M. Gonchar and Dan F. Hahn,
"The Rhetorical Predictability of Richard M. Nixon," Today's 
Speech. 19 (Fall, 1971), 3-13.
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these addresses is quite identifiable. I would therefore 
categorize these war speeches as apologia, encompassing Nixon's 
highly personalized defenses of a crucial moral issue— the 
Vietnam War.
"The Watergate Affair" was delivered by Nixon on
April 30, 1973, and was followed by a series of similar
apologetic discourses ending only with his resignation from
75
the Presidency on August 8, 1974. This speech was in 
response to mounting pressure on Nixon to finally confront 
the Watergate affair in terms of explaining his role in this 
scandal to the American people. Much of this pressure resulted 
from the fact that four key members of the ?3hits House staff—  
Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Kleindienst, and Dean— were implicated 
by March of 1973 in this s c an da l. Clearly, Watergate events 
had unfolded in such a way that Nixon's earlier blanket claims
74
Gonchar and Hahn, "The Rhetorical Predictability,"
p. 3. It is interesting to note that Nixon uses the word "I"
a total of 134 times in these two discourses.
Richard M. Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," Vital
Speeches of the Day, 39 (May 15, 1973), 450-52. See Appendix
E for a complete text of this address.
p. 253.
^^Harrell, Ware, and Linkugel, "Failure of Apology,"
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of White House innocence could not be supported. Consequently, 
this address would be an attempt to explain all of these 
seemingly incriminating events to the satisfaction of the 
American people. Although Nixon made apologetic-like state­
ments prior to this discourse. Ling (1977) observed that this
was "Nixon's first public address specifically directed to
7 7the issues of Watergate." Furthermore, Cheseboro and Ham-
sher (1976) stated, "In this speech, the foundation for per-
78ceiving all strategies used by Nixon can be discerned."
Thus, this address was, perhaps, Nixon's most crucial Water­
gate self-defense.
In conclusion, I believe that these four discourses 
represent some of Nixon's most significant self-defense 
efforts. Moreover, these four rhetorical situations provided
^^David A. Ling, "Nixon, Watergate and the Rhetor of 
Agent," in "A Pentadic Analysis of Richard Nixon and Water­
gate, " ed. Charles U. Larson, Speaker and Gavel. 15 (Fall 1977), 
7. In his memoirs, Nixon also referred to this speech as 
"the first time I formally addressed the American people 
specifically on Watergate." Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of
Richard Nixon, p. 849.
78James W. Chesebro and Caroline D. Hamsher, Orienta­
tions to Public Communication (Chicago: Science Research
Associates, Inc., 1976), p. 14.
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Nixon with, perhaps, the largest audiences of his political 
career, in hie i952 "Checkers" speech Nixon addressed the
largest television audience to that time, sixty million
79people. Strategically using prime time television, Nixon
reached a television audience of seventy-two million people
in his 1969 Vietnam address, and over sixty million in his
80
1970 address on Cambodia. Finally, Nixon's April 30, 1973
address on Watergate reached a large percentage of his prime
81
time audience of nearly one hundred million viewers. Con­
sequently, all four of these discourses can be categorized as 
truly mass-media apologia. The common exigencies of mass- 
media apologia can provide an excellent basis for strategic 
comparisons. As noted by Rosenfield, such surface similarities 
allow the critic to compare the speeches "in such ways that 
each address serves as a reference standard for the other «"^2
^^Rosenfield, "A Case Study," p. 436.
80Newton N. Minow, John Bartlow Martin, and Lee M. 
Mitchell, Presidential Television (New York: Basic Books,
1973), pp. 59-61, cited in Denis S. Rutkus, "Presidential 
Television," Journal of Communication, 26 (Spring 1976), 77.
p 1
Michael Baruch Grossman and Martha Joynt Kumar, 
Portraying the President (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 240.
82
Rosenfield, "A Case Study," p. 435.
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Additionally, these addresses provide an interesting cross- 
section of modern apologia— from early in Nixon's political 
career (1952) to nearly the end of his presidency (1973).
Hence, this study will analyze these critically important 
examples of Nixon's frequently used ritual of self-defense.
Summary
This first chapter offered a rationale for analyzing 
contemporary apologia as manifested in selected self-defense 
discourses of Richard Nixon. Apologia or the speech of 
self-defense was viewed as a crucial tool for the rhetor who 
chooses to extricate himself/herself from charges of impropriety. 
Since Richard Nixon was a frequent practitioner of such a 
rhetorical tool, four of his critical self-defense addresses 
were selected for analysis. Ware and Linkugel's (1973) self- 
defense criteria were viewed as the most appropriate critical 
system to apply to this apologia. The ultimate goal of this 
system, as it will be used in this study, will be to pursue 
the following research questions;
1. What are the subgenres of apologia apparent in 
Nixon's rhetoric?
2. What are the key apologetic strategies manifested 
in Nixon's rhetoric?
3. What are the recurring and/or significant apologetic 
tactics found in Nixon's rhetoric?
4. What influence did Nixon have on the contemporary 
apologetic genre?
5. What is the utility of Ware and Linkugel's critical 
system?
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Chapter II will provide a detailed analysis of selected 
self-defense rhetoric. Based on the Ware and Linkugel analy­
tic schema,the final chapter will (1) explore the rhetorical 
implications of this generic criticism of apologia, (2) assess 
Nixon's influence on contemporary apologia, (3) critique the 
analytic method selected for this study, and (4) suggest pos­
sible subsequent research.
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CHAPTER II
ANALYSIS OF SELECTED SELF-DEFENSE RHETORIC
This chapter will examine four of Richard Nixon's most 
significant self-defense discourses. Specifically, Ware and 
Linkugel's (1973) critical system will be applied to each 
address, and the following method of analysis will be under­
taken :
1. Relevant previous rhetorical analyses will be noted.
2. The four following strategies of apologia will 
be applied to each speech: denial, bolstering,
differentiation and transcendence,
3. Each discourse will be categorized into one of 
the following subgenres of apologia: absolution, 
vindication, explanation, or justification.
4. After all four speeches have been analyzed in 
accordance to the preceding criteria, the findings 
will be synthesized in summary form.
Mv Side of the Storv
This address was delivered by Nixon on September 23, 
1952, and is frequently labeled the "Checkers" or Fund speech.^
Richard M. Nixon, "My Side of the Story," Vital 
Speeches of the Day, 19 (October 15, 1952), 11-15. See 
Appendix B for a complete text of this address.
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There have been several rhetorical analyses of this address, 
and a brief review of this research will follow. Baskerville 
(1952) believed that Nixon's dominant device of portraying 
himself as a "common man" effectively obscured what should 
have been the essential goal of the address: a defense of 
a position.Assessing the initial reaction of a large parti­
san crowd, Gunderson (1952) noted that Nixon spellbound his 
audience into a pro-Nixon rally. McGuckin (1968) explained
the success of Nixon's speech by noting the frequency with
4
which he identified with American values. Rosenfield (1968) 
observed that Nixon's use of personal revelations, although 
quite effective at the time, could have jeopardized his long­
term political credibility.^ Finally, Gibson and Felkins (1974)
Barnet Baskerville, "The Nixon Affair," in "The Elec­
tion of 1952: A Symposium," ed. Frederick W. Haberman, Quarterly
Journal of Speech. 38 (December 1952), 406-408.
^Robert Gray Gunderson, "Eisenhower on Courage: The
General at Cleveland," in "The Election of 1952: A Symposium,"
ed. Frederick W. Haberman, Quarterly Journal of Speech, 38 
(December 1952), 400-402.
^Henry E. McGuckin, Jr., "A Value Analysis of Richard 
Nixon's 1952 Campaign-Fund Speech," Southern Speech Journal.
33 (Summer 1968), 259-69.
^L. W. Rosenfield, "A Case Study in Speech Criticism:
The Nixon-Truman Analog," Speech Monographs. 35 (November 1968), 
435-50.
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pointed out that Nixon used an extremely redundant, simple, 
and potentially emotional form of language in this speech,^
Thus, this previous research suggests that this address was 
emotion-packed, quiet effective as an immediate apologia, yet 
somewhat lacking in logical proof. However, how does this 
speech measure up when viewed from the genre of apologia?
Since this address has not been analyzed in terms of developed 
self-defense criteria, I will assess this speech relative to 
standards of apologia,
A frequency count of the strategies used in this 
address reveals the following tabulation; one denial strategy, 
nine bolstering strategies, fourteen differentiation strate­
gies, and four transcendental strategies.^ According to Ware 
and Linkugel, one reformative strategy— either denial or bol­
stering— and one transformative strategy— either differentia­
tion or transcendence— should constitute the essential strategic
^James w. Gibson and Patricia K. Felkins, "A Nixon
Lexicon," Western Speech. 38 (Summer 1974), 190-98. 
strategies
n
See Appendix B for a specific breakdown of these
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0
focus of apologia. My analysis would tend to verify their 
observation. That is, the two key strategies of this speech 
are denial and differentiation. This address thus falls into
9
the subgenres of absolution apologia. This does not mean, 
however, that bolstering and transcendental strategies do not 
play a role in this address.
Nixon does use bolstering strategies to identify him­
self with the following positive concepts:^® The Veteran's 
Administration (no. 7), the not so well-to-do (no. 9), the 
heroic World War II American soldier (no. 13), patriotic 
Americans (no. 14), courageous individuals who willingly con­
front adversities (no. 15), Abraham Lincoln (no. 17), the Alger 
Hiss Case (no. 20), the image of Eisenhower (no. 22), and 
people with fighting spirit, such as the Irish (no. 27). 
Furthermore, his transcendental strategies rhetorically join ■ 
Nixon with the following elements: the great office of the
®B. L. Ware and Wil A. Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense 
of Themselves: On the Generic Criticism of Apologia," Quarterly
Journal of Speech, 59 (October 1973), 282.
Q
See Figure 2 for a specific breakdown of these sub­
genres of apologia.
^^The numbers in parenthesis that will follow note the 
number of the strategy as it is listed in Appendix B. This 
notational system will be used throughout the remainder of 
this chapter.
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Vice-Presidency and the necessity of its holder to have the 
confidence of the American people (no. 2), an individual who 
has been subjected to unfair attacks by the media (no. 21), 
peaceful prosperity and honest government (no. 25), and part 
of a ticket that will be good for America (no. 28). As McGuckin 
(1968) has suggested, Nixon does align himself with what he 
believes to be important American values. Obviously these 
bolstering and transcendental strategies are fairly signifi­
cant rhetorical devices ; however, the main thrust of this 
address is most apparent through Nixon's denial and differen­
tiation strategies.
After delineating the charges against him, Nixon 
attempts to deny these charges of impropriety directly;
And now to answer those questions let me say this :
Not one cent of the $18,000 or any other money 
of that type went to me for ray personal use....
It was not a secret fund....
And third, let me point out, and I want to make 
this particularly clear, that no contributor to 
the fund, that no contributor to any of my 
campaign, has ever received any consideration 
that he would not have received as an ordinary 
constituent.
Although these denials encompass only one section of Nixon's 
address, they are a definite negation/denial of the charges
^^Nixon, "My Side of the Story," p. 12
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and thus constitute the essential reformative strategy of 
this discourse. I would argue further that whenever there is 
a clear denial in a self-defense speech that such an obvious 
confrontation of the charge would necessitate its role as the 
main reformative strategy.
The crucial transformative strategies of this address 
are found in Nixon's use of differentiation. These differen­
tiation efforts demonstrate that Nixon rhetorically separates 
himself from the following elements : The Truman Administration
(no. 1), the false charges (no. 3), any personal use of poli­
tical funds (no. 6), improper use of taxpayer's money (no. 8), 
the wealth of Stevenson (no. 16), Stevenson's and Sparkman's 
questionable conduct and lack of disclosure (nos. 18 and 19), 
Stevenson's soft stand on communism (no. 24), and the war and 
dishonesty of the present Democratic administration (no. 25). 
From the previous investigation of bolstering and transcendental 
strategies, it was apparent that Nixon sought to associate 
himself with selected American values. In the analysis of 
differentiation efforts, however, Nixon generally disassociates 
himself from certain elements. I believe that it is this 
disassociation— coupled with his blanket denials of wrong­
doing— that comprise the most telling rhetorical strategies 
here. Moreover, it is not so much what Nixon likens himself
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to, but with what and whom he distinguishes himself from. 
Essentially, there are two forces with which Nixon seeks 
distinction from; (1) the opposing Democratic party and the 
conduct of its leaders, such as Truman, Stevenson, and Spark­
man, and (2) any false charges of impropriety.
In the second sentence of this address Nixon clearly 
begins to draw the battle lines between himself and the Demo­
crats. Thus, in the following passage he challenges the 
integrity of the Truman Administration;
The usual political thing to do when charges are made 
against you is to either ignore them or to deny 
them without giving details.
I believe we've had enough of that in the United 
States, particularly with the present Administra­
tion in Washington. ^
In contrast to this, Nixon states, "The best and only answer 
to a smear or to an honest misunderstanding of the facts is 
to tell the t r u t h . S u b s e q u e n t l y ,  Nixon tells you his 
"side of the case."
Nixon becomes even more specific in his use of dif­
ferentiation strategies as he distinguishes between his con­
duct and that of his Democratic counterpart, John Sparkman.
^^Nixon, "My Side of the Story," p. 11. 
^^Nixon, "My Side of the Story," p. 11.
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In discussing how politicians pay for their political
expenses, Nixon states:
Another way that is used is to put your wife on 
the payroll. Let me say, incidentally, my 
opponent, my opposite number for the Vice Presidency 
on the Democratic ticket, does have his wife on 
the payroll. And has had her on his payroll for 
the ten years— the past ten years.
And I'm proud to say tonight that in the six years 
I've been in the House and Senate of the United 
States, Pat Nixon has never been on the Government
payroll.^4
It is interesting to note this differentiation/counter­
attack strategy that Nixon somehow alludes to in the midst 
of his own self-defense. The Democratic Presidential candi­
date Adlai Stevenson is also subjected to such differentia­
tion techniques. In fact, Stevenson is Nixon's most frequent 
target. The wealth of the Stevenson family and his affilia­
tion with the Truman Administration make him a particularly 
attractive subject for Nixon's differentiation purposes.
After disclosing his own rather modest financial situation, 
Nixon takes a passing differentiation shot at Stevenson:
I believe that it's fine that a man like Governor 
Stevenson who inherited a fortune from his 
father can run for President. But I also feel 
that it's essential in this country of ours that 
a man of modest means can also run for President.
^^Nixon, "My Side of the Story," p. 12.
^^Nixon, "My Side of the Story," p. 14.
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Furthermore, Nixon distinguishes the actions that an
Eisenhower-Nixon Administration would take from those which
Stevenson and Sparkman would pursue relative to their ties
with the Truman Administration:
You wouldn't trust a man who made the mess to clean 
it up— that's Truman. And by the same token you 
can't trust the man who was picked by the man that 
made the mess to clean it up— and that's Stevenson.
And so I say, Eisenhower, who owes nothing to 
Truman, nothing to big city bosses, he is the^^ 
man that can clean up the mess in Washington.
Considering the significance of the issue of Communism
in the early 1950s, Nixon certainly was not going to pass up
the opportunity to make distinctions between Stevenson and
Eisenhower on that subject:
I say that a man who like Mr. Stevenson has 
pooh-poohed and ridiculed the Communist threat 
in the United States— he said that they are 
phantoms among ourselves; he's accused us that 
have attempted to expose the Communists of looking 
in the Bureau of Fisheries and Wildlife— I say 
that a man who says that isn't qualified to be 
President of the United States. And I say that 
the only man who can lead us in this fight to rid 
Government of both those who are Communists and those 
who have corrupted this Government is Eisenhower, 
because Eisenhower, you can be sure, recoanizes the 
problem and he knows how to deal with it.
^^Nixon, "My Side of the Story," p. 14. 
^^Nixon, "My Side of the Story," p. 14.
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The last differentiation strategy relative to Nixon's
opposition is contained in his challenge to his opponents.
After disclosing his own complete financial history, Nixon
questions the propriety of some of Stevenson's and Sparkman's
financial matters. Consequently, Nixon makes the following
recommendation to his Democratic counterparts:
I would suggest that under the circumstances 
both Mr. Sparkman and Mr. Stevenson should 
come before the American people as I have and 
make a complete financial statement as to their 
financial history. And if they don't it will be 
an admission that they have something to hide.^®
Nixon thus differentiates his actions from the actions 
that his opponents should pursue. Overall, Nixon's differen­
tiation strategies separate him from his Democratic rivals 
in four essential aspects: (1) they are affiliated with
the ineffective Truman Administration, while he and Eisenhower 
are not; (2) they (especially Stevenson) are wealthy while 
he is of modest means; (3) they are soft on Communism while 
he and Eisenhower are not; and (4) they refuse to answer 
charges of impropriety while he has the courage to do so.
Next, are the distinctions that Nixon makes relative 
to the charges against him. Nixon uses differentiation
^^Nixon, "My Side of the Story," p. 14.
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strategies as he separates the legal and especially moral
wrongness of the charge into three categories:
I say that it was morally wrong if any of the 
$18,000 went to Senator Nixon for my personal 
use. I say that it was morally wrong if it 
was secretly given and secretly handled. And 
I say that it was morally wrong if any of the 
contributors got special favors for the contri­
butions that they made.^^
As previously noted, following this delineation of
the charges at hand, Nixon makes clear denials of each issue
in question. Within these denials, Nixon makes an important
differentiation between personal use of these funds and
using them for political expenses. He states, "Every penny
of it was used to pay for political expenses that I did not
think should be charged to the taxpayers of the United States.
Moreover, Nixon offers a detailed differentiation between
proper and improper senatorial use of taxpayer's money. He
concludes, "The taxpayers shouldn't be required to finance
items which are not official business but which are primarily
21
political business." Finally, Nixon differentiates between
^^Nixon, "My Side of the Story," p. 12.
^®Nixon, "My Side of the Story," p. 12.
^^Nixon, "My Side of the Story," p. 12.
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deceiving the taxpayers into paying for primarily political 
business, and what he has done— using willing contributors' 
money.
Thus, Nixon separates the wrongness of the charges 
against him into three categories which he then denies in 
terms of any personal wrongdoing. His distinction between 
personal and political expenses is worth noting. According 
to Nixon all he did was to allow willing contributors to pay 
for these political expenses so as not to burden unwilling 
taxpayers.
In sum, this 1952 apologia can be categorized as an 
address of absolution in which the speaker seeks acquittal 
of those charges levied against his character. Although bol­
stering and transcendental devices were used in this speech, 
Nixon relied primarily on denial and differentiation strate­
gies. After differentiating the charges against him, Nixon 
denied them rather directly. After these initial denials, 
Nixon used a series of differentiation strategies that 
separated him from the charges and especially his Democratic 
opposition. Moreover, the most noticeable device of this
22
Nixon, "My Side of the Story," p. 12.
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address seemed to be that of differentiation through com­
parison, that is, they are in the wrong while we are in the 
right. Rosenfield (1968) noted this phenomenon as he observed 
"Nixon's habit of joining off-handed insults of the opposi-
23tion with knight-in-shining-armor depictions of him and his."
In conclusion, this apologia can be labeled as an example of 
the "rhetoric of contrast." For although bolstering, trans­
cendental, and denial methods are used, the essential strategy
is differentiation in terms of separating or distinguishing
24
Nixon from his opposition.
A Vietnam Plan 
This address was delivered by Nixon on November 3, 1969 
and is often referred to as the "silent majority" s p e e c h . 25 
A brief review of relevant previous rhetorical analyses will 
follow. Newman (1970) did not believe that Nixon met the 
higher standards that Presidential addresses demand and that 
neither his rhetorical strategies nor his substantive arguments
^^Rosenfield, "A Case Study," p. 441.
24?his speech could also be viewed as somewhat of 
an address of vindication since Nixon often alludes to his 
greater worth relative to the worth of his accusers. See 
Figure 2 for further distinctions within the subgenres of 
apologia.
^^Richard M. Nixon, "A Vietnam Plan," Vital Speeches of 
the Day, 36 (November 15, 1969), 66-70. See Appendix C for a 
complete text of this address.
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26
were sound. Stelzner (1971) assessed Nixon's "quest for
peace" theme in this address as a failure because his ideas
2 7were unimaginative and did not confront the key issues.
King and Anderson (1971) characterized this discourse as 
representative of Nixon's rhetoric of polarization, that is,
attempting to create a solidarity while also creating a common
28foe. Campbell (1972) accused Nixon of misrepresenting his
29opposition and avoiding the real issues that confront America. 
However, Hill's (1972) neo-Aristotelian analysis found Nixon's 
address to be quite successful in choosing the available means 
of persuasion.Therefore, this previous research suggests 
that this address was possibly lacking in substance, somewhat 
of a polarizing phenomenon, out of touch with some of the crucial
^^Robert P. Newman, "Under the Veneer: Nixon's Vietnam
Speech of November 3, 1969," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 56 
(April 1970), 168-178.
27Herman G. Stelzner, "The Quest Story and Nixon's 
November 3, 1959 Address," Quarterly Journal of Speech. 57 
(April 1971), 163-172.
28
Andrew A. King and Floyd Douglas Anderson, "Nixon, 
Agnew, and the 'Silent Majority': A Case Study in the Rhetoric
of Polarization," Western Speech, 35 (Fall 1971), 243-55.
29
Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, Critiques of Contemporary 
Rhetoric (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company,
Inc., 1971), pp. 50-57.
^Oporbes Hill, "Conventional Wisdom— Traditional Form—  
The President's Message of November 3, 1969," Quarterly Journal 
of Speech, 58 (December 1971), 373-85.
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issues, but perhaps successful in terms of Aristotle's notion 
of persuasion. The diversity of this research— particularly 
the discrepancy in Campbell and Hill's findings— is further 
proof of the need for more objectivity and consistency in one's 
critical method. I believe that the Ware and Linkugel system 
relies less on subjectivity and more on the rigor of their 
critical method. Accordingly, I will assess this address by 
analyzing specific strategies of the genre of apologia.
A frequency count of the strategies used in this address
reveals the following tabulation: five bolstering strategies,
sixteen differentiation strategies, and thirteen transcendental 
31strategies. Clearly, the key reformative strategy in this 
address is that of bolstering. Since there are no clear 
denials of charges in this address, this is an easy decision 
to reach. However, the key transformative strategy is some­
what more difficult to discern. Although there are almost as 
many transcendental strategies as differentiation strategies, 
Nixon's essential strategic focus is again best viewed through 
his use of differentiation. Nixon's transcendental strategies
^^See Appendix C for a specific breakdown of these
strategies.
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are noteworthy, but they serve to provide fairly common 
patriotic appeals.
More specifically, Nixon's transcendental efforts
g n
rhetorically join him with the following concepts the 
future peace and freedom of the world (nos. 2 and 15), pro­
moting confidence in American leadership (no. 7), loyalty to 
friends in need (no. 9), halting world conquest, violence, 
and more war (no. 9), preventing future Vietnaras (no. 14), 
protecting the American spirit (no. 21), the historical strength 
of our nation in times of crisis (no. 22), concern with our 
historical principles of freedom (no. 24), and continuing 
to lead the United States in providing hope for the free 
world (no. 30). Although these transcendental strategies are 
interesting, they are commonly used rhetorical ploys appealing 
to freedom and Americanism. I would argue that it is through 
Nixon's differentiation strategies that the main thrust of 
his message is revealed. These differentiation strategies 
will be examined after analyzing Nixon's use of bolstering.
Since the two key strategies of this address are bolstering
32The numbers in parenthesis that will follow note 
the number of the strategy as it is listed in Appendix C.
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and differentiation, this speech can he categorized as
q o
explanative apologia.
Nixon's essential reformative strategy of bolstering 
serves to identify him with four important elements: those
who have been critical of the way the war was conducted—  
particularly by the Johnson Administration (no. 5), an admini­
stration with fewer war casualties (no, 26), past Presidents 
of the United States (nos. 8 and 33), and the actual office 
of the Presidency (no. 34). As Nixon identifies himself 
with those who have been critical of the way the war was 
conducted, he rhetorically becomes somewhat of a victim of 
circumstances :
Now many believe that President Johnson's decision 
to send American combat forces to South Vietnam 
was wrong, and many others, I among them, have been 
strongly critical of the way the war has been 
conducted.
But the question facing us today is— now that we 
are in the war, what is the best way to end it.
By using this bolstering strategy and identifying
himself with those who have been critical of the previous
administration's war policies, Nixon attempts to enhance his
credibility by making the Vietnam War Johnson's war and not his,
33See Figure 2 for a specific breakdown of these sub- 
genres of apologia.
^^Nixon, "A Vietnam Plan," p. 66.
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In fact, Nixon points out he was indeed critical of the
handling of the war and that all he can do now is to try and
rectify these wrongs. Thus, Nixon rhetorically creates himself 
as a rather tragic figure thrust into a bad situation that he 
had nothing to do with. Nixon further attempts to bolster 
his image by identifying his administration with fewer war 
casualties. IVhen discussing the sorrow of reconciling Ameri­
can war casualities, Nixon ingeniously alludes to a bolstering 
device :
This week I will have to sign S3 letters to mothers,
fathers, wives and loved ones of men who have
given their lives for America in Vietnam.
It is very little satisfaction to me that this is 
only one-third as many letters as I signed the 
first week in o f f i c e .  ^
In this passage, Nixon makes it clear to his audience that the
war was much worse before he took over. Hence,Nixon emerges
from a tragic figure to a heroic figure who is trying to save
American lives.
Although Nixon plainly disassociates himself from
Johnson, he also identifies with Johnson and other Presidents
when it fits his bolstering purposes. In the following
passage Nixon identifies his conclusions on the Vietnam
^^Nixon, "A Vietnam Plan," p. 69.
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situation with those reached by previous Presidents Kennedy,
Eisenhower, and Johnson;
Three American Presidents have recognized the great 
stakes involved in Vietnam and understood what had 
to be done. In 1963 President Kennedy with his 
characteristic eloquence and clarity said we want 
to see a stable Government there, carrying on the 
struggle to maintain its national independence.... 
President Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed 
the same conclusion during their terms of office.
Here, Nixon seems to be bolstering his decision-making ability 
by identifying his conclusions on Vietnam with those of his 
predecessors. I can understand his use of bolstering/identi­
fication efforts relative to Kennedy and Eisenhower. However, 
Nixon clearly indicts Johnson's Vietnam policy and then turns 
around and identifies with his conclusions on Vietnam. This 
would seem to constitute inconsistent use of bolstering/iden­
tification strategies, that is, shifting association and disas- 
sociation when rhetorically convenient. Nevertheless, Nixon 
demonstrates obvious bolstering strategies as he seeks to 
identify his plight with that of Woodrow Wilson and other 
peace-seeking American Presidents:
Fifty years ago, in this room, and at this very 
desk. President Woodrow Wilson spoke words which
36Nixon, "A Vietnam Plan," p. 67.
54
caught the imagination of a war-weary world. He 
said; 'This is the war to end wars...' I have 
initiated a plan which will end this war in a way 
that will bring us closer to that great goal to 
which Woodrow Wilson and every American President 
in our history has been dedicated— the goal of a 
just and lasting peace.
Finally, Nixon expands his bolstering technique of presidential 
association as he alludes to his own presidential responsi­
bilities, and thus identifies himself with this most powerful 
office. In concluding this address, Nixon reasserts the im­
portance of America's goal for peace and states, "As President 
I hold the responsibility for choosing the best path for that
3p
goal and then leading the nation along it."
The most significant transformative strategies of this 
speech are apparent in Nixon's use of differentiation. An 
analysis of these differentiation devices reveals that Nixon 
rhetorically separates himself from the following elements: 
the easy course of action— immediate withdrawal (nos. 1 and
19), preoccupation with his own re-election (no. 3), compromising 
the freedom of the South Vietnamese (no. 10), the uncooperative 
nature of the North Vietnamese (no. 11), the individuals respon­
sible for the failure to negotiate— the North Vietnamese (no. 13),
3?Nixon, "A Vietnam Plan," pp. 59-70,
^^Nixon, "A Vietnam Plan," p. 70.
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the approach taken toward the Vietnam War by the Johnson 
Administration (no, 16), threat appeals to the North Viet­
namese (no. 18), nonconstructive pursuits of the youth (no. 28), 
the vocal minority (no. 31), and dissension among Americans 
leading to a self-inflicted defeat (no. 32). Nixon thus disas­
sociates himself from a number of diverse issues. I will 
attempt to illustrate some of Nixon's more noteworthy disas- 
sociations.
One of the first apparent differentiation strategies
of this discourse is Nixon's attempt to disassociate himself
with taking the easy way out of the Vietnam dilemma:
In view of these circumstances, there were some 
who urged that I end the war at once by ordering 
the immediate withdrawal of all American forces.
From a political standpoint, this would have been 
a popular and easy course to follow. After all, 
we became involved in the war while ray predecessor 
was in office. I could blame the defeat, which would 
be the result of my action, on him— and come out as 
the peacemaker.
Some put it to me quite bluntly: this was the only
way to avoid allowing Johnson's war to become 
Nixon's war. But I had a greater obligation...
Nixon thus differentiates between the easy course of action
that some people have told him to pursue— immediate withdrawal
39
Nixon, "A Vietnam Plan," p. 66.
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o f  a l l  A m e r ic a n  f o r c e s — a n d  w h a t  h e  b e l i e v e d  t o  b e  h i s  
g r e a t e r  o b l i g a t i o n — t h e  f u t u r e  o f  p e a c e  a n d  f re e d o m  i n  t h e  
w o r l d .  L a t e r  i n  t h i s  a d d r e s s  N ix o n  o n c e  a g a in  a l l u d e s  t o  t h e
d i f f i c u l t y  o f  h i s  t a s k ,  " I  h a v e  c h o s e n  t h i s  s e c o n d  c o u r s e .
40
I t  i s  n o t  t h e  e a s y  w a y .  I t  i s  t h e  r i g h t  w a y ."  I n  m any
w a y s , N ix o n  r h e t o r i c a l l y  p e r s o n i f i e s  t h e  b a s i c  P u r i t a n  w o rk
e t h i c ,  t h a t  i s ,  i f  i t  i s  e a s y  i t  c a n ' t  b e  w o r t h w h i l e .
A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  N ix o n  d i f f e r e n t i a t e s  h e r e  b e tw e e n  t h e
im p o r t a n c e  o f  b e in g  r e - e l e c t e d  a n d  h i s  g r e a t e r  o b l i g a t i o n
r e l a t i v e  t o  w o r ld  p e a c e .  A f t e r  a c k n o w le d g in g  t h e  f a c t  t h a t
a  c o m p le te  w i t h d r a w a l  w o u ld  b e  t h e  p o p u la r  p o l i t i c a l  t h i n g
t o  d o , N ix o n  s t a t e s :
B u t  I  h a d  a  g r e a t e r  o b l i g a t i o n  t h a n  t o  t h i n k  o n ly  
o f  t h e  y e a r s  o f  my A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  a n d  o f  t h e  n e x t  
e l e c t i o n .  I  h a d  t o  t h i n k  o f  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  my 
d e c i s i o n  on  t h e  n e x t  g e n e r a t i o n ,  a n d  on t h e  f u t u r e ^ ^  
o f  p e a c e  a n d  f r e e d o m  i n  A m e r ic a ,  a n d  i n  t h e  w o r l d .
H e n c e ,  N ix o n  t e l l s  h i s  a u d ie n c e  t h a t  i t  i s  m o re  im p o r ­
t a n t  f o r  h im  t o  do  w h a t  i s  r i g h t  t h a n  t o  do  w h a t  i s  p o l i t i c a l l y  
p o p u la r — t h u s  i n s u r i n g  h i s  r e - e l e c t i o n .  N i x o n 's  p o i n t  h e r e  
i s  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  b e tw e e n  t h e  r i g h t  c o u r s e  o f  a c t i o n  and m e re
^^Nixon, "A Vietnam Plan," p. 69.
^^Nixon, "A Vietnam Plan," p. 66.
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political appeasement. However, as a differentiation strategy 
this is a counter-productive device. Moreover, Nixon is call­
ing attention to the fact that he has thought about the 1972 
election. In spite of his attempt to differentiate political 
considerations from the proper course of action, the nature of 
this distinction itself indicates that Nixon is most aware 
of its political ramifications. Furthermore, when this speech 
was delivered, Nixon had only been in office for a mere ten 
months. Consequently, any reference to his upcoming re-election 
influencing his decision-making would seem quite inappropriate 
and thus motivationally suspect.
In terms of specific target groups that Nixon seeks 
to distinguish himself from, there are three worth noting:
(1) the uncooperative North Vietnamese, (2) the Johnson Admini­
stration, and (3) the "vocal minority." First Nixon clearly 
differentiates between the cooperativeness of the United States 
and the uncooperativeness of North Vietnam:
At the Paris peace conference Ambassador Lodge has 
demonstrated our flexibility and good faith in 40 
public meetings. Hanoi has refused even to discuss 
our proposals. They demand our unconditional accep­
tance of their terras which are that we withdraw all 
American forces immediately and unconditionally and
that we overthrow the Government of South Vietnam 
49
as we leave.
'^^Nixon, "A Vietnam Plan," p. 57.
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Nixon goes one step further and differentiates the 
question as to who is at fault for the failure of negotiations. 
He believes that he has demonstrated that it is not the United 
States, not the South Vietnamese, but the North Vietnamese.
He states, "The obstacle is the other side's absolute refusal 
to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just 
p e a c e . I n  addition to this, Nixon reads a letter that he 
sent to Ho Chi Minh expressing his strong desire for peace. 
Nixon summarizes the response from Ho Chi Mnh, "It simply 
reiterated the public position North Vietnam had taken at 
Paris and flatly rejected my initiative. Obviously, Nixon 
views North Vietnam's attitude as the ultimate obstacle in his 
quest for peace. Moreover, his differentiation strategies 
definitely portray them as opposing his sincere efforts for 
peace.
Another important differentiation strategy that Nixon 
pursues is that of distinguishing the approach that was taken 
toward the Vietnam war by the Johnson Administration from the
^^Nixon, " A Vietnam Plan," p. 58. 
^^Nixon, "A Vietnam Plan," p. 67.
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a p p r o a c h  t a k e n  b y  h i s  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  I n  e x p l a i n i n g  h i s  
V i e t n a m i z a t i o n  p l a n  N ix o n  s t a t e s  ;
I n  t h e  p r e v io u s  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  w e A m e r ic a n iz e d  
t h e  w a r  i n  V ie t n a m .  I n  t h i s  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  we 
a r e  V i e t n a m i z i n g  t h e  s e a r c h  f o r  p e a c e .  T h e  
p o l i c y  o f  t h e  p r e v io u s  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  n o t  o n ly  
r e s u l t e d  i n  o u r  a s s u m in g  t h e  p r im a r y  r e s p o n ­
s i b i l i t y  f o r  f i g h t i n g  t h e  w a r ,  b u t  e v e n  m o re  
s i g n i f i c a n t  d id  n o t  a d e q u a t e ly  s t r e s s  t h e  g o a l  
o f  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  t h e  S o u th  V ie tn a m e s e  so  t h a t  
t h e y  c o u ld  d e fe n d  th e m s e lv e s  w h en  we l e f t .
N ix o n  seem s t o  b e  r e m in d in g  h i s  a u d ie n c e  o n c e  a g a in  t h a t  t h i s  
b a d  V ie tn a m  s i t u a t i o n  w a s  r e a l l y  p e r p e t u a t e d  b y  h i s  p r e d e c e s ­
s o r  an d  t h a t  N ix o n  i s  t r y i n g  t o  t u r n  i t  a r o u n d .  A g a in ,  i t ' s  
J o h n s o n 's  w a r ,  n o t  N ix o n 's  w a r .  T h a t  i s ,  N ix o n  h a s  b e e n  p u t  
i n t o  a b a d  s i t u a t i o n  n o t  o f  h i s  own m a k in g .  H is  r h e t o r i c a l  
r e s p o n s e ,  h o w e v e r ,  t o  t h i s  b a d  s i t u a t i o n  i s  " p e a c e  w i t h  h o n o r " 
b y  l e t t i n g  t h e  S o u th  V ie tn a m e s e  f i g h t  in s t e a d  o f  A m e r ic a n s .  
N ix o n 's  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  fro m  t h e  J o h n s o n  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  r e l a ­
t i v e  t o  h i s  s e l f - s e r v i n g  m a n ip u la t io n  o f  la n g u a g e  i s  s e e m in g ly  
u n f a i r .  F o r  e x a m p le ,  h e  c h a r a c t e r i z e s  t h e  p r e v io u s  a d m i n i s t r a ­
t i o n  a s  " A m e r ic a n iz in g  t h e  w a r  i n  V ie t n a m ."  C o n v e r s e ly ,  N ix o n 's  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i s  " V ie t n a m iz in g  t h e  s e a r c h  f o r  p e a c e . "
45
Nixon, "A Vietnam Plan," p. 68.
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This is an interesting linguistic differentiation that 
somehow chastises his predecessor while exonerating Nixon.
Having directed his blame-placing differentiation 
strategies toward the North Vietnamese and the Johnson Admini­
stration, Nixon differentiates public reaction to the situation 
at hand. This is Nixon's famous appeal to the "great silent 
majority" versus the "vocal minority." In discussing antiwar 
activists, "who hold that point of view and try to impose it 
on the nation by mounting demonstrations in the street,"
Nixon states:
If a vocal minority, however fervent its cause, 
prevails over reason and the will of the majority, 
this nation has no future as a free society....
So tonight, to you, the great silent majorit^^of 
my fellow Americans, I ask for your support.
There are several things worth noting here relative
to previous research. As King and Anderson (1971) point out,
this sort of differentiation of public reaction clearly creates
47
a polarizing phenomenon within Nixon's audience. The antiwar 
protestors are viewed as the "vocal minority;" everyone else 
is a part of Nixon's "great silent majority.” This is a
^^Nixon, "A Vietnam Plan," p. 69.
^^King and Anderson, "Nixon, Agnew, and the 'Silent
Majority,'" pp. 243-55.
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curious distinction. In a participatory democracy such as 
the United States, silence or Lack of involvement is not 
generally looked upon as a positive quality. In fact, some­
times silence or apathy is seen as just the opposite. However, 
in Nixon's conceptualization of the "great silent majority," 
these are the silent unsung heroes who constitute the will 
of the majority. Again, Nixon's differentiation strategies 
are interesting, but not altogether convincing or realistic 
to the discerning listener.
Campbell's (1972) observation that Nixon misrepresented
48
his opponents is also applicable here. Specifically, is it 
fair to say that all antiwar protestors "impose" their will 
on others? Are they not merely exercising their particular 
freedom of expression? Of course, acts of violence can be 
viewed as an imposition on others, but not the mere war demon­
strations that Nixon often alludes to in this address.
Nixon's final differentiation effort distinguishes the 
possible reasons for an American defeat in Vietnam: "Let us
be united against defeat. Because let us understand— North 
Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States.
48Campbell, Critiques of Contemporary Rhetoric, pp. 50-57,
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Only Americans can do that." In this differentiation, Nixon 
expands his scolding of the "vocal minority." Moreover, if 
they do not "toe the line" they, in fact, will cause America's 
ultimate downfall as a result of internal dissension. This 
is another rather perplexing appeal for a democratic society, 
is Nixon suggesting that Americans should close their eyes and 
totally acquiesce to his Vietnam solutions? If not, according 
to Nixon, Americans themselves will cause their own defeat or 
humiliation. The rhetorical tone of Nixon's differentiation 
of defeat thus assumes an almost threatening stance. This 
appears to be an inappropriate and ineffective tone for such 
an important Presidential address.
In summary, this 1969 speech on the Vietnam War can 
be categorized as an explanative address in which the speaker 
seeks to eliminate condemnation by providing a clearer under­
standing of the situation. Although patriotic transcendental 
strategies were used in this speech, Nixon relied primarily 
on bolstering and differentiation. Nixon's bolstering strate­
gies attempted to enhance his credibility by identifying him 
with those who have been critical of the way Johnson mishandled
^^Nixon, "A Vietnam Plan," p. 69.
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t h e  w a r ,  an d  h e  a ls o  i d e n t i f i e s  h i m s e l f  w i t h  h i s  own p o w e r ­
f u l  o f f i c e  o f  t h e  p r e s id e n c y .  N ix o n 's  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  s t r a t e ­
g ie s  s e r v e  tw o  g e n e r a l  p u r p o s e s .  F i r s t ,  t h e y  s e r v e  t o  a g g r a n ­
d i z e  h i s  d e c is io n - m a k in g  a b i l i t y  b y  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  t h e  p r o p e r  
V ie tn a m  d e c i s i o n  f ro m  t h e  e a s y  o r  p o l i t i c a l l y  m o t iv a t e d  d e c i ­
s i o n .  S e c o n d , th e s e  s t r a t e g i e s  d i r e c t  t h e  b l a m e - p la c in g  o f  
t h e  V ie tn a m  s i t u a t i o n  on t h e  J o h n s o n  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  t h e  
u n c o o p e r a t iv e  N o r t h  V ie tn a m e s e ,  an d  d i s s e n t i n g  A m e r ic a n s  
l a b e l e d  t h e  " v o c a l  m i n o r i t y . "  I n  t h i s  d is c o u r s e ,  a s  i n  t h e  
p r e v io u s  1952 N ix o n  a d d r e s s ,  i t  w o u ld  a p p e a r  t h a t  d i f f e r e n ­
t i a t i o n  i s  o n c e  a g a in  N ix o n 's  m o s t t e l l i n g  a p o lo g ia  s t r a t e g y .  
M o r e o v e r ,  N ix o n  s p e n d s  c o n s id e r a b le  t im e  an d  e f f o r t  d i s t i n ­
g u is h in g  h i s  V ie tn a m  d e c is io n s  fro m  t h e  a c t i o n s  o f  h i s  p r e ­
d e c e s s o r s  an d  h i s  o p p o s i t i o n .
C am b o d ia
This address was delivered by Nixon on April 30, 1970, 
and was necessary following Nixon's decision to send American 
troops into C a m b o d i a . T h e r e  have been several rhetorical
Richard M. Nixon, "Cambodia," Vital Speeches of the 
Dav, 35 (May 15, 1970), 450-52. See Appendix D for a complete 
text of this address.
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analyses of this speech, and a brief review of their findings 
will follow. Gonchar and Hahn (1971) believed that Nixon's 
great personal kinship with the office of the Presidency and 
his very strong concept of leadership were especially apparent 
in this s p e e c h . G r e g g  and Hauser (1973) concluded that 
Nixon's fundamental strategies of humiliation and self-pity
52had no place in the announcement of a military undertaking. 
Cushman (1974) observed that Nixon's so-called public justifi­
cation for committing troops to Cambodia did not really reveal
53the grounds for his decisions. Carpenter and Seltzer (1974) 
asserted that Nixon's militaristic tone in this address could 
have been influenced by his fascination with the motion picture 
Patton. F i n a l l y ,  Church (1977) contended that this speech
^^Ruth M. Gonchar and Dan F. Hahn, "The Rhetorical Predict­
ability of Richard H. Nixon," Today's Speech. 19 (Fall 1971), 3-13.
^^Richard B. Gregg and Gerard A. Hauser, "Richard Nixon's 
April 30, 1970 Address on Cambodia: The 'Ceremony' of Confron­
tation," Speech Monographs, 40 (August 1973), 167-181.
C O
Donald P. Cushman, "A Comparative Study of President 
Truman's and President Nixon's Justifications for Committing 
Troops to Combat in Korea and Cambodia," DAI. 36 (1975),
7429A (The University of Wisconsin— Madison).
^^Ronald H. Carpenter and Robert V. Seltzer, "Nixon,
Patton, and a 'Silent Majority' Sentiment About the Vietnam 
War: The Cinematographic Bases of a Rhetorical Stance,"
Central States Speech Journal. 25 (Summer 1974), 105-110.
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w as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  N i x o n 's  c r i s i s  r h e t o r i c  w h ic h  w as
g e n e r a l l y  b a s e d  o n  h i g h l y  v a lu e d  p r i n c i p l e s  a n d  b l a m e - p l a c i n g
. . 55devices.
T h u s , t h i s  p r e v io u s  r e s e a r c h  s u g g e s ts  t h a t  t h i s  s p e e c h  
w as d e p e n d e n t  u p o n  a  h i g h l y  p e r s o n a l i z e d  v ie w  o f  t h e  P r e s i ­
d e n c y , i n a p p r o p r i a t e  a p p e a ls ,  i l l u s i v e  r e a s o n in g ,  a  m i l i t a r ­
i s t i c  t o n e ,  a n d  n u m e ro u s  v a lu e  ju d g m e n ts  e s p e c i a l l y  r e l a t i v e  
t o  b l a m e - p l a c i n g .  A g a in ,  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  t h e  f o r t h c o m in g  
a n a l y s i s  w i l l  b e  t o  a s s e s s  t h i s  a d d r e s s  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  t o  
d e v e lo p e d  s e l f - d e f e n s e  c r i t e r i a .  I n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  w h a t  a r e  
t h e  k e y  s t r a t e g i e s  o f  t h i s  a d d r e s s  w h en  v ie w e d  fro m  t h e  g e n r e  
o f  a p o lo g ia ?  T h e r e f o r e ,  i t  i s  my i n t e n t i o n  t o  p o s s i b l y  r e p l i ­
c a t e  t h e s e  p r e v io u s  f i n d i n g s  b u t  p e r h a p s  a l s o  go b e y o n d  th e m  
i n  d i s c e r n i n g  s p e c i f i c  a p o lo g ia  s t r a t e g i e s .
A f r e q u e n c y  c o u n t  o f  t h e  s t r a t e g i e s  u s e d  i n  t h i s  a d d r e s s  
r e v e a l s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t a b u l a t i o n :  f o u r  b o l s t e r i n g  s t r a t e g i e s ,
t w e lv e  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  s t r a t e g i e s ,  a n d  e i g h t  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  
56
s t r a t e g i e s .  O b v io u s ly ,  t h e  k e y  r e f o r m a t i v e  s t r a t e g y  i n  t h i s
55Russell T. Church, "President Richard M. Nixon's Crisis 
Rhetoric, 1969-1970." DAI, 37 (1977), 7402A-7403A (Temple 
University).
^^See Appendix D for a specific breakdown of these 
strategies.
66
speech is that of bolstering. As in the previous speech, 
there, are no actual denials of charges in this address. Since 
there are a significant number of both differentiation and 
transcendental devices, the key transformative strategy is 
a bit more difficult to pinpoint. Although there are a near 
comparable number of differentiation and transcendental strate­
gies in this address, Nixon differentiation efforts prove to 
be the most revealing of his fundamental strategic focus.
O nce a g a in ,  N i x o n 's  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  s t r a t e g i e s  p r o v id e  i n t e r e s t ­
in g  b u t  f a i r l y  common p a t r i o t i c  a p p e a l s .
Specifically, Nixon's transcendental strategies rhetori­
cally join Nixon with the following n o t i o n s w i n n i n g  a just 
peace (no. 5), defending the security of American military 
men (no. 10), making decisions that go beyond all the diverse 
opinions on the Vietnam situation (no. 22), and the future 
of peace and freedom for the world (no. 23). The preceding 
transcendental strategies are worth noting; however, they do 
represent well-worn patriotic appeals for peace and freedom. 
Clearly, it is through Nixon's differentiation efforts that
57The numbers in parenthesis that will follow note 
the number of the strategy as it is listed in Appendix D.
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the audience can truly gain insight into his essential rhetori­
cal strategies. These differentiation strategies will be 
discussed following an analysis of Nixon's use of bolstering. 
Since this address relies primarily on bolstering and dif­
ferentiation strategies, it can be categorized as explanative 
apologia.
Nixon's fundamental reformative strategy of bolstering 
serves to identify him with following elements; slowing down 
the war (no. 5), commander and chief of American armed forces 
(no. 11), a President who keeps his promises (no. 17), and 
other decision-making Presidents (no. 18). After describing 
the war in southeast Asia as he sees it and his decision to 
send American troops into Cambodia, Nixon alludes to bolstering 
strategies as he identifies the peace-seeking initiatives of 
his administration:
Let's look again at the record.
We stopped the bombing in North Vietnam. We have 
cut air operations by over 20 percent. We've 
announced the withdrawal of over 250,000 of our men. 
We've offered to withdraw all of our men if they 
will withdraw theirs.
^^See Figure 2 for a specific breakdown of the sub­
genres of apologia. 
59Nixon, "Cambodia," p. 451.
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Although Nixon is also attempting to show that the
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  i s  s lo w in g  down t h e  w a r  w h i l e  N o r t h  V ie tn a m
r e f u s e s  t o  d o  s o , N ix o n  p l a i n l y  i d e n t i f i e s  h i m s e l f  a s  a s i n c e r e
p e a c e - s e e k e r . H o w e v e r , N ix o n  d o e s  n o t  h e s i t a t e  t o  i d e n t i f y
h i m s e l f  a s  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s '  n u m b er o n e  p e a c e - d e f e n d e r . N ix o n
b o l s t e r s  h i s  im a g e  a s  a p o w e r f u l  l e a d e r  a s  h e  s t a t e s ,  " I  s h a l l
m e e t  my r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  a s  com m ander i n  c h i e f  o f  o u r  a rm e d
f o r c e s  t o  t a k e  t h e  a c t i o n  I  c o n s id e r  n e c e s s a r y  t o  d e fe n d  t h e
s e c u r i t y  o f  o u r  A m e r ic a n  m e n ." ^ ^  T h u s , N i x o n 's  b o l s t e r i n g
s t r a t e g i e s  r e v e a l  t h a t  h e  w i l l  b e  c o n c i l i a t o r y  t o  a  p o i n t ,
b u t  t h a t  h e  h a s  t h e  P r e s i d e n t i a l  p o w e r t o  t a k e  m i l i t a r y
a c t i o n  i f  n e c e s s a r y .
N ix o n  m akes  a n  a t t e m p t  a t  a n o t h e r  b o l s t e r i n g  d e v ic e
a s  h e  i d e n t i f i e s  h i m s e l f  a s  a  P r e s id e n t  w ho k e e p s  h i s  p r o m is e s :
D u r in g  my c a m p a ig n  f o r  t h e  P r e s id e n c y ,  I  p le d g e d  
t o  b r i n g  A m e r ic a n s  home fro m  V ie t n a m .  T h e y  a r e  
c o m in g  h o m e . I  p ro m is e d  t o  en d  t h i s  w a r .  I
s h a l l  k e e p  t h a t  p r o m is e .  I  p r o m is e d  to ^ Y ^ r i a
j u s t  p e a c e .  I  s h a l l  k e e p  t h a t  p r o m is e .
C o n s id e r in g  t h a t  N ix o n  h a s  j u s t  a n n o u n c e d  an  A m e r ic a n  m i l i t a r y
in v a s io n  o f  s o r t s  i n t o  C a m b o d ia , I  am r a t h e r  p e r p le x e d  a s  t o
^^Nixon, "Cambodia," p. 451.
^^Nixon, "Cambodia," p. 452.
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w h y  h e  a l s o  c h o s e  t o  r e m in d  A m e r ic a n s  o f  h i s  c a m p a ig n  p r o m is e  
o f  p e a c e .  P e rh a p s  t h i s  s o r t  o f  i n e f f e c t i v e  b o l s t e r i n g  s e r v e d  
t o  f u r t h e r  i n s t i g a t e  t h e  n u m e ro u s  a n t i w a r  p r o t e s t s  t h a t  
o c c u r r e d  a f t e r  t h e  d e l i v e r y  o f  t h i s  a d d r e s s . N i x o n ' s  
s e e m in g ly  e m p ty  a p p e a ls  c o u ld  h a v e  t o t a l l y  f r u s t r a t e d  h i s  
a l r e a d y  d i s c o n t e n t  a n t i w a r  a u d ie n c e .
N ix o n  c o m p le te s  h i s  b o l s t e r i n g  e f f o r t s  a s  h e  i d e n t i ­
f i e s  h i s  d e c i s i o n  w i t h  o t h e r  s i g n i f i c a n t  d e c is io n s  m ade b y  
f o r m e r  P r e s i d e n t s ;
I n  t h i s  g r e a t  ro o m , W oodrow  W i ls o n  m ade t h e  
g r e a t  d e c i s i o n  w h ic h  l e d  t o  v i c t o r y  i n  W o r ld  
W a r I .
F r a n k l i n  R o o s e v e l t  m ade t h e  d e c is io n s  w h ic h  le d  
t o  o u r  v i c t o r y  i n  W o r ld  W a r I I .
D w ig h t  D . E is e n h o w e r  m ade d e c is io n s  w h ic h  e n d e d  t h e  
w a r  i n  K o r e a  a n d  a v o id e d  w a r  i n  t h e  M id d le  E a s t .
J o h n  P .  K e n n e d y  i n  h i s  f i n e s t  h o u r  m ade t h e  g r e a t  
d e c i s i o n  w h ic h  re m o v e d  S o v ie t  m i s s i l e s  fro m  C uba  
a n d  t h e  w e s t e r n  h e m is p h e r e .® ^
O b v io u s ly ,  N ix o n  h a s  c a r e f u l l y  s e l e c t e d  th o s e  P r e s id e n t s  whom
h e  w is h e s  t o  i d e n t i f y  h i m s e l f  w i t h .  By d o in g  s o , N ix o n  s u b t l y
Students and faculty involved in the May 4 Kent State 
tragedy specifically mentioned Nixon's speech when trying to 
analyze the causes leading to that event. See James Michener, 
Kent State: What Happened and >#iv (New York; Random House,
1971), pp. 13, 135, and 253, cited in Gregg and Hauser, "Richard 
Nixon's April 30, 1970 Address," p. 168.
^^Nixon, "Cambodia," p. 452.
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r e m in d s  h i s  a u d ie n c e  a n d  h i m s e l f  t h a t  h e ,  i n  f a c t ,  i s  now  
t h e  h o l d e r  o f  t h i s  p o w e r f u l  o f f i c e .  A l s o ,  t h i s  mode o f  P r e s i ­
d e n t i a l  a s s o c i a t i o n  a d d s  a s e n s e  o f  h i s t o r i c a l  d i g n i t y  t o  
N i x o n 's  d e c is io n - m a k in g  s i t u a t i o n  a t  h a n d .  T h is  p a r t i c u l a r  
b o l s t e r i n g  s t r a t e g y  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  a  r e c u r r i n g  d e v ic e  i n  N i x o n 's  
r h e t o r i c .
The crucial transformative strategies of this discourse 
are found in Nixon's use of differentiation. These differen­
tiation strategies rhetorically separate Nixon from the 
following elements: North Vietnam's lack of respect for the
neutrality of Cambodia (no. 1), an actual invasion of Cambodia 
(no. 3), and expanded war into Cambodia (no. 4), negotiating 
the freedom of the South Vietnamese (no. 7), the uncooperative 
attitude of the North Vietnamese (no. 8), humiliation at the 
conference table (no. 12), those who doubt his decisions (no.
20), and the easy political path (no. 21). These diverse 
differentiations serve essentially four rhetorical functions:
(1) they identify North Vietnam as our uncooperative foe;
(2) they attempt to show that Nixon's actions are necessary 
and geared toward ending this war; (3) they pinpoint the free­
dom of the South Vietnamese as the crucial issue at hand; and 
(4) they explore the ramifications of Nixon's decision.
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First, Nixon's differentiation strategies clearly 
identify North Vietnam as America's unrelenting enemy. More­
over, Nixon differentiates between America's respect for the 
neutrality of Cambodia and North Vietnam's lack of respect:
American policy since then Q:he Geneva Agreement of 
19543 has been to scrupulously respect the 
neutrality of the Cambodian people. We have 
maintained a skeleton diplomatic mission of 
fewer than 15 in Cambodia's capital, and that 
only since last August...North Vietnam, however, 
has not respected that neutrality. For the past 
five years, as indicated on this map, as you see 
here, North Vietnam has occupied military sanctuaries 
all along the Cambodian frontier with South Vietnam.
Nixon expands this differentiation of the enemy's actions as
he acknowledges America's continued efforts for peaceful
negotiations versus North Vietnam's uncompromising stance:
The answer of the enemy has been intransigence 
at the conference table, belligerence at Hanoi, 
massive military aggression in Laos and Cambodia 
and stepped-up attacks in South Vietnam designed 
to increase American casualities. This attitude 
has become intolerable.
This differentiation strategy is completed as Nixon 
states that America will be patient and conciliatory, but not 
humiliated or defeated as it works for peace:
54
Nixon, "Cambodia," p. 450.
^^Nixon, "Cambodia," p. 451.
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T h e  a c t i o n  I  h a v e  a n n o u n c e d  t o n i g h t  p u t s  t h e  
l e a d e r s  o f  N o r t h  V ie tn a m  on  n o t i c e  t h a t  we w i l l  
b e  p a t i e n t  i n  w o r k in g  f o r  p e a c e .  We w i l l  b e  
c o n c i l i a t o r y  a t  t h e  c o n f e r e n c e  t a b l e ,  b u t  w e  
w i l l  n o t  b e  h u m i l i a t e d .  We w i l l  n o t  b e  d e f e a t e d .
T h is  p a s s a g e  i s  o n e  w h ic h  p ro v o k e d  c o n s id e r a b le  i r e  fro m
c r i t i c s . F i r s t  o f  a l l ,  N ix o n  i s  a t t e s t i n g  t o  A m e r ic a 's
c o n c i l i a t o r y  e f f o r t s ;  y e t ,  h e  som ehow t h r e a t e n s  b o t h  N o r t h
V ie tn a m  an d  A m e r ic a  t h a t  h u m i l i a t i o n  and  d e f e a t  a r e  i n t o l e r a b l e ,
T h is  n o t i o n  o f  " h u m i l i a t i o n "  i s  o b v io u s ly  g ro u n d e d  in  some
c o n t r o v e r s i a l  v a lu e  ju d g m e n ts .  To  m any A m e r ic a n s  a t  t h i s
t im e  n o t h in g  c o u ld  b e  m o re  h u m i l i a t i n g  t h a n  e x p a n d in g  t h i s
u n w a n te d  w a r .^ ^  A ls o ,  o n e  i s  p ro m p te d  t o  a s k ;  How c a n  N ix o n
b e  t r u l y  s e e k in g  p e a c e  w i t h o u t  a l l o w i n g  f o r  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y
o f  d e f e a t ?  T h e s e  s o r t s  o f  d a n g l in g  q u e s t io n s  d e f i n i t e l y
w e a k e n  N i x o n ' s a t t e m p t  t o  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  fro m
i t s  N o r t h  V ie tn a m  f o e .
^^Nixon, "Cambodia," p. 451.
G ^ S e e , f o r  e x a m p le ,  G re g g  an d  H a u s e r ,  " R ic h a r d  N ix o n 's  
A p r i l  30, 1970 A d d r e s s ,"  p .  172.
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The findings of the Gallup Opinion Index show that 
during the May 1 to May 4 time period, only 25% of those polled 
approved Nixon's decision to send troops into Cambodia, while 
59% disapproved. Report no. 60, June 1970, p. 6, cited in 
Gregg and Hauser, "Richard Nixon's April 30, 1970 Address,"
p .  168.
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N i x o n 's  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  s t r a t e g i e s  e m p h a s iz in g  t h e  
n e c e s s i t y  an d  p e a c e - s e e k in g  n a t u r e  o f  h i s  a c t i o n s  a r e  w o r t h  
n o t i n g .  H is  f i r s t  r h e t o r i c a l  m ove h e r e  i s  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  h i s  
d e c is io n  t o  s e n d  t r o o p s  i n t o  C a m b o d ia — l a t e r  l a b e l e d  an  " i n c u r ­
s io n " — fro m  an  a c t u a l  i n v a s io n  o f  C a m b o d ia .
T h is  i s  n o t  a n  in v a s io n  o f  C a m b o d ia . T h e  a r e a s  i n  
w h ic h  t h e s e  a t t a c k s  w i l l  b e  la u n c h e d  a r e  c o m p le t e ly  
o c c u p ie d  a n d  c o n t r o l l e d  b y  N o r t h  V ie tn a m e s e  f o r c e s .
O u r p u rp o s e  i s  n o t  t o  o c c u p y  t h e  a r e a s .
O nce enem y f o r c e s  a r e  d r i v e n  o u t  o f  t h e s e  s a n c ­
t u a r i e s  and  o n c e  t h e i r  m i l i t a r y  s u p p l i e s  a r e  
d e s t r o y e d ,  w e w i l l  w i t h d r a w .
N ix o n  th u s  v ie w s  h i s  m i l i t a r y  u n d e r t a k in g  a s  o n e  o f  n e c e s s i t y  
an d  n o t  o f  c o n q u e s t .  M o re  s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  A m e r ic a  i s  m e r e ly  
t r y i n g  t o  d r i v e  t h e  enem y f o r c e s  o u t  o f  t h e s e  a g r e e d  u p o n  
C a m b o d ia n  s a n c t u a r i e s .  H e n c e , N ix o n  c o n c e p t u a l i z e s  A m e r ic a n  
f o r c e s  i n  C am b o d ia  a s  d e f e n s iv e  f o r c e s  a n d  n o t  o f f e n s i v e  f o r c e s ,  
T h is  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  o f  m o t iv e  i s  c o n t in u e d  a s  N ix o n  d i s t i n ­
g u is h e s  t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  g o a l  o f  h i s  m i l i t a r y  d e c i s i o n ;  "We 
t a k e  t h i s  a c t i o n  n o t  f o r  t h e  p u rp o s e  o f  e x p a n d in g  t h e  w a r  
i n t o  C a m b o d ia  b u t  f o r  t h e  p u rp o s e  o f  e n d in g  t h e  w a r  i n  V ie t n a m ,  
and  w in n in g  t h e  j u s t  p e a c e  w e a l l  d e s i r e .
^^Nixon, "Cambodia," p. 451.
^^Nixon, "Cambodia," p. 451.
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A g a in ,  N i x o n 's  r h e t o r i c a l  o b s e s s io n  w i t h  " w in n in g "  
a n d  " n o t  b e in g  d e f e a t e d  o r  h u m i l i a t e d "  w e a k e n  h i s  a t t e m p t s  f o r  
v i a b l e  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n .  M o r e o v e r ,  " w in n in g  a  w a r "  w h i l e  
a c t u a l l y  s e e k in g  a  " j u s t  p e a c e "  a r e  o f t e n  in c o m p a t ib le  g o a l s —  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  c ir c u m s t a n c e s  s u r r o u n d in g  t h e  V ie t n a m  W a r .
T h u s , o n e  m ig h t  d o u b t  t h e  s i n c e r i t y  o f  N ix o n 's  p e a c e - s e e k in g  
m o t iv e s  s in c e  h e  i s  o n ly  w i l l i n g  t o  v ie w  p e a c e  i n  l i g h t  o f  
v i c t o r y .
A m o s t c r u c i a l  is s u e  t h a t  N ix o n  d i f f e r e n t i a t e s  i n  
t h i s  a d d r e s s  c o n c e r n s  t h e  f re e d o m  o f  t h e  S o u th  V ie t n a m e s e .
I n  d is c u s s in g  h i s  c o n t in u e d  a t t e m p t s  t o  n e g o t i a t e  w i t h  N o r t h  
V ie t n a m ,  N ix o n  d i f f e r e n t i a t e s  o n e  is s u e  t h a t  i s  s im p ly  n o t  
n e g o t i a b l e :  " W e 'v e  o f f e r e d  t o  n e g o t i a t e  a l l  i s s u e s  w i t h  o n ly
o n e  c o n d i t i o n :  a n d  t h a t  i s  t h a t  t h e  f u t u r e  o f  S o u th  V ie tn a m
b e  d e t e r m in e d ,  n o t  b y  N o r t h  V ie tn a m ,  a n d  n o t  b y  t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s ,  b u t  b y  t h e  p e o p le  o f  S o u th  V i e t n a m . I  w o u ld  b e  h a r d  
p r e s s e d  t o  a t t a c k  s u c h  a s e e m in g ly  a l t r u i s t i c  m o t i v e . H e n c e ,  
t h i s  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  e f f e c t i v e ,  a t  l e a s t ,  i n  
p e r s o n i f y i n g  t h e  im a g e  o f  A m e r ic a n  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  i n  V ie tn a m  
a s  t h e  " c o n c e r n e d  b i g  b r o t h e r  o n ly  s e e k in g  t o  p r o t e c t  f r e e  c h o i c e . "
71
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P e r h a p s  N i x o n 's  m o s t t e l l i n g  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  s t r a t e g i e s
a r e  a p p a r e n t  i n  h i s  a t t e m p t s  t o  e x p lo r e  t h e  r a m i f i c a t i o n s  o f
h i s  d e c i s i o n  o n  C a m b o d ia . N ix o n  a t t e m p t s  t o  d e l i n e a t e  w h a t
i s  a t  s t a k e  i n  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  a t  h a n d ;
I t  i s  n o t  o u r  p o w e r  b u t  o u r  w i l l  an d  c h a r a c t e r  
t h a t  i s  b e in g  t e s t e d  t o n i g h t .
T h e  q u e s t io n  a l l  A m e r ic a n s  m u s t a s k  a n d  a n s w e r  
t o n i g h t  i s  t h i s  ; D o es  t h e  r i c h e s t  a n d  s t r o n g e s t  
n a t i o n  i n  t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  t h e  w o r ld  h a v e  t h e  
c h a r a c t e r  t o  m e e t  a  d i r e c t  c h a l l e n g e  b y  a g r o u p  
w h ic h  r e j e c t s  e v e r y  e f f o r t  t o  w in  a  j u s t  p e a c e ,  
ig n o r e s  o u r  w a r n in g s ,  t r a m p le s  on s o le m n  a g r e e m e n ts ,  
v i o l a t e s  t h e  n e u t r a l i t y  o f  a n  u n a rm e d  p e o p le  
a n d  u s e s  o u r  p r i s o n e r s  a s  h o s ta g e s ? ^ ^
I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t h a t  N ix o n  e q u a t e s  a  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o
e x p a n d  a c t i v e  c o m b a t w i t h  t h e  n a t i o n ' s  " w i l l  a n d  c h a r a c t e r . "
D o es  i t  n o t  t a k e  " w i l l  a n d  c h a r a c t e r "  t o  w a lk  aw ay  f ro m  a
h o p e le s s  f i g h t ?  N i x o n 's  c o m p a r is o n  t h u s  f o r c e s  t h e  q u e s t i o n :
v rh a t do  " w i l l  a n d  c h a r a c t e r "  h a v e  t o  do  w i t h  s t e p p in g  u p  an
u n w a n te d  w a r?  N i x o n 's  p o r t r a y a l / d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  o f  t h e  enem y
d o e s  e v o k e  t h e  a u d i e n c e 's  c o n te m p t .  H o w e v e r ,  h i s  n o t i o n  t h a t
i t  " ta lc e s  c h a r a c t e r  t o  s ta n d  u p  t o  s u c h  a  b u l l y "  p r e c lu d e s  t h e
t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h i s  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n .  T h a t  i s ,  t h e
72
Nixon, "Cambodia," p. 452.
76
c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  a c t u a l i z i n g  t h a t  n o t i o n  i n  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n
73
w e r e  g e n e r a l l y  u n d e s i r a b l e  t o  h i s  a u d ie n c e .
N i x o n 's  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ,  h o w e v e r ,  d o e s  n o t  s t o p  h e r e .  
He g o e s  o n  t o  r e f l e c t  o n  some o f  t h e  c r u c i a l  d e c is io n s  o f  
p r e v io u s  P r e s i d e n t s .  N ix o n  c h a s t i s e s  t h e  d i s s e n t e r s  i n  h i s  
a u d ie n c e  a s  h e  d i f f e r e n t i a t e s  h i s  p r e d e c e s s o r 's  d e c is io n s  
f ro m  h i s  :
B u t  b e tw e e n  t h o s e  d e c is io n s  a n d  t h i s  d e c i s i o n ,  
t h e r e  i s  a  d i f f e r e n c e  t h a t  i s  v e r y  f u n d a m e n t a l .
I n  th o s e  d e c i s i o n s  t h e  A m e r ic a n  p e o p le  w e r e  n o t  
a s s a i l e d  b y  c o u n s e ls  o f  d o u b t  a n d  d e f e a t  fro m  
some o f  t h e  m o s t w i d e l y  know n o p i n i o n  l e a d e r s  
o f  t h e  n a t i o n .
N ix o n 's  l o g i c  h e r e  p ro m p ts  t h e  o b s e r v a t i o n  t h a t  p e r h a p s  t h e  
r e a s o n  f o r  t h i s  " f u n d a m e n ta l  d i f f e r e n c e "  i n  s e n t im e n t  w as  t h a t  
h i s  p r e d e c e s s o r s '  d e c is io n s  w e r e  m o re  r e a s o n a b le  and  e f f e c t i v e  
th a n  h i s .  O b v io u s ly ,  N ix o n  d o e s  n o t  c o n s id e r  t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y .  
R a t h e r ,  h e  c h o o s e s  t o  s c o ld  h i s  a u d ie n c e  f o r  n o t  u n i t i n g  
b e h in d  h im  a s  A m e r ic a n s  d id  f o r  W i ls o n ,  R o o s e v e l t ,  E is e n h o w e r ,  
a n d  K e n n e d y  i n  t h e i r  c r u c i a l  h o u r  o f  d e c i s i o n .  N ix o n  t h u s
73 See Gallup Opinion Index, Report no. 60, June 1970, 
p. 6. That is, 59% of Nixon's audience did not agree with his 
decision on Cambodia. Cited in Gregg and Hauser, "Richard 
Nixon's April 30, 1970 Address," p. 168.
^^Nixon, "Cambodia," p. 452.
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presents an interesting Presidential decision-making com­
parison; however, his unwillingness to deal with dissent and 
his all powerful view of his position could serve to antagonize 
his audience rather than persuade them.
Finally, Nixon differentiates the easy political path 
from the right one. According to Nixon, "It is tempting to 
take the easy political path, to blame this way on previous
75Administrations, and to bring all of our men home immediately..." 
However, Nixon does not succumb to this easy temptation because 
its consequences would be defeat for the United States, deser­
tion of the South Vietnamese people, and a peace of humiliation:
"To get peace at any price now, even though I know that a peace 
of humiliation for the United States would lead to a bigger 
war or surrender l a t e r . T h u s ,  Nixon's differentiation of 
the consequences reveals that politically it would be easy to 
withdraw American troops from Southeast Asia, but morally this 
would be a wrong decision. Again, Nixon alludes to his funda­
mental military rationale that defeat and humiliation are 
intolerable. This rationale is quite revealing of Nixon's
75
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^^Nixon, "Cambodia," p. 452.
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value systems; however, does he have the right to impose
these values on Americans— particularly in terms of troop
commitments? Moreover, I would suggest that his notions of
defeat and humiliation are not only highly value-oriented,
but essentially self-inflicted. Nixon is creating his own
dreaded alternatives. Hence, he uses self-imposed standards
to differentiate right from wrong. The obvious strategical
shortcoming here is that those standards were not necessarily
77shared by his audience.
Nixon's last noteworthy differentiation strategy in 
this address concerns his political future. Similar to his 
1959 Vietnam speech, Nixon emphasizes here that he has "rejected
7 0
all political considerations in making his decision." More 
specifically, he states that the Republican party gains or 
loses in the 1970 election and his own re-election in 1972 
must not influence him and thus prompt a politically expedient 
decision. Nixon therefore believes that political self-interest 
must take a back seat to the cause of peace and freedom. His 
most succinct statement of this philosophy is contained in
7 7 See Gallup Opinion Index, p. 6.
^^Nixon, "Cambodia," p. 452.
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the following passage: "I would rather be a one-term Presi­
dent and do what I believed was right than to be a two-terra 
President and to see this nation accept the first defeat in 
its proud 190-year history.
The essential differentiation strategy here distin­
guishes the politically expedient decision from the politically 
sound decision. Yet, there seems to be a rhetorical contradic­
tion here. Nixon tells his audience that he is not concerned 
with political considerations and yet he obviously is. If 
not, why would he even choose to focus on the 1970 and 1972 
elections in the midst of an address concerned with an impor­
tant military undertaking? Nixon thus "protests too much," 
and these protestations seem to give him away in spite of 
his altruistic self-portrayal. Consequently, this amounts 
to another differentiation strategy that can, in fact, be 
counter-productive.
In sura, this 1970 address on Cambodia can be categorized 
as an explanative speech in which the speaker seeks to eliminate 
condemnation by providing a clearer understanding of the 
situation. Although patriotic transcendental appeals for
^^Nixon, "Cambodia," p. 452.
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peace and freedom were used in this address, Nixon relied
primarily on bolstering and differentiation strategies.
Nixon's bolstering efforts served to identify him with his own
effective and powerful use of the office of the presidency.
Also, these strategies attempted to identify Nixon with
other presidents— particularly in terms of their crucial
decision-making efforts. Nixon used differentiation in this
address to pinpoint North Vietnam as the foe who was trying
to defeat and humiliate America and South Vietnam as a friend
in need. Furthermore, these strategies examined the public's
response to Nixon's sincere and politically selfless efforts
for peace. In retrospect, it is especially worth focusing
on Church's (1977) observation that this speech was most
80
dependent on value judgments. However, Nixon's highly value- 
oriented conceptualization of "peace with honor" was not as 
widely accepted as Nixon had evidently anticipated.
The Watergate Affair 
This address was delivered by Nixon on April 30, 1973 
and was the first time Nixon formally spoke to the American
80
Church, "President Richard M. Nixon's Crisis Rhetoric,"
pp. 7402A-7403A.
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8Xpeople on Watergate. This discourse justifiably received
considerable rhetorical scrutiny, and a brief review of these
findings will follow. Baudhuin's (1974) empirical study
indicated that this address and subsequent Nixon apologia on
Watergate did not appear to help Nixon's credibility which
significantly dropped relative to trustworthiness, authorita-
82
tiveness, and interpersonal attractiveness. Gibson and
Felkins (1974) observed that this was a typical Nixon speech
in its highly personalized style; however, it was atypical of
Nixon's rhetoric as it lacked his often used strategy of
83associating himself with others. Eiland (1974) noted that
journalistic reaction to this discourse— as well as all of
84Nixon's Watergate apologia— was generally unfavorable.
 ^ Richard M. Nixon, "The Watergate affair," Vital Speeches 
of the Day. 39 (May 15, 1973), 450-52. See Appendix E for a 
complete text of this address.
82E. Scott Baudhuin, "From Campaign to Watergate:
Nixon's Campaign Image," Western Speech. 38 (Summer 1974),
182-89. I would concur that Nixon's personalized style is 
apparent in this speech. In fact, this short two page address 
contains the word "I" eighty-one times.
83 James W. Gibson and Patricia K. Felkins, "A Nixon 
Lexicon," Western Speech. 38 (Summer 1974), 190-98.
84
Millard F. Eiland, "Journalistic Criticism of 
Richard Nixon's Watergate of 1973," DAI, 36 (1975), 27A 
(The Louisiana State University and Agricultural and 
Mechanical College).
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Harrell, Ware, and Linkugel (1975) viewed this address as
unsuccessful and misdirected explanative apologia relying on
questionable differentiation of the facts as they were revealed
85to Nixon and ineffective bolstering of his presidential image. 
Finally, Ling (1977) pointed out an important contradiction in 
this speech, that is, although Nixon asserted responsibility 
for what occurred, he rejected any guilt for it because he
pg
implied that guilt rested on those who betrayed him.
This previous research thus suggests that this address 
was seemingly ineffective in restoring Nixon's credibility, 
highly personalized though lacking association strategies, 
unfavorably received by many journalists, rather unsuccess­
fully adapted for his audience and situation, and contradic­
tory in terras of blame-placing. With the exception of the
85Jackson Harrell, B. L, Ware, and Wil A. Linkugel, 
"Failure of Apology in American Politics: Nixon on Watergate,"
Speech Monographs. 42 (November 1975), 245-61. These authors 
cite (on page 255) a Gallup Poll finding that 40% of those 
polled did not think that Nixon had told the whole truth in 
his April 30 address while only 30% thought that he did.
Gallup Opinion Index. Report no. 95 (May 1973), pp. 9-10.
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David A. Ling, "Nixon, Watergate and the Rhetoric 
of Agent," in "A Pentadic Analysis of Richard Nixon and 
Watergate," ed. Charles U. Larson, Speaker and Gavel, 15 
(Fall 1977), 7-9.
83
Harrell, Ware, and Linkugel (1975) research, these findings 
resulted from diverse methods of analyses rather independent 
of the genre of apologia. The 1975 findings of Harrell et al. 
were in conjunction with developed self-defense criteria; 
however, they encompass only a brief and somewhat conclusionary 
section in their article. Therefore, the forthcoming analysis 
will attempt a thorough explication of this discourse relative 
to standards of apologia.
A frequency count of the strategies used in this speech
reveals the following tabulation: five bolstering strategies,
nine differentiation strategies, and seven transcendental 
8 7strategies. Since there are no personal denials of charges 
in this address, the key reformative strategy is clearly bol­
stering. Although somewhat more difficult to pinpoint, the 
most crucial transformative strategies are apparent in Nixon's 
use of differentiation. Nixon's transcendental strategies are 
worth noting, but once again his use of differentiation offers 
the critic the best insight into his essential strategic focus. 
Nixon's transcendental strategies r h e t o r i c a l l y  join Nixon with
B^See Appendix E for a specific breakdown of these
strategies.
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88the following concepts: selflessness— as he ignores personal
considerations (no. 2 ) ,  clean politics (no. 9), the more impor­
tant duties of his office (nos. 12 and 14), a goal of new stan­
dards for future election (no. 19), and hope for the free 
world (no. 21). The preceding transcendental strategies 
thus portray Nixon as sincerely wanting to get to the bottom 
of Watergate and other campaign abuses while not neglecting 
his other pressing presidential responsibilities. In his 1978 
memoirs, Nixon acknowledged the futility of such transcendental 
efforts: "I talked in terms of responsibility and the fact
that 'the man at the top must bear the responsibility....1
accept it.' But that was only an abstraction and the people
89saw through it." These particular rhetorical attempts by 
Nixon to enhance his credibility are interesting but not 
nearly as revealing as his differentiation techniques. These 
differentiation strategies will be examined following an 
analysis of Nixon's use of bolstering. Since this address
88The numbers in parenthesis that will follow note
the number of the strategy as it is listed in Appendix E. 
89Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixo
(New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), p. 851.
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relies primarily on bolstering and differentiation efforts,
90
it can be categorized as explanative apologia.
Nixon's fundamental reformative strategy of bolstering
serves the sole purpose of identifying Nixon with the office
of the Presidency. More specifically, Nixon's bolstering
strategies attempt repeatedly to identify Nixon with his
powerful office which he viewed as a "sacred trust" (no. 5),
having many responsibilities beyond mere campaigning (no. 7),
too important to be consumed by this political scandal (no. 13),
an office that can accomplish great things (no. 15) , and vital
to the hope of the world (no. 20). As Gibson and Felkins (1974)
have pointed out, Nixon did not resort to his usual rhetorical
9ldevice of associating himself with others. Instead, Nixon 
chose to associate or identify himself with his office. The 
whole Watergate scandal and Nixon's alleged involvement in it 
evidently represented such an embarrassing and unprecedented 
turn of events that Nixon could not find any strong grounds 
for identification with anything or anyone except his presi­
dential power. As this address unfolds, Nixon's bolstering
90
See Figure 2 for a specific breakdown of these sub­
genres of apologia.
^^Gibson and Felkins, "A Nixon Lexicon," pp. 190-98.
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strategies attempt to build this identification to the point
of conceptualizing Nixon as inseparable from his powerful
office. Thus, Nixon's first bolstering effort emphasizes the
sanctity of his office: "This office is a sacred trust, and
92
I am determined to be worthy of that trust." Furthermore,
Nixon believes that the tremendous responsibilities of this
"sacred trust" often go above and beyond mere campaigning for
an election: "And that is why I decided as the 1972 campaign
approached that the President should come first and politics 
93
second." Herein lies Nixon's crucial explanation for Water­
gate. He explains that his overwhelming presidential obliga­
tions necessitated his delegating authority for his 1972 
campaign to others. Nixon insists that he "sought to delegate
campaign operations to remove the day-to-day campaign decisions
94from the President's office and from the VThite House."
Hence, these subordinates "may have done wrong in a cause
95
they deeply believed to be right." In sum, these initial
^^Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," p. 451.
^^Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," p. 451.
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bolstering devices attempt to so strongly identify Nixon with
his office that any wrongdoing by his subordinates was actually
beyond his control— since he was so dedicated to his more
important task of leadership. Clearly, Nixon wanted his
audience to conclude with him that he was not to blame for
Watergate, and that he was merely trying to remove politics
from his sacred office.
Having made this explanation, Nixon chooses to look
to the future;
Whatever may now transpire in the case, whatever 
the actions of the grand jury, whatever the 
outcome of any eventual trials, I must now turn
ray full intention— and I shall do so— once again
to the larger duties of this office. I owe it 
to this great office that I hold, and I owe it 
to you, to my country.
Thus, Nixon suggests that his great office is much too impor­
tant to be totally consumed by this "senseless illegal action 
In retrospect, Nixon's "largest duty" was, in fact, to extri­
cate himself from the Watergate affair. Nixon further develops 
this bolstering strategy of presidential association as he
97
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insists that his, presidency can accomplish great things;
"When I think of this office, of what it means, I think of
all the things that I want to accomplish for this nation, of
98
all the things I want to accomplish for you."
Finally, Nixon asks for his audience's help so that
he can accomplish his presidential goals:
I looked at my own calendar this morning up at 
Camp David as I was working on this speech. It 
showed exactly 1,361 days remaining in my term.
I want these to be the best days in America's 
history because I love America....I know that in the 
quality and wisdom of the leadership America gives 
lies the only hope for millions of people all 
over the world....
Tonight, I ask for your prayers to help me in 
everything that I do throughout the days of my gg
Presidency to be worthy of their hopes and of yours.
This bolstering strategy ingeniously alludes to the notion that
Nixon's effective leadership throughout the remainder of his
term is the only hope for the world. The irony here is that
Nixon did not have 1,361 days remaining in his terra; he had
much less. I would contend that the ineffectiveness of the
preceding bolstering strategies significantly weakened Nixon's
apologia. Nixon's essential self-defense for Watergate was
grounded in a presidential association that was very meaningful
98
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to him relative to his strong view of the presidency.
However, this association was not particularly strong or con­
vincing to his audience— especially in light of incriminating 
evidence from the Watergate hearings.
The most significant transformative strategies of this 
address are found in Nixon's use of differentiation. These 
differentiation strategies indicate that Nixon rhetorically 
separates himself from the following elements; early reports 
on the Watergate scandal (no. 1), releasing Halderaan, Ehrlich- 
man, and Kleindienst because of wrongdoing on their part 
(nos. 3 and 4), the 1972 campaign and the Watergate break-in 
(no. 5), the easy and cowardly thing to do relative to Water­
gate blame-placing (no. 8), excessive reaction to Watergate 
(no. 11), and any whitewash at the IThite House (no. 16). These 
diverse differentiation devices serve three main rhetorical 
functions: (1) they attempt to extricate Nixon from actual
impropriety; (2) they pinpoint Nixon as ultimately responsible 
for his subordinates' actions; and (3) they explore the after- 
math of Watergate.
^^^Gonchar and Hahn, "The Rhetorical Predictability,"
pp. 3-13.
101 See Gallup Opinion Index, (May 1973), pp. 9-10.
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Nixon's first differentiation efforts are directed 
toward separating himself from any alleged improprieties. 
Specifically, Nixon's initial strategic focus is on distin­
guishing between the early reports he received about Watergate 
and those he received later:
Until March of this year, I remained convinced 
that the denials were true and that the charges 
of involvement by members of the White House 
were false....
However, new information then came to me which 
persuaded me that there was a real possi^^^ity 
that some of these charges were true....
Nixon's differentiation of the information he received on 
Watergate is worth noting. Clearly, this strategy helps to 
portray Nixon as being just as surprised and appalled by 
these "senseless, illegal actions" as were the American people. 
Nixon thus becomes the typical outraged citizen who could 
not have been a part of these crimes since he found out about 
them at the same time that everybody else did. Additionally, 
Nixon used this differentiation to explain his earlier claims 
of blanket White House innocence which nov/ could not be sup­
ported. The ultimate purpose here is to persuade the audience 
that he had not consciously lied to them in his earlier state­
ments, for he had been misinformed.
^^^Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," p. 450,
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Nixon further attempts to separate himself from any
wrongdoing as he differentiates the resignations of three key
members of his staff:
Today, in one of the most difficult decisions 
of my Presidency, I accepted the resignations 
of two of my closest associates in the White 
House, Bob Haldeman and John Ehrlichman, two 
of the finest public servants it has been my 
privilege to know. I want to stress that in 
accepting these resignations I mean to leave no 
implication whatever of personal wrongdoing on 
their part....
Attorney General Kleindienst, though a distin­
guished public servant, my personal friend for 20 
years, with no personal involvement whatever in 
this matter, has been a close personal associate 
of some of those who are involved in this case, 
he and I both felt it was also necessarv to name
*1 A O  -
a new Attorney General.
It is clear that Nixon's attempts to separate Haldeman, 
Erhlichman, and Kleindienst from personal wrongdoing are also 
attempts to separate himself from the same condemnation. 
Interestingly enough, Nixon chose to stress his close asso­
ciation with these individuals while, in effect, firing them.
In turn, Nixon chose to disassociate them from actual wrongdoing.
l03
Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," p. 451. In his memoirs, 
Nixon admits the self-serving nature of accepting Haldeman 
and Erhlichman's resignations: "i had always prided myself
on the fact that I stood by people who were down. Now I had 
sacrificed, for myself, two people I owed so much." Nixon, RN. 
p. 849.
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However, two problems arise here. First, if they are not 
guilty, why is Nixon accepting their resignations? This cer­
tainly is inconsistent with Nixon's notice of "standing up 
for one's friends." Nixon's anticipated response to such 
inquiries is the following: "I wanted to be fair, but I
knew that in the final analysis the integrity of this office—  
public faith in the integrity of this office— would have to 
take priority over personal considerations."^®^ Thus, these 
"innocent" victims are betrayed by their close friend because 
of the sanctity of Nixon's office. The discerning public 
obviously would have great difficulty in accepting such ques­
tionable reasoning. The second problem of Nixon's initial 
explanation of these resignations is that of "guilt by asso­
ciation." In other words, if Nixon is so closely associated 
with these individuals, couldn't he also be associated with 
the underlying reasons for their resignations? Hence, these 
inherent problems lead one full circle to the fact that Nixon 
needed to disassociate Haldeman, Erhlichman, and Kleindienst 
from wrongdoing. Moreover, whether Nixon stated it or not, 
the audience was probably aware of their close association 
with Nixon.
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Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," p. 450,
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Another important device relative to Nixon's attempts 
to remove himself from actual improprieties can be found in 
his differentiation of the 1972 campaign from his previous 
campaigns :
Political commentators have correctly observed 
that during my 27 years in politics. I've always 
previously insisted on running my own campaigns 
for office.
In both domestic and foreign policy, 1972 was a 
year of crucially important decisions, of intense 
negotiations, of vital new directions,...
And that is why I decided as the 1972 campaign 
approached that the Presidency should come first 
and politics second. To the maximum extent 
possible, therefore, I sought to delegate 
campaign operations....
An important distinction that is alluded to in the preceding 
passage is that Nixon was not the President during his previous 
campaigns and thus could afford to spend time on campaign 
operations. The implication here is that Nixon can not really 
be held accountable for illegal campaigning actions committed 
while he was in the midst of pursuing his presidential respon­
sibilities. The President is a very busy man and he simply 
cannot do and see everything. Nixon's priorities were such
lO^Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," p. 451.
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that the 1972 campaign operations were delegated to others. 
Having made this distinction clear, Nixon turns around and 
states that he is ultimately responsible for his subordinates' 
actions:
For the fact that alleged improper actions 
took place within the White House or within 
my campaign organization, the easiest course 
would be for me to blame those whom I dele­
gated the responsibility to run the campaign.
But that would be a cowardly thing to do.
I will not place the blame on subordinates, on 
people whose zeal exceeded their judgment....
In any organization the man at the top must 
bear the responsibility.
That responsibility, therefore, belongs here 
in this office. I accept it.
Once again Nixon resorts to his differentiation of the 
easy or cowardly action versus the proper action. On the 
surface, this self-imposed courage appears to be an admirable 
and selfless trait. However, closer scrutiny demonstrates 
just the opposite. Prior to this "acceptance of responsibility" 
Nixon had already placed the real blame for Watergate elsewhere 
with his only fault being his preoccupation with the duties 
of his office. His strategy is much like the attorney who 
puts forth an incriminating question and then willingly
^^^Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," p. 451.
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withdraws it, knowing that his point has been made. Following 
this, another questionable aspect of this strategy becomes 
apparent as Nixon pledges, "I will do everything in my power 
to insure that the guilty are brought to justice.
This pledge for justice prompts the question: If Nixon is
really accepting blame for Watergate, how can he truly pursue 
those who are guilty? More specifically, how can the guilty 
earnestly pursue the guilty, particularly when they are 
closely associated with one another? Obviously, Nixon does not 
really accept the blame for Watergate, and his blame-placing 
differentiation becomes a rather transparent and self-serving 
attempt for credibility.
Nixon's last differentiation strategies explore the 
aftermath of Watergate. The initial differentiation effort 
here is to distinguish proper from excessive reaction to 
Watergate :
It is essential that we let the judicial process 
go forward, respecting those safeguards that are 
established to protect the innocent as well as 
to convict the guilty.
^®^Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," p. 451.
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It is essential that in reacting to the excesses 
of others, we not fall into excesses ourselves.
It is also essential that we not be so dis­
tracted by events such as this that we neglect 
the work before us....
Since March, when I first learned that the 
Watergate affair might in fact be far more 
serious that I had been led to believe, it has 
claimed far too much of my time.^^®
According to Nixon, Watergate is now a judicial matter. Nixon's 
essential distinction here is that there is a right and wrong 
way of dealing with such matters. The right way is to let the 
courts do what is necessary; the wrong way is to be so preoc­
cupied with it as to cripple America and particularly Nixon's 
leadership task. Unfortunately for Nixon, the American people 
did not view his alternatives as being mutually exclusive.
Hence, this differentiation strategy failed its essential
109purpose of particularizing the charges at hand.
Finally, Nixon uses differentiation as he delineates
the needed reform in our political system:
We must reform our political process, ridding it 
not only of the violations of the law but also of 
the ugly mob violence and other inexcusable campaign 
practices that have been too often practiced and
^®®Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," p. 451.
^®^See Figure 1 for a complete analysis of the compo­
nents of differentiation strategies.
97
too readily accepted in the past including 
those that may have been a response by one-sided 
[si(0 to the excesses or expected excesses of 
the other side....
And both of our great parties have been guilty 
of such tactics.
Although Nixon professes to be seeking improved campaign prac­
tices, one senses that he is really alluding to the fact that 
Watergate-like incidents are not that uncommon in politics. 
Moreover, Nixon implies that his Democratic counterparts are 
not strangers to such activities. This Nixon counterattack 
is reminiscent of the predominant style of his "Checkers" 
speech. In fact, I would suggest that this address 
might have been more effective if Nixon were to have relied 
more openly on such a differentiation strategy. Instead, 
early in his speech, Nixon chose to assume the role of the 
shocked and appalled leader as he referred to Watergate as a 
"senseless, illegal action" and a "sordid a f f a i r . H a v i n g  
taken such a position, it would have been rather difficult 
for Nixon to completely admit to his audience that such 
"sordidness" was a common part of the American political process. 
He relied instead on brief innuendo. Thus, Nixon attempted to
^^^Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," p. 452.
^^^Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," pp. 450-51.
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play both the outraged leader and.subtle counterattacking 
political realist. In light of the circumstances, Nixon's 
dual roles proved to be mutually exclusive and thereby weakened 
the efficacy of both strategies.
In summary, this crucial 1973 speech on Watergate can 
be categorized as an explanative address in which the speaker 
seeks to eliminate condemnation by providing a clearer under­
standing of the situation. Although Nixon's transcendental 
strategies interestingly allude to his sincere efforts to 
deal with Watergate while not neglecting his presidential 
obligations, Nixon relied primarily on bolstering and differ­
entiation strategies. Nixon's fundamental reformative strategy 
of bolstering serves the sole purpose of identifying Nixon 
with the office of the Presidency. Within this strategy is 
Nixon's essential explanation for Watergate. Specifically, 
his presidential responsibilities necessitated his delegating 
authority for his 1972 campaign to others who, in turn, "may 
have done wrong." Nixon's most significant transformative 
strategies of this address are apparent in his use of differ­
entiation. These strategies function to separate Nixon from 
actual wrongdoing, to differentiate his acceptance of respon­
sibility from cowardly blame-placing, and to explore the aftermath
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of Watergate. Overall, this Watergate defense was dependent 
upon a presidential association and a very unconvincing 
separation of facts. The ultimate failure of this address—  
as well as subsequent Watergate apologia— can be attributed 
to the audience's unwillingness to accept the notion of 
presidential omnipotence and the contradictory and highly 
incriminating testimonies that would continue to surface.
Summary
In review of this chapter, four of Nixon's most 
crucial self-defense discourses were analyzed in accordance 
to the apologia criteria set forth by Ware and Linkugel (1973) 
I have attempted to synthesize this analysis in terras of a 
comparison of the key strategies used in these speeches (see 
Figure 3). The rhetorical implications of these findings 
will be addressed in Chapter III.
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FIGURE 3
1952 "Checkers" Speech
A STRATEGIC COMPARISON 
1969 Vietnam Speech 1970 Cambodia Speech 1973 Watergate Speech
Subgenre of 
apologia
Key denial 
strategies
Key bolster­
ing strat­
egies______
Key differen­
tiation 
strategies
Absolutive address using Explanative address using 
primarily denial and primarily bolstering
differentiation strategies and differentiation
strategies
Nixon denies personal 
use, secretive nature, 
and giving special 
favors relative to 
$18,000 contributions
Nixon identifies with 
American values of 
patriotism, humility, 
courage, and anti­
communism
Nixon distinguishes 
himself from his 
opposing Democratic 
party leaders and any 
false charges of 
impropriety
None
Nixon identifies him­
self with those 
critical of Johnson's 
handling of Vietnam, 
and Nixon also iden­
tifies with his own 
office of the presi­
dency
Nixon emphasizes his 
decision-making 
ability while placing 
blame on the Johnson 
Administration, North 
Vietnam, and the "vocal 
minority"
Explanative address 
using primarily bolster­
ing and differentiation 
strategies
None
Nixon identifies him­
self as an effective 
President and iden­
tifies with other 
Presidents and their 
crucial decision­
making efforts
Nixon pinpoints North 
Vietnam as the foe.
South Vietnam as a 
friend in need, and 
the public's response to 
his selfless efforts 
for peace
Explanative 
address using 
primarily bol­
stering and 
differentiation 
strategies
None
Nixon's sole 
tactic here is to 
identify himself 
with the office 
of the Presidency
Nixon separates 
himself from actual 
wrongdoing, dif­
ferentiates his 
acceptance of 
responsibility 
from cowardly 
blame-placing, and 
explores the after- 
math of Watergate
Key trans­
cendental 
strategies
Nixon uses appeals to 
American values, such 
as political integrity, 
the victimized under­
dog, and peaceful 
prosperity
Nixon uses fairly 
common patriotic 
appeals for freedom 
and Americanism
Nixon uses broad 
patriotic appeals 
for peace and 
freedom
Nixon alludes to 
his sincere efforts 
to deal with Water­
gate while not 
neglecting his 
presidential 
responsibilities
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CHAPTER III 
RHETORICAL IMPLICATIONS
This chapter will explore the rhetorical implications 
of the findings that were reached in the preceding chapter. 
Specifically, the following research questions will be 
addressed:
1. What are the subgenres of apologia apparent in 
Nixon’s rhetoric?
2. What are the key apologetic strategies manifested 
in Nixon's rhetoric?
3. What are the recurring and/or significant apologe­
tic tactics found in Nixon's rhetoric?
4. What influence did Nixon have on the contemporary 
apologetic genre?
5. What is the utility of Ware and Linkugel's 
critical system?
Subqenres and Key Strategies
The two key strategies of an apologetic discourse 
are combined and result in a specific subgenre of apologia. 
With the exception of the 1952 "Checkers" speech, all of the 
addresses examined relied primarily on bolstering and differ­
entiation strategies for their persuasive impact, and there­
fore can be placed in the subgenre of explanative apologia. 
Although the "Checkers" speech made use of bolstering, its
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essential strategies were focused on denial and differentiation 
and thus is categorized as absolutive apologia. This speech 
was the result of a very specific charge against Nixon's 
character, that is, he was accused of illegal use of campaign 
funds.^ Hence, Nixon viewed his alternatives as either being 
removed from the Republican ticket or denying this charge 
directly.2 His use of differentiation in this address attempted 
to reinforce his denial by particularizing the charge and those 
who probably made it.^
The 1969 Vietnam address relied mainly on bolstering 
and differentiation strategies. As noted, mounting antiwar 
sentiment appeared to prompt this speech. The underlying 
charge of impropriety that this discourse addressed itself to 
was implied more than clearly stated by specific accusers. 
Nonetheless, the essential accusation was that President Nixon
^Richard M. Nixon, "My Side of the Story," Vital Speeches 
of the Dav. 19 (October 15, 1952), 11.
2
Richard Nixon, RN; The Memoirs of Richard Nixon 
(New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), p. 98.
^Rosenfield (1968) noted that Nixon never really pin­
pointed his accusers, instead, he alluded to the misdeeds of 
his democratic counterparts and thereby implied that they were 
in no position to accuse him of wrongdoing. L. W. Rosenfield,
"A Case Study in Speech Criticism: The Nixon-Truman Analog,"
Speech Monographs. 35 (November 1968), 446.
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had not ended the Vietnam War as he had promised to do so in 
his campaign rhetoric. Since this was an implied charge,
Nixon was not quite forced into the position of either offer­
ing a definite denial or losing his office. Thus, Nixon 
chose to holster his image versus direct denial. Additionally, 
Nixon's differentiation strategies sought to reinforce this 
bolstering by particularizing those who were truly responsible 
for America's Vietnam dilemma.
Nixon's 1970 Cambodia address also relied primarily 
on bolstering and differentiation strategies. In this speech, 
he attempted to explain his decision to send American troops 
into Cambodia. The apparent force that prompted this dis­
course was the implied charge that Nixon was, in fact, stepping 
up a war that he had promised to end. Since Nixon could retain 
his position as president without directly denying this charge, 
he relied more on bolstering his presidential image than direct 
denial. Furthermore, Nixon's use of differentiation served 
to particularize his obstacles in seeking peace.
Finally, Nixon's 1973 Watergate address also proved 
to rely essentially on bolstering and differentiation strategies. 
However, the charge that necessitated this speech was quite clear.
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In fact, Nixon admitted that the charge at hand was involvement
4
of his staff in the Watergate affair. Thus, the specificity 
of the accusation was similar to that of the "Checkers" speech. 
Yet, Nixon's strategic approach here was noticeably different. 
Instead of attempting a confrontation or denial of the charge, 
Nixon chose to seek refuge in bolstering by clearly identifying 
himself with his office. In addition to this strategy, Nixon 
sought to reinforce this identification by separating his 
presidential responsibilities.
In sum, Nixon's fundamental self-defense strategies 
were fairly consistently bolstering and differentiation and 
thus resulted in explanative apologia. However, use of these 
strategies in his crucial Watergate speech resulted in especially 
ineffective apologia. Nixon's administration was accused of 
specific and incriminating deeds. Rather than confronting 
these accusations, Nixon chose to reassert his presidential 
position through bolstering and differentiation. In assessing 
Nixon's Watergate apologia, Harrell, Ware, and Linkugel stated, 
"Rhetorical critics face the task of explaining why in the case
^Richard M. Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," Vital
Speeches of the Dav. 39 (May 15, 1973), 450.
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of Richard Nixon, who used apologia on a scale unprecedented 
in the history of America politics, apology failed."^ Per­
haps Nixon's decision to essentially bolster his presidential 
image as opposed to a direct confrontation of the charges 
contributed to the ultimate failure of his apologia.
If Nixon had analyzed his previous apologia efforts 
he might not have made this decision. Clearly, the situation 
and specificity of the charges surrounding the "Checkers" 
speech demanded a direct confrontation without which Nixon 
faced the strong possibility of being removed from the Repub-
g
lican ticket. In the Vietnam and Cambodia addresses, however, 
there were implied versus specific charges that demanded 
rhetorical consideration. Moreover, Nixon's popularity might 
have been affected, but he was not really in danger of losing 
his office through impeachment. Although not always completely 
effective with his audience, Nixon's bolstering strategies
^Jackson Harrell, B. L. Ware, and wil A. Linkugel, 
"Failure of Apology in American Politics: Nixon on Watergate,"
Speech Monographs, 42 (November 1975), 245.
^Barnet Baskerville, "The Nixon Affair," in "The Election 
of 1952: A Symposium," ed. Frederick W. Haberman, Quarterly
Journal of Speech. 38 (December 1952), 406.
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in these war speeches were feasible rhetorical devices, in 
his 1973 Watergate address, Nixon seemingly failed to recog­
nize the specificity and incriminating nature of the charges 
at hand. Additionally, Nixon seemingly failed to realize that 
the Watergate scandal, like the "Checkers" case, could be an 
either/or situation, that is, either confront the charges 
directly or lose your office. If one truly seeks to retain 
an office in such a rhetorical situation, the strategic alter­
natives are severely limited. Thus, Nixon's strategic choices 
imply that either he was unaware of the necessity of a definite 
rhetorical confrontation through denial or simply unable to 
support such denials because the available facts could contra­
dict them.
In light of this second set of circumstances, apologia 
appeared nearly doomed to failure. Specifically, the self- 
defense rhetor attempts to extricate himself from wrongdoing 
by illuminating the situation. If such an illumination is 
unavoidably self-incriminating, the rhetor will find himself 
"hoisted on his own petard." i can view only two possible 
exceptions to this rule. First, the rhetor may obscure the 
facts convincingly and thereby diminish the charges. Second, 
the charges may not have been severe enough to warrant
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public condemnation. In the case of Richard Nixon, both of 
these exceptions also failed.
Significant Tactics 
The notion of rhetorical tactic will be viewed as a 
specific means of implementing the general strategies of 
denial, bolstering, differentiation, and transcendence. Of 
the four examined discourses, the only definite use of denial 
was apparent in the 1952 "Checkers" speech. In this address, 
Nixon accomplished his strategic task of denial by first 
differentiating the charges against him and then denying them 
rather directly. Hence, denial strategies and subsequent 
tactics are thus limited to one address and obviously not a 
recurring phenomenon.
In terms of specific tactics underlying Nixon's bol­
stering strategies, several observations can be made. The 
important tactic here was that of identification and definite 
trends emerge in Nixon's apologia. In the "Checkers" speech 
Nixon's essential identification was with American values.
He associated himself with patriotism, humility, courage, and 
anti-communism. Nixon's crucial identification tactics in the 
Vietnam address linked him with those critical of Johnson's 
Vietnam politics, but more importantly, with his own office
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of the presidency. Furthermore, similar presidential associa­
tion tactics were pursued in both the Cambodia and Watergate 
discourses. In fact, this association tactic amounted to his 
fundamental Watergate defense, that is, the urgency of presi­
dential responsibilities caused him to delegate authority to 
those who evidently abused it. From this analysis, one can 
conclude that when Nixon was in office and under fire, he often 
sought refuge in the mere legitimacy of his office.
The key tactics within his strategy of differentiation 
are also revealing. The significant tactics here are that 
of distinguishing oneself from the opposition and particularizing 
certain facts, in the "Checkers" speech Nixon distinguishes 
himself both from charges of impropriety and especially from 
his opposing Democratic party leaders. In the Vietnam address 
Nixon contrasted his peace-seeking efforts with the ineffective 
measures of the previous administration, the uncooperative 
North Vietnamese, and the trouble-making "vocal minority."
Similar tactics were used in the Cambodia address as Nixon pin­
pointed North Vietnam as the belligerent foe. South Vietnam 
as a friend in need, and the public's often counter-productive 
response to his selfless efforts for peace. Finally, Nixon's 
Watergate tactics function to separate him from actual wrongdoing.
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to differentiate his acceptance of responsibility from cowardly 
blame-placing, and to particularize the aftermath of this 
scandal.
It is interesting to note that in the first three 
addresses Nixon separates himself from wrongdoing by contrast­
ing the propriety of his actions with the actions of others. 
Although not always effective, this "rhetoric of contrast" 
was one of Nixon's more convincing tactics. Given the circum­
stances surrounding the Watergate speech, Nixon evidently did 
not view this tactic of contrast as a viable differentiation 
alternative. As previously noted, his only use of this device 
in this speech amounted to a rather brief allusion to the 
realities of campaigning. It would appear that Nixon did not 
believe that the apparent campaign abuses of Watergate lent 
themselves to the tactic of contrast. This kind of tactic 
would have amounted to a more complete examination of campaign 
abuses, particularly by Nixon's democratic counterparts. Per­
haps a thorough and open development of this tactic was seen 
as simply too negative to really pursue.
Last, the specific tactics underlying Nixon's transcen­
dental strategies will be noted. The tactics here are those 
which rhetorically join Nixon with certain abstract concepts.
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In his "Checkers" speech Nixon used appeals to American values, 
such as political integrity, the victimized underdog, and 
peaceful prosperity. In both the Vietnam and Cambodia speeches 
Nixon employed fairly common patriotic appeals for peace, 
freedom,and Americanism. The Watergate address alluded to 
the importance of political integrity and the necessity of 
strong but honest leadership in America. These rhetorical 
tactics consistently join Nixon with the American values of 
peace, freedom, and political integrity. Thus, Nixon's 
rhetorical tactics that constitute transcendental strategies 
appeal to basic American values. As previously noted, this 
is a fairly common rhetorical practice and Nixon's most 
telling tactics are more apparent when viewed through his 
bolstering and differentiation efforts.
In sum, the following recurring tactics are evident 
in the examined self-defense discourses: (1) Nixon attempted
to bolster his image essentially through identifying himself 
with his presidential position; (2) Nixon often differentiated 
himself from wrongdoing by contrasting the propriety of his 
actions with the actions of others; and (3) Nixon frequently 
transcended the situation at hand by alluding to basic American 
values. Since this second recurring tactic was a seemingly
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unavailable option for Nixon in his Watergate self-defense, 
this could have weakened his attempts for persuasion.
Nixon's Influence on Contemporary Apologia
The self-defense rhetoric of Richard Nixon has had a 
significant influence on the genre of modern apologia. I 
contend that Nixon's impact on contemporary apologia has 
(1) maximized the need for apologetic-like statements in 
politics while (2) prompting a change in the traditional 
form of apologia. As Gold (1978) has pointed out, the after- 
math of Watergate and Nixon's mishandling of it have increased 
politicians' need to "defend their character."^ However, the 
traditional form of the apology appears to have undergone some 
changes since Nixon left office in 1974.
The 1976 and 1980 presidential campaigns serve as 
examples of the heightened importance of apologia in the 
political arena. With Nixon's political ruination from the 
Watergate scandal still fresh in their mind, the electorate 
in 1976 was subjected to a number of presidential candidates 
insistent upon proving their honest and integrity. In fact.
^Ellen Reid Gold, "Political Apologia; The Ritual 
of Self-Defense," Communication Monographs, 45 (November 1978), 
306.
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the most successful Democratic and Republican candidates—
Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford— seemed to make "personal integrity" 
the foundation of their campaign. Perhaps Carter ultimately 
won the election with his repeated campaign promise : "I'11
never lie to you." Consequently, Gold concluded that the 
circumstances were such in the 1976 presidential election 
that "the need to defend one's character [wa0 more imperative—  
and difficult— than ever."®
Even more recently— in the 1980 presidential campaign—  
self-defense strategies were of definite import. The strong 
morality of Jimmy Carter was alluded to throughout the early 
campaign thus transcending other charges of presidential inept­
ness. Additionally, the Chappaquiddick incident haunted Edward 
Kennedy's candidacy as he attempted to deny continued allega­
tions. Finally, John Connally sought to disassociate himself 
from the "Milk Fund" scandal with strong denials of wrongdoing 
and emphasizing his swift acquittal in that bribery trial.
Not surprisingly, Ronald Reagan emerged victorious as the 
"oldest and wisest" and the "anti-Washington" candidate.
®Gold, "Political Apologia," p. 306.
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Although Richard Nixon's inability to apologize his 
way out of the Watergate scandal and his subsequent political 
demise may have increased the need for politicians to "defend 
their character," the actual mode of the classic apologia has 
taken on numerous forms. More specifically, Nixon's frequent 
use of the mass media (televised) apology seems to have 
spawned nontraditional and indirect forms of apologia. While 
political figures feel the need to uphold their integrity, 
there appears to be a growing effort by politicians to avoid 
the mass media and highly personalized apologetic style which 
characterized Nixon's apologia.
Upon taking office in the summer of 1974, Gerald Ford 
exemplified such an avoidance in his handling of the Presidential 
pardon of Nixon. Although he delivered his actual pardon speech 
to the nation via television, he did not attempt to use this 
channel when confronted with considerably negative reactions 
from Americans. He chose instead to appear before a Congres­
sional subcommittee in an attempt to justify his decision. Ford
consciously seemed to distinguish his apologia style from that
9
of Nixon who constantly went before Americans on television.
^See Gold, "Political Apologia," pp. 309-310.
114
Another interesting variation in post 1974 apologia 
is the emergence of surrogate apologists. In contrast to 
Nixon's face-to-face televised encounters with his audience, 
in recent years a number of surrogate spokesmen/women often 
deliver apologetic-like statements. For example, in the early 
1980 presidential campaign Jimmy Carter relied heavily on a 
number of surrogates, such as brother Billy, wife Rosalynn, 
mother Lillian, Vice-President Mondale, and campaign chairman 
Robert Strauss. As Carter initially vowed not to hit the 
campaign trail until the safe release of the American hostages 
in Iran, his surrogates were called upon to defend his "morality, 
motives, and reputation."
Other candidates in the 1980 presidential campaign 
also relied on surrogate apologists. When the Chappaquiddick 
incident troubled Edward Kennedy's candidacy, his campaign 
chairman, Stephen Smith, would frequently defend Kennedy's 
integrity.Similarly, Reagan spokesman. Representative Jack 
Kemp, often upheld the wisdom and reputation of Ronald Reagan.
^^See, for example, "Kennedy Timetable Plans Pushed
Ahead," Daily Oklahoman, 31 October 1979, p. 5.
^^See, for example, "Aide Describes Reagan as ' 
but Wisest,'" Daily Oklahoman. 15 November 1979, p. 10.
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Overall, Richard Nixon appears to have had a dual 
influence on the contemporary practice of apologia. First, 
Nixon's political downfall seems to have increased the need 
for politicians to take part in substantive self-defense. 
Second, political figures appear hesitant to use Nixon's 
particular style of apologia and many opt for different 
approaches in defending their character.
Utility of Critical System 
Ware and Linkugel's (1973) critical system has pro­
vided an effective analytic method which can be applied to 
Nixon's self-defense rhetoric. As previously noted, this 
method is specifically tailored for the genre of apologia, 
and it is the only detailed system of analysis adapted to con­
temporary self-defense rhetoric. Thus, Ware and Linkugel have 
formulated strategic standards which can be applied to the 
genre in question. Additionally, four subgenres are isolated 
to further categorize apologetic discourses.
An important asset of this critical method is that it 
allows the critic to make strategic comparisons across time 
and diverse apologetic situations (see Figure 3). For example, 
the critic can easily conclude that Nixon frequently identified 
himself with past presidents as a key bolstering strategy in
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crucial self-defense addresses. The critics can also deduce 
that Nixon thrived on a "rhetoric of contrast," that is, 
clearly distinguishing himself from his opposition as a 
recurring differentiation strategy. This analytic system thus 
provides the critic with a fairly objective means of evaluating 
the rhetor's strategic choices in self-defense discourses.
Finally, this system can lend a scientific attractive­
ness to the rather subjective art of rhetorical criticism as 
the critic can easily quantify the use of specific strategies. 
Hence, the critic fulfills his/her traditional role by advancing 
well-reasoned observations based not only on value judgments 
but also on quantifiable frequency counts of isolated strategies. 
Dealing with numbers alone, the critic can conclude that Nixon 
used differentiation in each of the analyzed addresses more 
than any other strategy. Conversely, Nixon made only one clear 
denial— apparent in his "Checkers" speech.
However, the Ware and Linkugel system does have some 
shortcomings. First, this method can become somewhat prescrip­
tive in its focus on isolated strategies— denial, bolstering, 
differentiation, and transcendence. The problem here is that 
these strategies constitute the foundation of the critic's 
method of analysis. Strategies which do not fit into the 
above categories are overlooked by the critic. Consequently,some
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of the apologist's important emotional and logical appeals 
might not be accounted for in this system.
A second weakness of this method of analysis is the 
lack of sufficient explanation particularly in terras of 
distinguishing bolstering and transcendental strategies.
While I have tried to fill in Ware and Linkugel's explanative 
gaps (see Figure 1) ,  raore detail is needed from the original 
authors. Unfortunately, it sometimes becomes difficult to 
distinguish "positive identifications" (bolstering) from 
"attempts to go beyond the situation at hand" (transcendence). 
Further explanation is thus needed to maintain discrete strategic 
categorization.
A final flaw is apparent in the lack of clarification 
of the four "subgenres" of apologia. Ware and Linkugel state 
that speakers usually assume one of four major rhetorical 
postures or subgenres when speaking in defense of their characteri
(1) absolution, (2) vindication, (3) explanation, or (4) justi­
fication (see Figure 2). However, the authors do not demon­
strate how they arrive at these four postures other than to 
state that "these four subgenres represent those postures which 
Western culture, customs, and institutions seem to dictate as 
being most acceptable in dismissing charges against a
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rhetor's character." A sufficiently detailed explanation of 
the origins of these subgenres would allow the critic to advance 
more generalizable findings on the possible types of discourses 
found within the genre of apologia.
As a result of applying Ware and Linkugel's critical 
system to selected self-defense discourses, several future 
investigations can be suggested. Although four of Richard 
Nixon's apologetic discourses were analyzed in this study, 
the self-defense rhetoric of other apologists certainly could 
be examined with the use of this analytic tool. For example, 
a thorough application of Ware and Linkugel's system to 
Edward Kennedy's 1969 "Chappaquiddick" address could yield 
insightful analysis. Moreover, entire political campaigns, 
such as the 1980 presidential election could be analyzed in 
terms of candidates' use of selected self-defense strategies.
Ware and Linkugel's critical system could be effec­
tively applied to a relatively new area of political communi­
cation research known as political advertising. Thus, a content
19
B. L. Ware and Wil A. Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense 
of Themselves: On the Generic Criticism of Apologia," Quarterly
Journal of Speech, 59 (October 1973), 282.
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analysis of apologetic strategies— denial, bolstering, dif­
ferentiation, and transcendence— apparent in television poli­
tical advertisements could produce insightful findings. With 
the huge amounts of money and time devoted to political adver­
tising, such an analysis would be of interest to communicolegists 
as well as advertising specialists.
Finally, I have suggested in this study that the poli­
tical downfall of Richard Nixon actually increased politicians' 
need to "defend their character." I have also suggested that 
these defenses have often strayed from Nixon's apologia style 
to more nontraditional methods of character defenses. An 
entire study devoted to tracing post-Nixon (1974) apologia 
could be worthwhile. Such a study would actually begin where 
my study has ended and thus more conclusively explore the 
present state of the art of apologia.
Summary
In the examined discourses, the predominant subgenre 
of apologia assumed by Nixon was that of explanation. The 
fundamental purpose of such apologia is to eliminate condemna­
tion by providing a clearer understanding of the situation. 
Explanative apologia is mainly the result of bolstering and 
differentiation strategies. The most noteworthy shortcoming
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of Nixon's strategic efforts was apparent in his crucial 
Watergate address. The circumstances of this scandal demanded 
a more direct response to the charges at hand. However, Nixon 
circumvented the charges of impropriety by attempting to bolster 
his presidential image instead of a direct confrontation and 
a definite denial of wrongdoing. The recurring rhetorical 
tactics of the examined addresses were presidential association, 
the use of contrast— particularly from one's opposition, and 
appeals to basic American values. It was speculated that the 
failure of Nixon's Watergate apologia could have been attri­
buted to his inordinate reliance on presidential omnipotence 
and the fact that this address was lacking in Nixon's funda­
mental tactic of contrast.
Rhetoricians have noted that the long and controversial 
political career of Richard Nixon resulted in an unprecedented 
use of the apologia f o r u m . I  have further theorized that 
Nixon has had an identifiable influence on contemporary apologia. 
Dating as far back as the ancient Greek civilization, however, 
there have been numerous examples of rhetors thrust into this
^^Harrell, Ware, and Linkugel, "Failure of Apology,"
p. 245.
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critical rhetorical situation. Some of the most interesting 
rhetoric of history was produced by those rhetors who stood 
before the bar of public opinion and spoke in defense of thera-
14
selves. Indeed, thoughtful analysis of self-defense rhetoric 
is a fascinating and worthwhile endeavor, particularly to stu­
dents of persuasive communication. The critical system used 
in this study— Ware and Linkugel (1973)— proved to be a 
fruitful method for examining this genre of apologia. More­
over, I suggest that subsequent researchers of apologia con­
sider this analytic system to make their critical moment a 
revealing one.
See, for example: Socrates' "Apology"; Isocrates'
"On the Antidoses"; Demosthenes’ "On the Crown"; Sir Thomas 
More's "Remarks at His trial"; Martin Luther's "Speech at the 
Diet of Worms"; Susan B. Anthony's "Is It a Crime for a 
United States Citizen to Vote?"; Douglas MacArthur's "Address 
to Congress"; Harry S. Truman's "Television Address on Harry 
Dexter White"; Adlai Stevenson's "The Hiss Case"; and Edward 
Kennedy's "Chappaquiddick Address."
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APPENDIX A 
LETTER FROM KENNETH KHACHIGIAN
August 10, 1978
Mr. Robert A. Vartabedian 
407 Pinecrest 
Wichita, Kansas 67208
Dear Mr. Vartabedian;
In response to your request for information for your 
Master's thesis, I have drafted up some answers 
which you might find helpful. They follow:
Q: Does President Nixon have any particular theory on
what he believes to be the key ingredients of an effective 
political speech? (Any elaboration on this question 
through specific examples from his long political 
career —  or of other political figures —  would be 
appreciated.)
A: While each speech is different, there are a number
of common ingredients that President Nixon believes are 
essential to a good speech.
(1) Preparation - This is the most important 
element of them all. President Nixon sets aside several 
days of uninterrupted time to prepare for a major speech.
Only preparation permits a speaker to develop a coherent, 
logical and persuasive presentation. Writing, re-writing, 
organization and total familiarity with the material
are essential to get his message across in the most 
effective manner —  to know what the central theme is 
and to deliver it well.
As you noted in reading RN, virtually every important 
speech President Nixon delivered included intense 
preparation: the.March, 1954 speech in response to Adlai 
Stevenson; the 1960 and 1968 Acceptance Speeches; the 
Lakeside Speech at Bohemian Grove in 1967; the November 3, 1969 
'Silent Majority" speech are examples.
(2) Addressing the Audience - Each speech must 
address the audience that is listening. A speech to a 
small group of, say, visiting Boy Scouts that will be 
heard only by those in the room requires different delivery 
and presentation than a speech on television to be
heard and watched around the world. Speeches to political 
conventions are good examples of the problem that is raised 
in deciding which audience to address. The audience in 
the hall is excited, partisan,. and anxious for rhetorical 
flourish. In a large hall that audience might.number 15,000 
people. But.on television and radio, the audience might
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be 70 to 80 million people, and after replays on news 
broadcasts, the audience that hears the speech may 
jump to over 100 million in America alone. It is the wise 
political speaker who determines that he must address 
idle convention in such a way as to ensure that his 
message reaches, the entire voting public. Thus, eye 
contact with the television audience is at least as 
important as eye contact with those in the hall. President 
Nixon's Acceptance speech of 1968 —  which you should 
watch if possible —  is really a classic in this genre.
Both the partisan crowd and the broader audience were 
reached very effectively.
(3) Brevity - Lincoln's Second Inaugural and his 
Gettysburg Address are superb examples of how eloquence 
and a message can be maintained in very short speeches. 
President Nixon tried whenever possible to keep his 
speeches short. There are occasions, of course, when 
complex issues or the need for elaborate explanation, 
make absolute brevity shortsighted, if not impossible. 
Nevertheless, as a general rule, a point worth making 
is worth making briefly.
(4) Apecdotes, Quotations and Stories - These should 
only be used when they help make a point better than the 
speaker can make in his own words and when they drive home 
a point very effectively through illustration. Too many 
public speakers are inclined to toss in quotations which 
sound eloquent, but in fact may not be apt. President 
Nixon feels strongly that quotations should never be
just thrown in a speech haphazardly. They should be 
introduced with a little background —  to capture if 
possible the drama and import of the original speaker's 
presentation.
You will note in a review of President Nixon's 
speeches that he uses quotations only selectively. The 
Lincoln quote used in the Fund speech of 1952 was 
particularly apt. It made a point better than it could 
have been made otherwise. More often than not, the 
President preferred a story, sometimes out of his own 
experience, to reach his audience. One of the best 
examples of this is in his speech to the Russian people 
in May, 1972. He referred to a diary he had read at 
Leningrad's Piskaryev Cemetery —  the poignant story of 
the death of a 12-year-old girl and all the members of 
her'family. No words could have better made his point 
about the grim consequences of war; and there was no 
better way to capture his Russian audience than this 
reference to the heroic stand of the Russians during the 
Nazi siege at Leningrad in World War II.
(5) Newsworthiness - The age of mass communications 
has transformed the art of rhetoric. Today, an essential 
ingredient of a speech is for it to include something 
that will command attention. Newsmen call the central
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point of their stories the "lead." Thus, the modern 
speaker must think out what the "lead" of his speech 
will be; what the central point is; and what will be 
deemed most newsworthy. Like it or not, aphorisms and 
homilies compete with substance in modern communications. 
It is helpful to come up with a unique way of saying 
something, a perceptive thought, and a fresh presentation 
that is forceful in wording or memorable in impact and 
delivery. Two examples that come to mind are the call 
to the "Silent Majority" in 1969 and this line from 
President Nixon's Second Inaugural; "Government must 
learn to take less from the people so that people 
can do more for themselves."
(6) The Peroration - A good peroration is one of 
the most difficult elements for any speaker. It takes 
great skill to bring all points of the address together 
thematically and to leave the audience on a high note.
It folds together logic, eloquence and a flair for the 
dramatic. Care must be taken not to overdo the 
peroration; a bad peroration can ruin an otherwise 
effective speech.
Q: Did President Nixon consider his obvious skill in
public speaking (in both substance and delivery) a 
significant factor contributing to his political career? 
(•Again, any elaboration on this question through specific 
examples from his long political career would be appreciated.)
A: Yes. In his first political campaign, it was the
debates with his better-known opponent that were so 
important to President Nixon's victory. His presentation 
was sharp, concise, and reflected substantial preparation.
His opponent's presentation was methodical, plodding, 
technical and much more boring. The difference between 
the challenger's abilities and the experienced five-term 
incumbent's less effective presentation was telling. It 
appeared that Mr. Nixon knew Congressman Voorhis’s record 
better than Voorhis himself.
There are several other examples where President 
Nixon's skill as a public speaker was a significant factor 
in his success —  the Senate campaign against Helen 
Douglas; the Fund Speech; the speech in 1952 before the 
New York State Republican dinner which caused Governor 
Dewey to predict the presidency some day for then Senator 
Nixon; the Lakeside Speech at Bohemian Grove which, 
because of the important audience and the substance of 
the speech, played a key role in President Nixon's 
comeback in 1968.
Nevertheless, public speaking is not, in the end, 
a substitute for competence. The most eloquent man 
in the world could not survive in politics if he is an 
incompetent administrator or an ineffective leader.
The quality of one's work is always much more important 
than the glibness of his speech.
* * * * *
page 4
Best of luck to you as you move ahead for your 
PhD.
Cordially,
Kenneth L. Khachigian
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Mï SIDE OF THE STORY: A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS*
Analysis
1. There is a clear differ­
entiation of Nixon from 
the Truman Administration.
2. A transcendental strategy 
is demonstrated as Nixon 
alludes to the actual 
office of the Vice Presi­
dency and its inherent 
greatness.
3. The charge against Nixon 
is differentiated,
4. Nixon differentiates the 
legal and especially moral 
wrongness of the charge 
into three categories.
M'
Denials are offered for 
each of the categories of 
possible impropriety. 
Within these denials, 
Nixon makes an important 
differentiation between 
personal use of the fund 
and using it for politi­
cal expenses.
Speech
Y  Fellow Americans: I  come before you tonight as 
a candidate for the Vice Presidency and as a man
  whose honesty and integrity have been questioned.
The usual political thing to do when charges are made 
against you is to either ignore them or to deny them with­
out giving details.
I  believe we’ve had enough of that in the United States, 
particularly with the present Administration in Washington, 
D . C. T o  me the office of the Vice Presidency of the United 
States is a great office, and I feel that the people have got to 
have confidence in the integrity of the men who run for that 
office and who might obtain it.
I  have a theory, too, that the best and only answer to a 
smear or jo  an honest misunderstanding of the facts is to tell 
the truth. And that’s why I ’m here tonight. I  want to tell 
you my side of the case.
I  am sure that you have read the charge and you’ve heard 
that I, Senator Nixon, took $18,000 from a group of my 
supporters.
W as  I t  W r o n g ?
Now, was that wrong? And let me say that it was wrong 
— I ’m saying, incidentally, that it was wrong and not just 
illegal. Because it isn’t a question of whether it was legal or 
illegal, that isn’t enough. The question is, was it morally 
wrong?
I  say that it was morally wrong if any of that $18,000 
went to Senator Nixon for my personal use. I  say that it_ 
was morally wrong if it was secretly given and secretly 
handled. And I say that it was morally wrong if any of the 
contributors got special favors for the contributions that they 
made.
And now to answer those questions let me say this:
Not one cent of the $18,000 or any other money of that 
type ever went to me for my personal use. Every penny of 
it was used to pay for political expenses that I  did not think 
should be charged to the taxpayers of the United States.
I t  was not a secret fund. As a matter of fact, when I  was 
on “Meet the Press,” some of you may have seen it last Sun­
day— Peter Edson came up to me after the program and he 
said, “Dick, what about this fund we hear about?” And I  
said. W ell, there’s no secret about it. Go out and see Dana 
Smith, who was the administrator of the fund. And I  gave 
him his address, and I  said that you will find that the pur­
pose of the fund simply was to defray political expenses that 
I  did not feel should be charged to the Government.
*Richard M. Nixon, "My Side of the Story," Vital Speeches 
of the Day. 19 (October 15, 1952), 11-15.
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8
Bolstering is evident 
as Nixon attempts to 
identify himself as 
working with the 
Veterans Administration
Nixon differentiates 
between proper and im­
proper Senatorial use 
of taxpayer's money.
And third, let me point out, and I  want to make this par­
ticularly clear, that no contributor to this fund, no contribu­
tor to any of my campaign, has ever received any consider­
ation that he would not have received as an ordinary con­
stituent.
I  just don’t believe in that and I  can say that never, while 
I  have been in the Senate of the United States, as far as the 
people that contributed to this fund are concerned, have I 
made a telephone call for them to an agency, or have I  gone 
down to an agency in their behalf. And the record will show 
that, the records which are in the hands of the Adminis­
tration.
W h .^ t  for AXD W h y ?
But then some of you will say and rightly, “Well, what 
did you use the fund for. Senator? W hy did you have to 
have it?”
Let me tell you in just a word how a Senate ofHce oper­
ates. First of all, a Senator gets $15,000 a year in salary. 
He gets enough money to pay for one trip a year, a round 
trip that is, for himself and his family between his home and 
Washington, D . C.
And then he gets an allowance to handle the people that 
work in his office, to handle his mail. And the allowance 
for my State of California is enough to hire thirteen people.
And let me say, incidentally, that that allowance is not 
paid to the Senator— it’s paid directly to the individuals that 
the Senator puts on his payroll, that all of these people and 
all of these allowances are for strictly official business. Busi­
ness, for example, when a constituent writes in and wants 
you to go down to the Veterans Administration and get some 
information about his G I policy. Items of that type for ex­
ample.
But there are other expenses which are not covered by the 
Government. And 1 think I  can best discuss those expenses 
by asking you some questions. Do you think that when I  or 
any other Senator makes a political speech, has it printed, 
should charge the printing of that speech and the mailing of 
that speech to the taxpayers ?
Do you think, for exaniple, when I  or any other Senator 
makes a trip to his home state to make a purely political 
speech that the cost of that trip should be charged to the tax­
payers ?
Do you think when a Senator makes political broadcasts 
or political television broadcasts, radio or television, that the 
expense of those broadcasts should be charged to the tax­
payers?
W ell, I  know what your answer is. The same answer that 
audiences give me whenever I  discuss this particular prob-
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9. A bolstering strategy 
is apparent as Nixon 
attempts to identify 
himself with the not so 
well-to-do but honest 
Americans.
10. There is a differentia­
tion of Nixon from his 
Democratic counterpart, 
John Sparkman, who has 
put his wife on the 
payroll for the past 
ten years.
11. A differentiation is 
made between deceiving 
taxpayers into paying 
for primarily political 
business and what he has 
done— using willing 
contributors' money.
Speech
lem. The answer is, "no." The taxpayers shouldn’t be re­
quired to finance items which are not official business but 
which are primarily political business.
But then the question arises, you say, "W ell, how do you 
pay for these and how can you do it legally ?”
And there are several ways that it can be done, inci­
dentally, and that it is done legally in the United States 
Senate and in the Congress.
The first way is to be a rich man. I  don’t  happen to be a 
rich man so I  couldn’t use that.
Another way that is used is to put your wife on the pay­
roll. Let me say, incidentally, my opponent, my opposite 
number for the Vice Presidency on the Democratic ticket, 
does have his wife on the payroll. And has had her on his 
payroll for the ten years— the past ten years.
Now just let me say this. That’s his business and I'm  not 
critical of him for doing that. You w ill have to pass judg­
ment on that particular point. But I  have never done that 
for this reason. I  have found that there arc so many deserv­
ing stenographers and secretaries in Washington that needed 
the work that I  just didn’t feel it was right to put my wife 
on the payroll.
M y wife’s sitting over here. She’s a wonderful stenog­
rapher. She used to teach stenography and she used to teach 
shorthand in high school. That was when I  met her. And I  
can tell you folks that she’s worked many hours at night and 
many hours on Saturdays and Sundays in my office'and she's 
done a fine job. And I ’m proud to say tonight that in the 
six years I ’ve been in the House and the Senate of the 
United States, Pat Nixon has never been on the Government 
payroll.
There are other ways that these finances can be taken care 
of. Some who are lawyers, and I  happen to be a lawyer, con­
tinue to practice law. But I  haven’t been able to do that. 
I ’m so far away from California that I ’ve been so busy with 
my Senatorial work that I  have not engaged in any legal 
practice.
And also as far as law practice is concerned, it seemed to 
me that the relationship between an attorney and the client 
was so personal that you couldn’t possibly represent a man 
as an attorney and then have an unbiased view when he pre­
sented his case to you in the event that he had one before the 
Government.
And so I  felt that the best way to handle these necessary 
political expenses of getting my message to the American 
people and the speeches I  made, the speeches that I  had 
printed, for the most part, concerned this one message— of 
exposing this Administration, the communism in it, the cor­
ruption in it— the only way that I  could do that was to ac­
cept the aid which people in my home state of California who 
contributed to my campaign and who continued to make 
these contributions after I  was elected were glad to make.
No Sp e c u l  F avors
And let me say I  am proud of the fact that not one of 
them has ever asked me for a special favor. I'm  proud of 
the fact that not one of them has ever asked me to vote on 
a bill other than as my own conscience would dictate. And 
I  am proud of the fact that the taxpayers by subterfuge or 
otherwise have never paid one dime for expenses which I  
thought were political and shouldn’t be charged to the tax­
payers.
Let me say, incidentally, that some of you may say, “Well, 
that’s all right. Senator; that’s your explanation, but have 
you got any proof?”
And I ’d like to tell you tJiis evening that just about an
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12.There is a differentia­
tion between Nixon's 
own opinion of the pro­
priety of his use of the 
fund and the legal 
opinion of his indepen­
dent audit.
13. In the midst of his 
financial history, Nixon 
uses a bolstering 
strategy as he identi­
fies himself with the 
rather heroic World 
War II American soldier.
!iour a"o v\c received an independent audit of this entire 
fund.
1 suRgested to Gov. Sherman Adams, wlio is the chief of 
staff of the Dwight Eisenhower campaign, that an independ­
ent audit and legal report be obtained. And I  have that 
audit here in my hand.
I t ’s an audit made by the Price, Waterhouse & Co. firm, 
and the legal opinion by Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, lawyers 
in Los Angeles, the biggest law firm and incidentally one of 
the best ones in Los Angeles.
I'm  proud to be able to report to you tonight that this 
audit and this legal opinion is being forwarded to General 
Eisenhower. And I ’d like to read to you the opinion that 
was prepared by Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher and based on all 
the pertinent laws and statutes, together with the audit re­
port prepared by the certified public accountants.
“ I t  is our conclusion that Senator Nixon did not obtain 
any financial gain from the collection and disbursement of 
the fund by Dana Smith; that Senator Nixon did not violate 
any Federal or state law by reason of the operation of the 
fund, and that neither the portion of the fund paid by Dana 
Smith directly to third persons nor the portion paid to Sen­
ator Nixon to reimburse him for designated office expenses 
constituted income to the Senator which was either report­
able or taxable as income under applicable tax laws, 
(signed) Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher by Alma H . Conway.”
Now that, my friends, is not Nixon speaking, but that’s 
an independent audit which was requested because I  want 
the American people to know all the facts and I ’m npt afraid 
of having independent people go in and check the facts, and 
that is exactly what they did.
But then I  realize that there are still some who may 
say, and rightly so, and let me say that I  recognize that some 
will continue to smear regardless of what the truth may be, 
but that there has been understandably some honest misun­
derstanding on this matter, and there’s some that will say :
“W ell, maybe you were able. Senator, to fake this thing. 
How can we believe what you say? After all, is there a pos­
sibility that maybe you got some sums in cash? Is there a 
possibility that you may have feathered your own nest?”
F in . n^ c ia l  H is to r y
And so now what I  am going to do— and incidentally this 
is unprecedented in the history of American politics— I  am 
going at this time to give to this television and radio audi­
ence a complete financial history; everj’thing I ’ve earned; 
everything I ’ve spent; everything I  owe. And I  want you 
to know the facts. I ’ll have to start early.
I  was born in 1913. Our family was one of modest cir­
cumstances and most of my early life was spent in a store out 
in East Whittier. - I t  was a grocery store— one of those 
family enterprises. The only reason we were able to make it 
go was because my mother and dad had five boys and we all 
worked in the store.
I  worked my way through college and to a great extent 
through law school. And then, in 1940, probably the best 
thing that ever happened to me happened, I  married Pat—  
sitting over here. W e had a rather difficult time after we 
were married, like so many of the young couples who may 
be listening to us. I  practiced law; she continued to teach 
School. I  went into the service.
Let me say that my service record was not a particularly 
unusual one. I  went to the South Pacific. I  guess I ’m en­
titled to a couple of battle stars. I  got a couple of letters of 
commendation but I  was just there when the bombs were 
falling and then I  returned. I  returned to the United States 
and in 1946 I  ran for the Congress.
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14. A bolstering strategy 
is apparent as Nixon 
identifies himself as 
a patriotic American 
with "every cent" 
of his money in Govern­
ment bonds.
Wlicn we came out of the war, Pat and 1— Pat during the 
war had worked as a stenographer and in a bank and as an 
economist for a Government agency— and when we came 
out the total of our savings from both my law practice, her 
teaching and all the time that I  was in the war— the total 
for that entire period was just a little less than $10,000. 
Ever)’ cent of that, incidentally, was in Government bonds.
W ell, that’s where we start when I  go into politics. Now 
what have I earned since I  went into politics? W ell, here it 
is— I  jotted it down, let me read the notes. First of all I ’ve 
had my salary as a Congressman and as a Senator. Second, 
I  have received a total in this past six years of $1,600 from 
estates which were in my law firm at the time that I  severed 
my connection with it.
And, incidentally, as I  said before, 1 have not engaged in 
any legal practice and have not accepted any fees from busi­
ness that came into the firm after I  went into politics. I  have 
made an average of aproximately $1,500 a year from non- 
political speaking engagements and lectures. And then, for­
tunately, we’ve inherited a little money. Pat sold her inter­
est in her father’s estate for $3,000 and I  inherited $1,500 
from my grandfather.
W e live rather modestly. For four years we lived in an 
apartment in Park Fairfax, in Alexandria, Va. The rent 
was $80 a month. And we saved for the time that we could 
buy a house.
Now, that was what we took in: W hat did we do with 
this money? W hat do we have today to show for it? This 
will surprise you, because it is so little, I  suppose, as stand­
ards generally go, of people in public life. First of all, we’ve 
got a house in Washington which cost $41,000 and on which 
we owe $20,000.
W e have a house in Whittier, Calif., which cost $13,000 
and on which we owe $10,000. M y  folks are living there at 
the present time.
I  have just $4,000 in life insurance, plus my G. I .  policy 
which I ’ve never been able to convert and which w ill run 
out in two years. I  have no life insurance whatever on Pat. 
I  have no life insurance on our two youngsters, Patricia and 
Julie. I  own a 1950 Oldsmobile car. W e have our furniture. 
W e have no stocks and bonds of any type. W e have no inter­
est of any kind, direct or indirect, in any business.
W h a t  D o W e O w e ?
Now, that’s what we have. W hat do we owe? W ell, in 
addition to the mortgage, the $20,000 mortgage on the house 
in Washington, the $10,000 one on the house in Whittier, 
I  owe $4,500 to the Riggs Bank in Washington, D . C. with 
interest 4J4 per cent.
I  owe $3,500 to my parents and the i.iterest on that loan 
which I  pay regularly, because it’s the part of the savings 
they made through the years they were working so hard, I  
pay regularly 4 per cent interest. And then I  have a $500 
loan which I  have on my life insurance.
W ell, that’s about it. That’s what we have and that’s 
what we owe. I t  isn’t very much but Pat and I  have the 
satisfaction that every dime that we’ve got is honestly ours. 
I  should say this— that Pat doesn’t have a mink coat. But 
she does have a respectable Republican cloth coat. And I  
always tell her that she’d look good in anything.
One other thing I  probably should tell you because if I  
don’t they’ll probably be saying this about me too, we did 
get something— a gift— after the election. A  man down in 
Texas heard Pat on the radio mention the fact that our two 
youngsters would like to have a dog. And, believe it or not, 
the day before we left on this campaign trip we got a mes­
sage from Union Station in Baltimore saying they had a
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15. Nixon further holsters 
his image as he identi­
fies himself as a coura­
geous individual who is 
willing to confront dif­
ficult tasks in spite of 
personal hardships.
16. A strategic differen­
tiation is made between 
Nixon and the very 
wealthy Adlai Stevenson,
17. A bolstering strategy
is demonstrated as Nixon 
identifies his beliefs 
with a statement made 
by Abraham Lincoln.
18. An implied differentia­
tion is made between 
Nixon's conduct and 
that of his opponents 
Stevenson and Sparkman.
19. There is a differentia­
tion between what Nixon 
has done— a complete 
financial history— and 
what Stevenson and 
Sparkman should do— con­
sidering the allegations
package for us. W c went 'down to get it. You know what 
it was.
I t  was af little cocker spaniel dog in a crate that he sent 
all the way from Texas. Black and white spotted. And our 
little girl— Trisha, the 6-year-old— named it Checkers. And 
you know, the kids love the dog and 1 just want say this right 
now, that regardless of what they say about it, we’re gonna 
keep it.
I t  isn’t easy to come before a nation-wide audience and air 
your life as I ’ve done. But 1 want to say some things before 
I  conclude that I  think most of you will agree on. M r. 
Mitchell, the chairman of the Democratic National Com­
mittee, made the statement that if a man couldn’t afford to 
be in the United States Senate he shouldn’t run for the 
Senate.
And I  just want to make my position clear. I  don’t agree 
with M r. Mitchell when he says that only a rich man should 
serve his Government in the United States Senate or in the 
Congress.
I  don’t believe that represents the thinking of the Demo­
cratic party, and I  know that it doesn’t represent the think­
ing of the Republican Party.
I  believe that it’s fine that a man like Governor Steven­
son who inherited a fortune from his father can run for 
President. But 1 also feel that it’s essential in this country 
of ours that a man of modest means can also run for Presi­
dent. Because, you know, remember Abraham Lincoln, you 
remember what he said: ‘God must have loved the common 
people— he made so many of them.’
C ourses  of  C o n d u c t
And now I ’m going to suggest some courses of conduct.
First of all, you have read in the papers about other funds 
now. M r . Stevenson, apparently, had a couple. One of them 
in which a group of business people paid and helped to sup­
plement the salaries of state employees. Here is where the 
money went directly into their pockets.
And 1 think that what M r. Stevenson should do should be 
to come before the American people as 1 have, give the names 
of the people that have contributed to that fund ; give the 
names of the people who put this money into their pockets at 
the same time that they were receiving money from their 
state government, and see what favors, if any, they gave out 
for that.
1 don't condemn M r. Stevenson for what he did. But 
until the facts are in there there is a doubt that will be 
raised.
And as far as M r . Sparkman is concerned, I  would sug­
gest the same thing. He’s had his wife on the payroll. I  
don’t condemn him for that. But I  think that he should 
come before the American people and indicate what outside 
sources of income he has had.
I  would suggest that under the circumstances both M r. 
Sparkman and M r. Stevenson should come before the Amer­
ican people as I  have and make a complete financial state­
ment as to their financial history. And if they don’t it will 
be an admission that they have something to. hide. And I  
think that you w ill agree with me.
Because, folks, remember, a man that’s to be President of 
the United States, a man that’s to be Vice President of the 
United States must have the confidence of all the people. 
And that’s why I ’m doing what I ’m doing, and that’s why 
I  suggest that M r . Stevenson and M r. Sparkman since they 
are under attack should do what 1 am doing.
Now, let me say this: I  know that this is not the last of 
the smears. In  spite of my explanation tonight other smears
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20, A bolstering strategy 
is illustrated as 
Nixon reinforces his 
role in the Alger Hiss 
case.
21, A transcendental strat­
egy is implied as Nixon 
joins those columnists 
and commentators who 
attacked him then, with 
those who attack him 
now.
22, Nixon uses a bolstering 
strategy as he identi­
fies his fighting spirit 
and love for this 
troubled country with 
the only man who can 
save America, his run­
ning mate, Eisenhower.
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made between the Presi­
dential actions that 
Eisenhower would take 
and those which Steven­
son would pursue.
24, There is a differentia­
tion, in particular, of 
Eisenhower's and Steven­
son's stand on Communism
will be made; others have been made in the past. And the 
purpose of the smears, I  know, is this— to silence me, to make 
me let up. .
W ell, they just don’t know who they're dealing with. 
I ’m going to tell you this: I  remember in the dark days of 
the Hiss case some of the same columnists, some of the same 
radio commentators who are attacking me now and misre­
presenting my position were violently opposing me at the 
time I  was after Alger Hiss.
T o  C o n t in u e  F ig h t
But I  continued the fight because I  knew I  was right. 
And I  can say to this great television and radio audience 
that I  have no apologies to the American people for my part 
in putting Alger Hiss where he is today.
And as far as this is concerned, I  intend to continue the 
fight.
W hy do I  feel so deeply? W hy do I  feel that in spite of 
the smears, the misunderstandings, the necessities for a man 
to come up here and bare his soul as I  have ? W hy is it nec­
essary for me to continue this fight?
And I  want to tell you why. Because, you see, I  love my 
country. And I  think my country is in danger. And I think 
that the only man that can save America at this time is the 
man that’s running for President on my ticket— Dwight 
Eisenhower.
You say, “W hy do I  think it’s in danger?” and I  say 
look at the record. Seven years of the Truman-Acheson Ad­
ministration and what’s happened? Six hundred million peo­
ple lost to the Communists, and a war in Korea in which 
we have lost 117,000 American casualties.
And I say to all of you that a policy that results in a loss 
of 600,000,000 to the Communists and a war which costs 
us 117,000 American casualties isn’t good enough for Amer­
ica.
And I  say that those in the State Department that made 
the mistakes which caused that war and which resulted in 
those losses should be kicked out of the State Department 
just as fast as we can get ’em out of there.
And let me say that I know M r. Stevenson won’t do that. 
Beeause he defends the Truman policy and I  know that 
Dwight Eisenhower w ill do that, and that he will give 
America the leadership that it needs.
Take the problem of corruption. You’ve read about the 
mess in Washington. M r . Stevenson can’t clean it up be­
cause he was picked by the man, Truman, under whose Ad­
ministration the mess was made. You wouldn’t trust a man 
who made the mess to clean it up— that’s Truman. And by 
the same, token you can’t trust the man who was picked by 
the man that made the mess to clean it up— and that’s 
Stevenson.
And so I  say, Eisenhower, who owes nothing to Truman, 
nothing to the big city bosses, he is the man that can clean 
up the mess in Washington.
Take Communism. I  say that as far as that subject is 
concerned, the danger is great to America. In the Hiss case 
they got the secrets which enabled them to break the Amer­
ican secret State Department code. They got secrets in the 
atomic bomb case which enabled ’em to get the secret of the 
atomic bomb, five years before they would have gotten it by 
their own devices.
And I  say that any man who called the Alger Hiss case a 
“red herring” isn’t fit to be President of the United States. 
I  say that a man who like M r. Stevenson has pooh-poohed 
and ridiculed the Communist threat in the United States—  
he said that they are phantoms among ourselves; he’s accused
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25. A transcendental strat­
egy is used to equate 
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government.
25. There is an implied
differentiation between 
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us that have attempted to expose the Communists of looking 
for Communists in the Bureau of Fisheries and Wildlife—  
1 say that a man who says that isn’t qualified to be President 
of the United States.
And I  say that the only man who can lead us in this fight 
to rid the Government of both those who are Communists 
and those who have corrupted this Government is Eisen­
hower, because Eisenhower, you can be sure, recognizes the 
problem and he knows how to deal with it.
Now let me say that, finally, this evening I  want to read 
to you just briefly excerpts from a letter which I  received, 
a letter which, after all this is over, no one can take away 
from me. I t  reads as follows:
“Dear Senator Nixon,
“Since I'm only 19 years of age I  can’t vote in this Presi­
dential election but believe me if I  could you and General 
Eisenhower would certainly get my vote. M y  husband is 
in the Fleet Marines in Korea. He’s a corpsman on the front 
lines and we have a two-month-old son he’s never seen. • And 
I  feel confident that with great Americans like you and Gen­
eral Eisenhower in the White House, lonely Americans like 
myself will be united with their loved ones now in Korea.
" I  only pray to God that you won’t be too late. Enclosed 
is a small check to help you in your campaign. Living on 
$85 a month it is all I  can afford at present. But let me Imow 
what else I  can do.”
Folks, it’s a check for $10, and it’s one that I  will never 
cash.
And just let me say this. W e hear a lot about prosperity 
these days but I  say, why can’t we have prosperity built on
peace rather than prosperity built on war? W hy can’t we 
have prosperity and an honest government in Washington, 
D . C., at the same time. Believe me, we can. And Eisen­
hower is the man that can lead this crusade to bring us that 
kind of prosperity.
And, now, finally, I  know that you wonder whether or 
not I  am going to stay on the Republican ticket or resign.
Let me say this: I  don’t believe that I  ought to quit be­
cause I ’m not a quitter. And, incidentally, Pat’s not a quit­
ter., After all, her name was Patricia Ryan and she was born 
on St. Patrick’s Day, and you know the Irish never quit.
But the decision, my friends, is not mine. I  would do 
nothing that would harm the possibilities of Dwight Eisen­
hower to become President of the United States. And for 
that reason I  am submitting to the Republican National 
Committee tonight through this television broadcast the de­
cision which it is theirs to make.
Let them decide whether my position on the ticket will 
help or hurt. And I  am going to ask you to help them de­
cide. W ire and write the Republican National Committee 
whether you think I  should stay on or whether I  should get 
off. And whatever their decision is, I  w ill abide by it.
But just let me say this last word. Regardless of what 
happens I ’m going to continue this fight. I ’m going to cam­
paign up and down America until we drive the crooks and 
the Communists and those that defend them out of Wash­
ington. And remember, folks, Eisenhower is a great man. 
Believe me. He’s a great man. And a vote for Eisenhower 
is a vote for what’s good for America.
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Analysis
1. A familiar Nixon strategy 
is demonstrated here as 
he differentiates between 
the easy course of action 
and what he believes to 
be his greater obligation
2. A transcendental strategy 
is apparent as Nixon re­
lates U.S. involvement
in Vietnam to the future 
of peace and freedom 
for the world.
3. A differentiation is 
made between the impor­
tance of being re-electec 
and Nixon's greater obli­
gation to the future
of the world,
4. Nixon differentiates 
that the essential ques­
tion is not who is for 
peace or who is to blame, 
but how can peace be won.
Speech
Go o d  e v e n in g , my feliow Americans. Tonight I  want to talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all Americans and to many people in all parts of the world, the war in Vietnam.
I  believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about 
Vietnam is that many Americans have lost confidence in what 
their Government has told them about our policy. The 
American people cannot and should not be asked to support a 
policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace 
unless they know the truth about that policy.
Tonight, therefore, I  would like to answer some of the 
questions that I  know are on the minds of many of you 
listening to me.
How and why did America get involved in Vietnam in the 
first place?
How has this Administration changed the policy of the 
previous Administration?
What has really happened in the negotiations in Paris and 
the battlefront in Vietnam?
What choices do we have if we are to end the war?
What are the prospects for peace?
Now let me begin by describing the situation I  found when 
I  was inaugurated on Jan. 20th: The war had been going on 
for four years. Thirty-one thousand Americans had been killed 
in action. The training program for the South Vietnamese was 
behind schedule. Five hundred forty-thousand Americans were 
in Vietnam with no plans to reduce the number. No progress 
had been made at the negotiations in Paris and the United 
States had not put forth a comprehensive peace proposal
The war was causing deep division at home and criticism 
from many of our friends, as well as our enemies, abroad.
In view of these circumstances, there were some who urged 
that I end the war at once by ordering the immediate 
withdrawal of all American forces. From a political standpoint, 
•this would have been a popular and easy course to follow. 
After all, we became involved in the war while my predecessor 
, was in office.
I  could blame the defeat, which would be the result of mj 
action, on him— and come out as the peacemaker.
Some put it to me quite bluntly: this was the only way to 
avoid allowing Johnson’s war to become Nixon’s war.
But I  had a greater obligation than to think only of thj 
years of my Administration, and of the next election. I had to 
think of the effect of my decision on the next generation, atul 
on the future of peace and freedom in America, and in tht 
world.
I  Let us all understand that the question before us is not 
, whether some Americans are for peace and some Americans 
are against peace. The question at issue is not whether 
Johnson’s war becomes Nixon's war. The great question is; 
How can we win America’s peace?
Richard M. Nixon, "A Vietnam Plan," Vital Speeches of
the Day. 36 (November 15, 1969), 66-70.
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5. Bolstering is evident
as Nixon identifies him­
self with those who have 
been critical of the way 
the war was conducted—  
particularly by the John­
son Administration.
6 . A transcendental strategy 
is illustrated as Nixon 
relates withdrawal of 
American forces from 
Vietnam to a disaster 
for the cause of peace.
7. An additional transcen­
dental device is apparent 
as Nixon relates a U.S. 
defeat in Vietnam to a 
collapse of confidence
in American leadership 
throughout the world.
8 . A bolstering strategy
is demonstrated as Nixon 
identifies his conclu­
sions on the Vietnam 
situation with those 
reached by previous 
Presidents.
9. A transcendental strat­
egy is used as Nixon 
relates U.S. defeat
in Vietnam with betray­
ing one's friends, pro­
moting reckless con­
quests, sparking vio­
lence, and ultimately 
more deaths from more 
war.
Speech
Well, let us turn now to the fundamental issue: why and 
how did the United States become involved in Vietnam in tbt 
first place? Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with die 
logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet Union, 
launched a campaign to impose a Communist government on 
South Vietnam by instigating and supporting a revolution.
In response to the request of the Government of Soud: 
Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military 
equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their 
efforts to prevent a Communist takeover.
Seven years ago, President Kermedy sent 16,000 military 
personnel to Vietnam as combat advisers. Four years ago, 
President Johnson sent American combat forces to Soud: 
Viemam. .
Now many believe that President Johnson’s decision to send 
American combat forces to South Vietnam was wrong. And 
. many others, I  among them, have been strongly critical of the 
way the war has been conducted.
But the question facing us today is— now that we are in the 
war, what is the best way to end it?
In January I  could only conclude that the précipitait 
withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnam would be i
disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States 
and for the cause of peace.
For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal 
would inevitably allow the Communists to repeat the 
massacres which followed their takeover in the North 15 years 
before. They then murdered more than 50,000 people and 
hundreds of thousands more died in slave labor camps.
W e saw a prelude of what would happen in South Vietnam 
when the Communists entered the city of Hue last year. 
During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign of 
terror in which 3,000 civilians were clubbed, shot to death, 
and buried in mass graves.
With the sudden collapse of our support, these atrocities at 
Hue would become the nightmare of the entire nation and 
particularly for the million-and-a half Catholic refugees who 
fled to South Vietnam when the Communists took over in the 
North.
For the United States this first defeat in our nation’s history 
would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership 
not only in Asia but throughout the world.
Three American Presidents have recognized the great stakes 
involved in Vietnam and understood what had to be done.
In 1963 President Kennedy with his characteristic, 
eloquence and clarity said we want to see a stable Government 
there, carrying on the struggle to maintain its national 
independence.
W e believe strongly in that. We are not going to withdraw 
from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that 
effort would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam but 
Southeast Asia. So we re going to stay there.
President Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed the 
same conclusion during their terms of office. For the future of 
peace, precipitate withdrawal would be a disaster of immense 
magnitude.
A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets 
down its friends. Our defeat and humiliation in South 
Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the 
councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned 
their goals of world conquest.
This would spark violence wherever our commitments help 
maintain the peace— in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually 
even in the Western Hemisphere.
Ultimately, this would cost more lives. It would not bring 
peace. It would bring more war.
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10. A differentiation is 
made between points 
which are negotiable 
and those which are not- 
the freedom of the South 
Vietnamese.
11. There is also a differ­
entiation between the 
cooperativeness of the 
U.S. and the uncoopera­
tiveness of North 
Vietnam.
12. Nixon differentiates 
between public and 
private forums as a 
means of negotiating 
peace.
For these reasons I  rejected the recommendation I should 
end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our forces. I 
chose instead to change American policy on both the 
negotiating front and the battle front in order to end the war 
on many fronts. I  initiated a pursuit for peace on many 
fronts.
In a television speech on May 14, in a speech before the 
United Nations, on a number of other occasions, I  set forth 
our peace proposals in great detail. W e  have offered the 
complete withdrawal of all outside forces within one year. We 
have proposed to cease fire under international supervision. 
W e have offered free elections under international supervision 
with the Communists participating in the organization and 
conduct of the elections as an organized political force.
And the Saigon Government has pledged to accept the 
result of the election.
-  We have not put forth our proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it 
basis. W e have indicated that we’re willing to discuss the 
proposals that have been put forth by the other side. We have 
declared that anything is negotiable, except the right of the 
people of South Vietnam to determine their own future.
At the Paris peace conference Ambassador Lodge has 
demonstrated our ■ flexibility and good faith in 40 public 
meetings. Hanoi has refused even to discuss our proposals. 
They demand our unconditional acceptance of their terms 
which are that we withdraw all American forces immediately 
and unconditionally and that we overthrow the Government 
of South Vietnam as we leave.
We have not limited our peace initiatives to public forums 
and public statements. 1 recognized in January that a long and 
bitter war like this usually cannot be settled in a public 
forum.
That is why in addition to the public statements and 
negotiations, 1 have explored every possible private avenue 
that might lead to a settlement.
Tonight, 1 am taking the unprecedented step of disclosing 
to you some of our other initiatives for peace, initiatives we 
undertook privately and secretly because we thought we 
thereby might open a door which publicly would be closed.
1 did not wait for my inauguration to begin my quest for 
peace. Soon after my election, through an individual who was 
directly in contact on a personal basis with the leaders of 
North Vietnam, 1 made two private offers for a rapid, 
comprehensive settlement.
Hanoi’s replies called in effect for our surrender before 
negotiations. Since the Soviet Union furnishes most of the 
military equipment for North Vietnam, Secretary of State 
Rogers, my assistant for national security affairs. Dr. 
Kiesinger; Ambassador Lodge and 1 personally have met on a 
number of occasions with representatives of the Soviet 
Government to enlist their assistance in getting meaningful 
negotiations started.
In addition, we have had extended discussions directed 
toward that same end with representatives of other 
governments which have diplomatic relations with North 
Vietnam.
None of these initiatives have to date produced results. In 
mid-July 1 became convinced that it was necessary to make a 
major move to break the deadlock in the Paris talks.
1 spoke directly in this oflSce, where I ’m now sitting, with an 
individual who had known Ho Chi Minh on a personal basis 
for 25 years. Through him 1 sent a letter to Ho Chi Minh.
1 did this outside the usual diplomatic channels with the 
hope that with the necessity of making statements for 
propaganda removed, there might be constructive progress 
toward bringing the war to an end.
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13. There is a differentia­
tion of the question 
regarding who is at 
fault for the failure 
of negotiations.
l4. A transcendental strat­
egy is used as Nixon 
explains that his plan 
for peace— the Nixon 
Doctrine— will both end 
this war and prevent 
future Vietnams.
Speech
"Dear Mr. President:
"I realize that it is difficult to communicate meaningfully 
across the gulf of four years of war. But precisely because of 
this gulf I  wanted to take this opportunity to reaffirm in all 
solemnity my desire to work for a just peace.
"I deeply believe that the war in Viemam has gone on too 
long and delay in bringing it to an end can benefit no one, 
least of all the people of Vietnam. The time has come to move 
forward at the conference table toward an early resolution of 
this tragic war.
"You will find us forthcoming and open-minded in a 
common effort to bring the blessings of peace to the brave 
people of Vietnaia
"Let history record that at this critical juncture both sides 
turned their face towards peace rather than toward confilct 
and war."
I  received Ho Chi Minh's reply on Aug. 30, three days 
before his death. It  simply reiterated the public position North 
Vietnam had taken at Paris and flatly rejected my initiative. 
The full text of both letters is being released to the press.
In addition to the public meetings that Fve referred to. 
Ambassador Lodge has met with Vietnam’s chief negotiator in 
Paris in 11 private sessions.
And we have taken other significant initiatives which must 
remain secret to keep open some channels of communications 
which may still prove to be productive.
But the effect of all the public, private and secret 
negotiations which have been undertaken since tlie bombing 
halt a year ago, and since this Administration came into office 
on Jan. 20, can be summed up in one sentence: No progress 
whatever has been made except agreement on the shape of the 
bargaining table.
Well, now, who’s at fault? It ’s become clear that the obstacle 
in negotiating an end to the war is not the President of the 
United States. It is not the South Vietnamese Government. 
The obstacle is the other side’s absolute refusal to show the 
least willingness to join us in seeking a just peace.
And it will not do so while it is convinced that all it has to 
do is to wait for our next concession, and our next concession 
after that one, until it gets everything it wants.
There can now be no longer any question that progress in 
negotiation depends only on Hanoi’s deciding to negotiate— to 
negotiate seriously.
I realize that this report on our efforts on the diplomatic 
front is discouraging to the American people, but the 
American people are entitled to know the truth— the bad 
news as well as the good news— where the lives of our young 
men are involved.
Now let me turn, however, to a more encouraging report on 
another front. At the time we launched our search for peace, 1 
recognized we might not succeed in bringing an end to the 
war through negotiation. I  therefore put into effect another 
plan to bring peace— a plan which will bring the war to an 
end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front.
It is in line with the major shift in U. S. foreign policy 
which I described in my press conference at Guam on July 
25.
Let me briefly explain what has been described as the Nixon 
Doctrine— a policy which not only will help end the war in 
Vietnam but which is an essential element of our program to 
prevent future Vietnams.
W e Americans are a do-it-yourself people— were an 
impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, 
we like to do it ourselves. And this trait has been carried over 
into our foreign policy.
In Korea, and again in Vietnam, the United States furnished 
most of the money, most of the armament and most of the 
men to help the people of those countries defend their 
freedom against Communist aggression.
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15.
16,
A transcendental strat­
egy is evident as Nixon 
relates his military 
policy with the defense 
of freedom.
Nixon differentiates 
between the approach 
that was taken toward 
the Vietnam War by the 
Johnson Administration 
and his administration.
17,
Before any American ttoôpîWBre commited to Vietnam, a 
leader of another Asian country expressed this opinion to me 
when I  was traveling in Asia as a private citizen.
He said: "When you are trying to assist another nation 
defend its freedom, United States policy should be to help 
them fight the war, but not to fight the war for them.”
W ell in accordance with this, wise counsel, I  laid down in 
Guam three principles of guidelines for future American 
policy toward Asia,
First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commit­
ments.
As Nixon recites the 
improved statistics con­
cerning the fighting 
in Vietnam, there is 
an implied differentia­
tion between his admini­
stration and the previous 
one.
Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power 
threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation 
whose survival we consider vital to our security.
Third, in cases involving other types of aggression we shall 
furnish military and economic assistance when requested in 
accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to 
the nation directly threatened to assume the primary 
responsbiiity of providing the manpower for its defense.
After I  announced this policy, I  found that the leaders of 
the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea and other 
nations which might be threatened by Communist aggression, 
welcomed this new direction in American foreign policy.
The defense of freedom is everybody's business— not just 
America’s business. And it  is particularly the responsibility of
the people whose freedom is threatened. In the previous 
Administration, we Americanized the war in Vietnam. In this 
Administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace.
The policy of the previous Administration not only resulted 
in our assuming the primary responsibility for fighting the 
war, but even more significant did not adequately stress the 
goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could 
defend themselves when we left.
The Vietnamization plan was launched following Secretary 
Laird’s visit to Vietnam in March. Under the plan, I ordered 
first a substantial increase in the training and equipment of 
South Vietnamese forces.
In July, on my visit to Vietnam, I  changed General 
Abrams’s orders so that they were consistent with the 
objectives of our new policies.
Under the new orders, the primary mission of our troops is 
to enable the South Vietnamese forces to assume the full 
responsibility for the security of South Vietnam. Our air 
operations have been reduced by over 20 per cent
And now we have begun to see the results of this long- 
overdue change in American policy in Vietnam.
After five years of Americans going into Vietnam we are 
finally bringing American men home. By Dec. 15 over 60,000 
men will have been withdrawn from South Vietnam, including 
20 per cent of all of our combat forces.
'The South Vietnamese have continued to gain in strength. 
As a result, they have been able to take over combat 
responsibilities from our American troops.
Two other significant developments have occurred since this 
Administration took office. Enemy infiltration, infiltration 
which is essential if they are to launch a major attack over the 
last three months, is less than 20 per cent of what it was over 
the same period last year.
And, most important. United States casualties have declined 
during the last two months to the lowest point in three 
years.
Let me now turn to our program for the future. W e have 
adopted a plan which we have worked out in cooperation with 
the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all 
United States combat ground forces and their replacement by 
South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable.
This withdrawal will be made from strength and not from 
weakness. As South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the 
rate of American withdrawal can become greater.
152
Analysis
A differentiating 
strategy is apparent as 
Nixon assesses his 
warning to Hanoi as a 
legitimate statement 
of policy and not a 
threat.
19. Nixon differentiates 
his Vietnamization plan 
as not the easy way, 
but the right way.
20. A transcendental strat­
egy is demonstrated as 
Nixon views his plan
as providing peace for 
the entire world.
Speech
I  have not, and do not, intend to announce the timetable for 
our program, and there are obvious reasons for this decision 
which I ’m sure you will understand. As I’ve indicated on 
several occasions, the rate of withdrawal will depend on 
developments on three fronts. One of these is the progress 
which can be, or might be, made in the Paris talks.
An announcement of a fixed timetable for our withdrawal 
would completely remove any incentive for the enemy to 
negotiate an agreement. They would simply wait until our 
forces had withdrawn and then move in.
The other two faaors on which we will base our withdrawal 
decisions are the level of enemy activity and the progress of 
the training programs of the South Vietnamese forces.
And I’m glad to be able to report tonight progress on both 
of these fronts has been greater than we anticipated when we 
started the program in June for withdrawal.
As a result, our timetable for withdrawal is more optimistic 
now than when we made our first estimates in June.
Now this clearly demonstrates why it is not wise m be 
frozen in on a fixed timetable. W e must retain the flexibility to 
base each withdrawal decision on the situation as it is at that 
time, rather than on estimates that are no longer valid.
Along with this optimistic estimate, 1 must in all candor 
leave one note of caution. I f  the level of enemy activity 
j nificantly increases, we might have to adjust our timetable 
^cordingly- However, I want the record to be completely clear
At the time of the bombing halt just a year ago there was 
jome confusion as to whether there was an understanding on 
jjjc part of the enemy that if we stopped the bombing of 
I>jorth Vietnam, they would stop the shelling of cities in Æuth 
Vietnam.
I want to be sure that there is no misunderstanding on the 
paji of the enemy with regard to our withdrawal program. We  
^ve  noted the reduced level of infiltration, the reduction of 
our casualties and arc basing our withdrawal decisions partially 
on those factors,
If the level of infiltration or our casualties increase while we 
are trying to %ale down the fighting, it will be the result of a 
conscious decision by the enemy. Hanoi could make no greater 
mistake than to assume that an increase in violence will be 
m its advantage.
If  1 conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes our 
remaining forces in Vietnam, 1 shall not hesitate to take strong 
and eflective measures to deal with that situation.
This is not a threat This is a statement of policy which as 
commander in chief of our armed forces 1 am making and 
meeting my responsibility for the protection of American 
fighting men wherever they may be.
My fellow Americans, 1 am sure you can recognize from 
what 1 have said that we really have only two choices open to 
us if we want to end this war.
I  can order an immediate precipitate withdrawal of all 
Americans from Vietnam without regard to the eflects of that 
action.
Or we can persist in our search for a just peace through a 
negotiated settlement, if possible, or through continued 
implementation of our plan for Vietnamization, if necessary. A  
plan in which we will withdraw all of our forces from 
Vietnam on a schedule in accordance with our program as the 
South Vietnamese become strong enough to defend their own 
freedom.
I have chosen this second course. It is not the easy way. It  is 
the right way. It is a plan which will end the war and serve the 
cause of peace, not just in Vietnam but in the Pacific and the 
world.
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21. In projecting the conse­
quences of an immediate 
withdrawal of U.S. 
troops, Nixon's strat­
egy is that of trans­
cendence .
22. Another transcendental 
strategy is illustrated 
as Nixon relates the 
Vietnam situation with 
other crises that Ameri­
cans have confronted.
23. There is a differentia­
tion between Nixon and 
other Americans who 
have reached different 
conclusions on the 
Vietnam situation.
24,
25.
2 6 ,
A transcendental strat­
egy is used as Nixon 
equates the cause of the 
"vocal minority" with 
opposing the historical 
principles of our nation 
The reasons for peace 
are differentiated.
Nixon bolsters his image 
as he identifies his 
administration with 
fewer war casualties.
2 7 . A transcendental strat­
egy is employed as Nixon 
seeks to avoid future 
Vietnams.
28. As Nixon discusses his 
quest for peace, he dif­
ferentiates the efforts 
of the youth.
29. There is an apparent 
transcendental strategy 
as Nixon implies that 
whether or not his Viet­
nam plan for peace suc­
ceeds, what the critics 
say is irrelevant.
30. Another transcendental 
strategy is evident as 
Nixon contends that U.S. 
is still the hope of the 
free world.
Speech
In speaking of the consequences of a precipitous 
withdrawal, I  mentioned that our allies would lose confidence 
in America. Far more dangerous, we would lose confidence in 
ourselves. Oh, the immediate reaction would be a sense of 
relief that our men were coming home. But as we saw the 
consequences of what we had done, inevitable remorse and 
divisive recrimination would scar our spirit as a people.
We have faced other crises in our history and we have 
become stronger by rejecting the easy way out and taking the 
right way in meeting our challenges. Our greatness as a nation 
has been our capacity to do what has to be done when we 
knew our course was right.
I  recognize that some of my fellow Americans have reached 
different conclusions as to how peace should be achieved. 
Honest and patriotic citizens disagree with the plan for peace I 
have chosen.
In San Francisco a few weeks ago, I  saw demonstrators 
carrying signs reading, "Lost in Vietnam, bring the boys 
home.”
Well, one of the strengths of our free society is that any 
American has a right to reach that conclusion and to advocate 
that point of view.
But as President of the United States, I  would be untrue to 
my oath of office to be dictated by the minority who hold that 
point of view and who try to impose it on the nation by 
mounting demonstrations in the street.
'  For almost 200 years, the policy of this nation has been 
under our Constitution by those leaders in the Congress and 
the White House elected by all the people.
If  a vocal minority, however fervent its cause, prevails over 
reason and the will of the majority, this nation has no future 
as a free society.
’ And now I would like to address a word, if I  may, to the 
young people of this nation who are particularly concerned, 
and I understand why they are concerned about this war.
I  respect your idealism. I share your concern for peace. I  
want peace as much as you do. There are powerful personal 
reasons I  want to end this war. This week I  will have to sign 
83 letters to mothers, fathers, wives and loved ones of men 
who have given their lives for America in Vietnam.
It  is very little satisfaction to me that this is only one-third 
as many letters as I signed the first week in office. There is 
nothing I want more than to see the day come when I do not 
have to write any of those letters.
I  want to end the war to save the lives of those brave young 
men in Vietnam. I  want to end it in a way which will increase 
the chance that their younger brothers and their sons will not 
have to fight in some future Vietnam some place in the 
world.
And I  want to end the war for another reason. I  want to end 
it so that the energy and dedication of you, our young people, 
now too often directed into bitter hatred against those 
responsible for the war, can be turned to the great challenges 
of peace, a better life for all Americans, a better life for all 
people on this earth.
I have chosen a plan for peace. I  believe it will succeed. I f  it 
does not succeed, what the critics say now won’t matter. Or if 
it does succeed, what the critics say now won’t matter. I f  it 
does not succeed, anything I say then won’t matter.
I  know it may not be fashionable to speak of patriotism! 
national destiny these days, but I  feel it is appropriate to do so 
on this occasion.
Two hundred years ago this nation was weak and poor. But 
even then, America was the hope of millions in the world.
Today we have become the strongest and richest nation in 
the world, and the wheel of destiny has turned so that any 
hope the world has for the survival of peace and freedom will 
be determined by whether the American people have the 
moral stamina and the courage to meet the diallenge of free- 
world leadership.
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31. There is an interesting 
use of differentiation 
here as Nixon implies
a contrast between 
the great silent 
majority and the vocal 
minority,
32. The notion of possible 
defeat is differen­
tiated .
33. There is an attempt at 
bolstering as Nixon 
equates his goal of 
peace with the goal
of Woodrow Wilson as 
well as other American 
Presidents.
34. A bolstering strategy 
is also used as Nixon 
alludes to his Presi­
dential responsibility 
and thus identifies 
himself with his 
powerful office.
Let historians not record that, when America was the most 
powerful nation in the world, we passed on the other side of 
the road and allowed the last hopes for peace and freedom of 
millions of people to be simocated by the forces of 
totalitarianism.
So tonight, to you, the great silent majority of my fellow 
Americans, I  ask for your support. I  pledged in my campaign 
for the Presidency to end the war in a way that we could win 
the peace.
I  have initiated a plan of action which will enable me to 
keep that pledge. The more support I  can have from the 
American people, the sooner that pledge can be redeemed. For 
the more divided we are at home, the less likely the enemy is 
to negotiate in Paris.
Let us be united for peace. Let us also be united against 
■defeat. Because let us understand—North Vietnam cannot 
defeat or humilitate the United States. Only Americans can do 
that.
Fifty years ago, in this room, and at this very desk, President 
Woodrow Wilson spoke words which caugRt the imagination 
of a war-weary world. He said: 'This is the war to end wars.” 
His dream for peace after World War 1 was shattered on the 
hard reality of great power politics. And Woodrow Wilson 
died a broken man.
Tonight, I  do not tell you that the war in Vietnam is the 
war to end wars, but I  do say this:
I  have initiated a plan which will end this war in a way that 
will bring us closer to that great goal to which Woodrow 
Wilson and every American President in our history has been 
dedicated— the goal of a just and lasting peace.,
As President I hold the responsibility for choosing the best 
path for that goal and then leading the nation along it.
I  pledge to you tonight that I shall meet this responsibility 
with all of the strength and wisdom I  can command, in 
accordance with your hopes, mindful of your concerns, 
sustained by your prayers.
Thank you.
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Analysis Speech
America's respect 
for the neutrality of 
Cambodia is differen­
tiated from North 
Vietnam's lack of 
respect.
Go o d  e v e n in g  my fellow Americans. Ten days ago in my report to the nation on Vietnam I announced a decision to withdraw an additional 150,000 Ameri­cans from Vietnam over the next year. I  said then that I  was 
making that decision despite our concern over increased 
enemy activity in Laos, in Cambodia and in South Vietnam.
And at that time I warned that if I  concluded that increased 
enemy activity in any of these areas endangered the lives of 
Americans remaining in Vietnam, I  would not hesitate to take 
strong and effective measures to deal with that situation.
Despite that warning. North Vietnam has increased its 
military aggression in all these areas, and particularly in 
Cambodia.
After full consultation with the National Security Council, 
Ambassador Bunker, General Abrams and my other advisors, 
1 have concluded that the actions of the enemy in the last 10 
days clearly endanger the lives of Americans who are in 
Vietnam now and would constitute an unacceptable risk to 
those who will be there after withdrawal of another 
150,000.
To protect our men who are in Vietnam, and to guarantee 
the continued success of our withdrawal and Vietnamization 
program, I have concluded that the time has come for 
action.
Tonight, 1 shall describe the actions of the enemy, the 
actions 1 have ordered to deal with that situation, and the 
reasons for my decision.
Cambodia— a small country of seven million people— has 
been a neutral nation since the Geneva Agreement of 1954, an 
agreement, incidentally, which was signed by the government 
of North Vietnam.
American policy since then has been to scrupulously respect 
the neutrality of the Cambodian people. W e have maintained 
a skeleton diplomatic mission of fewer than 15 in Cambodia’s 
capital, and that only since last August.
For the previous four years, from 1965 to 1969 we did not 
have any diplomatic mission whatever in Cambodia, and for 
the past five years we have provided no military assistance 
whatever and no economic assistance to Cambodia.
North Vietnam, however, has not respected that neutrality. 
For the past five years, as indicated on this map, as you see 
here. North Vietnam has occupied military sanctuaries all 
along the Cambodian frontier with South Vietnam. Some of 
these extend up to 20 miles into Cambodia.
The sanctuaries are in red, and as you note they are on both 
sides of the border.
They are used for hit-and-run attacks on American and 
South Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam. These Communist- 
occupied territories contain major base camps, training sites, 
logistics facilities, weapons ^ d  ammunition factories, airstrips 
and prisoner of war compounds.
*Richard M. Nixon, "Cambodia," Vital Speeches of the Day. 
36 (May 15, 1970), 450-52.
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The available options 
are differentiated;
(1) do nothing, (2) pro­
vide only massive 
military assistance, or 
(3) provide both mili­
tary assistance and 
American soldiers.
And for five years neither the United States nor South 
Vietnam has moved against these enemy sanctuaries because 
we did not wish to violate the territory of a neutral nation.
Even after the Vietnamese Communists began to expand 
these sanctuaries four weeks ago, we counseled patience to our 
South Vietnamese allies and imposed restraints on our own 
commanders.
In  contrast to our policy the enemy in the past two weeks 
has stepped up his guerrilla actions and he is concentrating his 
main force in these sanctuaries that you see in this map, where 
they are building up the large massive attacks on our forces 
and those of South Vietnam.
North Vietnam in the last two weeks has stripped away all 
pretense of respecting the sovereignty or the neutrality of 
Cambodia. Thousands of their soldiers are invading the 
country from the sanctuaries. They are encircling the capital of 
Pnompenh. Coming from these sanctuaries as you see here, 
they had moved into Cambodia and are encircling the 
capital.
Cambodia, as a result of this, has sent out a call to the 
United States, to a number of other nations, for assistance. 
Because if this enemy effort succeeds, Cambodia would become 
a vast enemy staging area and a springboard for attacks on 
South Vietnam along 600 miles of frontier: a refuge where 
enemy troops could return from combat without fear of
fetahation.
North Vietnamese men and supplies could then be poured 
jfjto that country, jeopardizing not only the lives of our men 
but the people of South Vietnam as well.
Now confronted with this situation we had three
options:
First, we can do nothing. Now, the ultimate result of that 
course of action is clear. Unless we indulge in wishful 
thinking, the lives of Americans remaining in Vietnam after 
our next withdrawal of 150,000 would be gravely threatened.
Let us go to the map again.
Here is South Vietnam. Here is North Vietnam. North 
Vietnam already occupies this part of Laos. If  North Vietnam 
jlso occupied this whole band in Cambodia or the entire 
country, it would mean that South Vietnam was completely 
outflanked and the forces of Americans in this area as well as 
the South Vietnamese would be in an untenable military 
position.
Our second choice is to provide massive military assistance 
to Cambodia itself and, unfortunately, while we deeply 
sympathize with the plight of seven million Cambodians 
whose country has been invaded, massive amounts of military 
assistance could not be rapidly and effectively utilized by this 
small Cambodian Army against the immediate trap. '
W ith other nations we shall do our best to provide the small 
arms and other equipment which the Cambodian Army of 
40,000 needs and can use for its defense.
But the aid we will provide will be limited for the purpose 
of enabling Cambodia to defend its neutrality and not for the 
purpose of making it an active belligerent on one side or the 
other.
Our third choice is to go to the heart of the trouble.
And that means cleaning out major North Vietnamese- and 
Vietcong-occupied territories, these sanctuaries which serve as 
bases for attacks on both Cambodia and American and South 
Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam.
Some of these, incidentally are as close to Saigon as 
Baltimore is to Washington. This one, for example, is called 
the Parrots’ Beak— it’s only 33 miles from Saigon.
Now faced with these three options, this is die decision I 
have made. In co-operation with the armed forces of South 
Vietnam, attacks are being launched this week to clean out 
major enemy sanctuaries on the Cambodian-Vietnam border. 
A major responsibility for the ground operation is being 
assumed by South Vietnamese forces.
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For example, the attacks in several areas, including the 
parrot’s beak, that I  referred to a moment ago, are exclusively 
South Vietnamese ground operations, under South Vietnamese 
command, with the United States providing air and logistical 
support.
There is one area however, immediately above the parrot’s 
beak where I  have concluded that a combined American and 
South Vietnamese operation is necessary.
And now, let me give you the reasons for my decision.
A  majority of die American people, a majority of you 
.listening to me are for the withdrawal of our forces from 
Vietnam. The action I  have taken tonight is indispensable for 
the continuing success of that withdrawal program.
A majority of the American people want to end this war 
rather than to have it drag on interminably.
The action I  have taken tonight will serve that purpose.
A majority of the American people want to keep the 
casualties of our brave men in Vietnam at an absolute 
minimum.
Tonight, American and South Vietnamese units will attack 
the headquarters for the entire Communist military operation 
in South Vietnam. This key control center has been occupied 
3 . Nixon differentiates his by the North Vietnamese and Vietcong for five years in
 blatant violation of Cambodia’s neutrality.
decision as not  ^ This is not an invasion of Cambodia. The areas in which 
being an invasion of Cambodia «these attacks will be launched are completely occupied and
controlled by North Vietnamese forces.
Our purpose is not to occupy the areas. Once enemy forces 
are driven out of these sanctuaries and once their military 
supplies are destroyed, we will withdraw.
These actions are in no way directed to security interests of 
any nation. Any government that chooses to use these actions 
as a pretext for harming relations with the United States will 
be doing so on its own responsibility and on its own initiative 
and we will draw the appropriate conclusions.
The action I  take tonight is essential if we are to accomplish 
that goal.
W e take this action not for the purpose of expanding the 
war into Cambodia but for the purpose of ending the war in 
Vietnam, and winning the just peace we all desire.
W e have made and will continue to make every possible 
effort to end this war through negotiation at the conference 
table rather than through more fighting in the battlefield.
Let’s look again at the record.
W e stopped the bombing of North Vietnam. We have cut 
air operations by over 20 per cent. W e’ve announced the 
withdrawal of over 250,000 of our men. We’ve offered to 
.  withdraw all of our men if they will withdraw theirs. W e’ve 
n o n - n e g o t i a n i e  offered to negotiate all issues with only one condition: and
5.
The purpose of Nixon's deci­
sion is differentiated; not 
to expand the war into Cambo­
dia but to end the war in 
Vietnam.
Also inherent in this state­
ment is a transcendental 
strategy as Nixon relates 
his decision to winning a 
just peace.
Bolstering is evident as 
Nixon identifies his admini­
stration with slowing down 
the war.
Negotiable and
8 ,
issues are differentiated .  that is that the fumre of South Vietnam be determined, not by
The answer of the North Viet- Vietnam, and not by the United States, but by the
people of South Vietnam themselves.namese is differentiated. 
There is an apparent trans­
cendental strategy as Nixon 
relates a lack of U.S. mili­
tary response to our loss of 
credibility throughout the 
world.
The answer of the enemy has been intransigeance at the 
conference table, belligerence at Hanoi, massive military 
aggression in.Laos and Cambodia and stepped-up attacks in 
South Vietnam designed to increase American casualties.
This attitude has become intolerable.
W e will not react to this threat to American lives merely by 
plaintive diplomatic protests.
I f  we did, credibility of the United States would be 
destroyed in every area of the world where only the power of
10. Another transcendental Strat-the United States deters aggression.
1 1 .
egy is used as Nixon relates 
North Vietnam's escalation 
of the war to action neces­
sary to defend U.S. men. 
Nixon bolsters his image as 
"commander and chief"
Tonight, I  again warn the North Vietnamese that if they 
continue to escalate the fighting when the United States is 
withdrawing its forces, I  shall meet my responsibility as 
commander and chief of our armed forces to take the action I 
consider necessary to defend the security of our American 
men.
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12. It is differentiated that 
the U.S. will be patient 
and conciliatory but not 
humiliated or defeated 
as it works for peace.
13. A transcendental strat­
egy is illustrated as 
Nixon labels the times: 
"an age of anarchy."
14. A transcendental device 
is also employed as 
Nixon equates a lack of 
U.S. action with a 
threat to free nations 
throughout the world.
15. A differentiation strat­
egy is used as Nixon 
distinguishes that which 
is being tested.
16. There is a transcenden­
tal strategy as Nixon 
equates U.S. failure to 
meet this challenge with 
a widespread loss of 
respect.
17. Bolstering is used as 
Nixon identifies himself 
as a President who keeps 
his promises.
18. Nixon again bolsters his 
image as he identifies 
his decision with other 
great decisions made by 
former Presidents.
19. However, Nixon differ­
entiates the magnitude 
of their decisions from 
his decision.
20. There is an additional 
differentiation of the 
fundamental difference 
between his decision 
and their decisions.
The action I  have announced tonight puts the leaders of 
North Vietnam on notice that we will be patient in working 
for peace. W e will be conciliatory at the conference table, but 
we will not be humiliated. W e will not be defeated.
W e will not allow American men by the thousands to be 
killed by an enemy from privileged sanctuary.
The time came long ago to end this war through pieaceful 
negotiations. We stand ready for those negotiations. W e’ve 
made major efforts many of which must remain secret
I  say tonight all the offers and approaches made previously 
remain on the conference table whenever Hanoi is ready to 
negotiate seriously.
But if the enemy response to our most conciliatory offers for 
peaceful negotiation continues to be to increase its attacks and 
humiliate and defeat us, we shall react accordingly.
My fellow Americans, we live in an age of anarchy, both 
abroad and at home. W e see mindless attacks on all the great 
institutions which have been created by free civilizations in 
the last 500 years. Even here in the United States, great 
universities are being systematically destroyed.
Small nations all over the world find themselves under 
attack from within and from without. If when the chips are 
down the world’s most powerful nation— the United States of 
America— acts like a pitiful, helpless giant, the forces of 
totalitarianism and anarchy will threaten free nations and free 
institutions throughout the world.
It is not our power but our will and character that is being 
tested tonight.
The question all Americans must ask and answer tonight is 
this:
Does the richest and strongest nation in the history of the 
world have the character to meet a direct challenge by a group 
which rejects every effort to win a just peace, ignores our 
warning, tramples on solemn agreements, violates the 
neutrality of an unarmed people and uses our prisoners as 
hostages?
If  we fail to meet this challenge all other nations will be on 
notice that despite its overwhelming power the United States 
when a real crisis comes will be found wanting.
During my campaign for the Presidency, I pledged to bring 
Americans home from Vietnam. They are coming home. I 
promised to end this war. I  shall keep that promise. I promised 
to win a just peace. I shall keep that promise.
W e shall avoid a wider war, but we are also determined to 
put an end to this war.
In this room, Woodrow Wilson made the great decision 
which led to victory in World War 1.
Franklin Roosevelt made the decisions which led to our 
victory in World War II.
Dwight D. Eisenhower made decisions which ended the war 
in Korea and avoided war in the Middle East.
John F. Kennedy in his finest hour made the great decision 
which removed Soviet nuclear missiles from Cuba and the 
western hemisphere.
I have noted that there’s been a great deal of discussion with 
regard to this decision I have made. And I should point out 
that I  do not contend that it is in the same magnitude as these 
decisions that I have just mentioned.
But between those decisions and this decision, there is a 
difference that is very fundamental. In those decisions the 
American people were not assailed by counsels of doubt and 
defeat from some of the most widely known opinion leaders of 
the nation.
I have noted, for example, that a Republican Senator has 
said that this action I have taken means that my party has lost 
all chance of winning the November elections, and others are 
saying today that this move against enemy sanctuaries will 
make me a one-term President.
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21. The easy political
path is differentiated 
from the right one.
22. A transcendental strat­
egy is illustrated as 
Nixon states that the 
ramifications of his 
decision go beyond any 
differences of opinion 
that may exist about U 
involvement in the 
Vietnam War.
23. Nixon differentiates 
between the customary 
way to conclude a 
speech from the White 
House and his con­
cluding statement.
24. Also implicit in this 
final paragraph is a 
transcendental strat­
egy as Nixon relates 
the efforts of the 
American soldier in 
Vietnam to the future 
of peace and freedom 
for the world.
No one is more aware than I am of the political 
consequences of the action I've taken. It is tempting to take 
the easy political path, to blame this war on previous 
Administrations, and to bring all of our men home 
immediately— regardless of the consequences, even though 
that would mean defeat for the United States; to desert Ig 
million South Vietnamese people who have put their trust in 
us; to expose them to the same slaughter and savagery which 
the leaders of North Vietnam inflicted on hundreds of 
thousands of North Vietnamese who chose freedom when the 
Communists took over North Vietnam in 1954.
To get peace at any price now, even though I know that a 
peace of humiliation for the United States would lead to a 
bigger war or surrender later.
I have rejected all political considerations in making this 
decision. Whether my party gains in November is nothing 
compared to the lives of 400,000 brave Americans fighting for 
our country and for the cause of peace and, freedom in 
Vietnam.
Whether I  may be a one-term President is insignificant 
compared to whether by our failure to act in this crisis the 
United States proves itself to be unworthy to lead the forces of 
freedom in this critical period in world history.
I would rather be a one-term President and do what 1 
believe was right than to be a two-term President at the cost 
■ of seeing America become a second-rate power and to see this 
nation accept the first defeat in its proud 190-year history.
I realize in this war there are honest, deep differences in this 
country about whether we should have become involved, that 
there are differences to how the war should have been 
conducted.
But the decision I announce tonight transcends those 
differences, for the lives of American men are involved. The 
, S ppportunity for a 150,000 Americans to come home in the 
next 12 months is involved. The future of 18-million people in 
South Vietnam and 7-million people in Cambodia is involved, 
the possibility of winning a just peace in Vietnam and in the 
Pacific is at stake.
It is customary to conclude a speech from the White House 
by asking support for the President of tlie United States.
Tonight, I depart from that precedent. What I ask is far 
more important. 1 ask for your support for our brave men 
fighting tonight halfway around the world, not for territory, 
not for glory but so that their younger brothers and their sons 
and your sons can have a chance to grow up in a world of 
peace and freedom, and justice.
Thank you, and good night.
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Analysis Speech
1. The initial reports 
Nixon received about 
the Watergate scandal 
are differentiated 
from those he received 
later.
G o o d  e v e n in g . I  want to talk to you tonight from my heart on a subject of deep concern to every American. In recent months members of my Administra­tion and officials of the Committee for the Re-election of the Presi­
dent — including some of my closest friends and most trusted aides 
—  have been charged with involvement in what has come to be 
known as the Watergate affair.
These include charges of illegal activity during and preceding the 
1972 Presidential election and charges that responsible officials par­
ticipated in efforts to cover up that illegal activity.
The inevitable result of these charges has been to raise serious 
questions about the integrity of the White House itself. Tonight I 
wish to address those questions.
Last June 17 while I was in Florida trying to get a few days’ rest 
after my visit to Moscow, I first learned from news reports of the 
Watergate break-in. I was appalled at this senseless, illegal action, 
and I was shocked to learn that employes of the re-election com­
mittee were apparently among those guilty. I immediately ordered 
an investigation by appropriate Government authorities.
On Sept. 15, as you will recall, indictments were brought against 
seven defendants in the case.
As the investigation went forward, I repeatedly asked those con­
ducting the investigation whether there was any reason to believe 
that members of my Administration were in any way involved. I 
received repeated assurances that there were not. Because of these 
continuing reassurances, because I believed the reports I was getting, 
because I had faith in the persons from whom I was getting them, I 
discounted the stories in the press that appeared to implicate 
members of my Administration or other officials of the campaign 
committee.
Until March of this year, I remained convinced that the denials 
were true and that the charges of involvement by members of the 
White House staff were false.
The comments I made during this period, the comments made by 
my press secretary in my behalf, were based on the information 
provided to us at the time we made those comments.
• However, new information then came to me which persuaded me 
that there was a real possibility that some of these charges were true 
and .suggesting further that there had been an effort to conceal the 
facts both from the public — from you — and from me.
As a result, on March 21 I personally assumed the responsibility 
for coordinating intensive new inquiries into the matter and I per­
sonally ordered those conducting the investigations to get all the 
facts and to report them directly to me right here in this office.
*Richart3 M. Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," vital Speeches
of the Day. 39 (May 15, 1973), 450-52.
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2. There is an apparent 
transcendental strategy 
as Nixon suggests that 
the situation at hand 
goes beyond personal 
considerations,
3. A differentiation strat­
egy is evident as Nixon 
accepts the resignations 
of Haldeman and Ehrlich- 
man while still attempt­
ing to separate them 
from actual wrongdoing.
4. The same differentiation 
strategy is used in 
accepting Kleindienst's 
resignation.
5. Bolstering is employed 
as Nixon identifies 
himself with the office 
of the Presidency.
I  again ordered that all persons in the Government or at the re- 
election committee should cooperate fully with the F B I., the 
prosecutors and the grand jury.
I also ordered that anyone who refused to cooperate in telling the 
truth would be asked to resign from Government service.
And with ground rules adopted that would preserve the basic con­
stitutional separation of powers between the Congress and the 
Presidency, I directed that members of the White House staff 
should appear and testify voluntarily under oath before the Senate 
committee which was investigating Watergate.
I was determined that we should get to the bottom of the matter, 
and that the truth should be fully brought out no matter who was in­
volved.
At the same time, I was determined not to take precipitive action 
and to avoid if at all possible any action that would appear to reflect 
on innocen' people.
I  wanted to be fair, but I knew that in the final analysis the in­
tegrity of this office — public faith in the integrity of this office — 
would have to take priority over all personal considerations. Today, 
in one of the most difficult decisions of my Presidency, I accepted 
the resignations of two of my closest associates in the White House, 
Bob Haldeman and John Ehrlichman, two of the finest public ser­
vants it has been my privilege to know. I want to stress that in ac­
cepting these resignations I mean to leave no implication whatever 
of personal wrongdoing on their part, and I leave no implication 
[onight of implication on the part of others who have been charged 
jo this matter. But in matters as sensitive as guarding the integrity of 
our democratic process, it is essential not only that rigorous legal and
ethical standards be observed, but also that the public, you, have 
total confidence that they are both being observed and enforced by 
those in authority, and particularly by the President of the United 
States. They agreed with me that this move was necessary in order to 
restore that confidence, because Attorney General Kleindienst, 
though a distinguished public servant, my personal friend for 20 
years, with no personal involvement whatever in this matter, has 
been a close personal and professional associate of some of those who 
are involved in this case, he and I both felt that it was also necessary 
to name a new Attorney General.
The counsel to the President, John Dean, has also resigned.
As the new Attorney General, I have today named Elliott 
Richardson, a man of unimpeachable integrity and rigorously high 
principle. I have direned him to do everything necessary to insure 
that the Department of Justice has the confidence and the trust of 
every law-abiding person in this country. I have given him absolute 
authority to make all decisions bearing upon the prosecution of the 
Watergate case and related matters. I have instructed him that if he 
should consider it appropriate he has the authority to name a special 
supervising prosecutor for matters arising out of the case.
Whatever may appear to have been the case before, whatever im­
proper activities may yet be discovered in connection with this whole 
sordid affair, I want the American people, I want you, to know 
beyond the shadow of a doubt that during my term as President 
justice will be pursued fairly, fully and impartially, no matter who is 
involved.
This office is a sacred trust, and I am determined to be worthy pf 
that trust!
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6 . The 1972 campaign is 
differentiated from 
Nixon's past campaigns.
7. Also inherent in this 
passage is a bolstering 
attempt as Nixon clearly 
identifies himself with 
the office he holds.
8 . In terms of blame- 
placing for Watergate, 
Nixon differentiates the 
easy and cowardly thing 
to do from the right 
thing to do.
9. A transcendental strat­
egy is used as Nixon 
seeks to insure clean 
politics even after 
his terra of office.
10. There is a differentia­
tion of the ramifications 
of Watergate as demon­
strating good rather than 
bad things about the 
American system.
11. Possible reactions to 
Watergate are differen­
tiated.
12. Nixon demonstrates a 
transcendental strategy 
as he attempts to go 
beyond Watergate to his 
more important duties.
13. Once again Nixon
attempts to bolster 
his image as he iden­
tifies himself with 
his office.
Looking back at the history of this case, two questions arise:
How could it have happened —  who is to blame?
Political commentators have correctly observed that during my 27 
years in politics, I ’ve always previously insisted on running my own 
campaigns for office.
In both domestic and foreign policy, 1972 was a year of crucially 
important decisions, of intense negotiations, of vital new direaions, 
particularly in working toward the goal which has been my 
overriding concern throughout my political career —  the goal of 
bringing peace to America, peace to the world.
And that is why I decided as the 1972 campaign approached that 
the Presidency should come first and politics second. To the max­
imum extent possible, therefore, I sought to delegate campaign 
operations, to remove the day-to-day campaign decisions from the 
President’s office and from the White House.
I also, as you recall, severely limited the number of my own cam­
paign appearances.
Who then is to blame for what happened in this case?
For specific criminal actions by specific individuals those who 
committed those actions must of course bear the liability and pay the 
penalty. For the fact that alleged improper actions took place within 
the White House or within my campaign organization, the easiest 
course would be for me to blame those to whom I delegated the 
responsibility to run the campaign. But that would be a cowardly 
thing to do.
I will not place the blame on subordinates, on people whose zeal 
exceeded their judgment and who may have done wrong in a cause 
they deeply believed to be right. In any organization the man at the 
top must bear the responsibility.
That responsibility, therefore, belongs here in this office. I accept
it.
And I pledge to you tonight from this office that I will do 
everything in my power to insure that the guilty are brought to 
justice and that such abuses are purged from our political processes 
in the years to come long after I have left this office.
Some people, quite properly appalled at the abuses that occurred, 
will say that Watergate demonstrates the bankruptcy of the 
American political system. I believe precisely the opposite is true.
Watergate represented a series of illegal acts and bad judgments 
by a number of individuals. It was the system that has brought the 
facts to light and that will bring those guilty to justice.
A system that in this case has included a determined grand jury, 
honest prosecutors, a courageous judge —  John Sirica, and a 
vigorous free press.
It is essential that we place our faith in that system, and especially 
in the Judicial System.
It is essential that we let the judicial process go forward, respect- 
ing those safeguards that are established to protect the innocent as 
well as to convict the guilty.
It is essential that in reacting to the excesses of others, we not fall 
into excesses ourselves.
It is also essential that we not be so distracted by events such as 
this that we neglect the vital work before us, before this nation, 
before America at a time of critical importance to America and the 
world.
Since March, when I first learned that the Watergate affair 
might in fact be far more serious than I had been led to believe, it 
has claimed far too much of my time and my attention. Whatever 
may now transpire in the case, whatever the actions of the grand 
jury, whatever the outcome of any eventual trials, I must now turn 
my full intention — and I shall do so —  once again to the larger 
duties of this office.
I owe it to this great office that I hold, and I owe it to you, to my 
country. ’
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14. A transcendental
strategy is illustrated 
as Nixon attempts to 
go beyond Watergate 
to his more pressing 
duties.
15, Bolstering is quite 
apparent as Nixon 
frequently identifies 
himself with his office.
16. America's important 
goals are differentiated
17, Differentiation is 
employed as Nixon 
delineates the needed 
reform in our political 
process.
I know that, as Attorney General, Elliot Richardson will be both 
fair and he will be fearless in pursuing this case wherever it leads. I 
am confident that with him in charge justice will be done.
There is vital work to be done toward pur goal of a lasting struc­
ture of peace in the world —  work that cannot wait, work that I
must do. _
Tomorrow, for example. Chancellor Brandt of West Germany
will visit the White House for talks that are a vital element of the 
Year of Europe, as 1973 has been called.
We are already preparing for the next Soviet-American summit 
meeting later this year.
This is also a year in which we are seeking to negotiate a mutual 
and balanced reduction of armed forces in Europe which will reduce 
our defense budget and allow us to have funds for other purposes at 
home so desperately needed.
It is the year when the United States and Soviet negotiators will 
seek to work out the second and even more important round of our 
talks on limiting nuclear arms, and of reducing the danger of a 
nuclear war that would destroy civilization as we know it.
It is a year in which we confront the difficult tasks of maintaining 
peace in Southeast Asia and in the potentially explosive Middle East.
There's also vital work to be done right here in America to insure 
prosperity — and that means a good job for everyone who wants to 
work; to control inflation that I know worries every housewife, 
everyone who tries to balance the family budget in America. To set 
in motion new and better ways of insuring progress toward a better 
life for all Americans.
When I think of this office, of what it means, I think of all the 
things that 1 want to accomplish for this nation, of all the things I 
want to accomplish for you.
On Christmas Eve, during my terrible personal ordeal of the 
renewed bombing of North Vietnam which, after 12 years of war, 
finally helped to bring America peace with honor, I sat down just 
before midnight. I wrote out some of my goals for my second term 
as President. Let me read them to you.
To make this country be more than ever a land of opportunity —  
of equal opportunity, full opportunity — for every American; to 
provide jobs for all who can work and generous help for those who 
cannot; to establish a climate of decency and civility in which each 
person respects the feelings and the dignity in the God-given rights 
of his neighbor; to make this a land in which each person can dare 
to dream, can live his dreams not in fear but in hope, proud of his 
community, proud of his country, proud of what America has meant 
to himself, and to the world.
These are great goals. I believe we can, we must work for them, 
we can achieve them.
But we cannot achieve these goals unless we dedicate ourselves to 
• another goal. We must maintain the integrity of the White House.
And that integrity must be real, not transparent.
There can be no whitewash at the White House.
We must reform our political process, ridding it not only of the 
violations of the law but also of the ugly mob violence and other in­
excusable campaign tactics that have been too often practiced and 
too readily accepted in the past including those that may have been a 
response by one-sided to the excesses or expected excesses of the 
other side.
Two wrongs do not make a right.
I 've been in public life for more than a quarter of a century. Like 
any other calling, politics has good people and bad people and let me 
tell you the great majority in politics, in the Congress, in the Federal 
Government, in the state government arc good people.
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18. A transcendental effort 
is evident as Nixon 
charges that both 
parties have been 
guilty of campaign 
abuses.
19. Nixon uses a transcen­
dental strategy as he 
attempts to make his 
goal, the goal of 
America.
20. Bolstering is demon­
strated as Nixon again 
identifies himself 
with his office.
21. Finally, Nixon uses
a transcendental strat­
egy as he equates the 
leadership of America 
with the only hope 
for the free world.
I  know that it can be yery easy under the intensive pressures of a 
campaign for even well-intentioned people to fall into shady tactics, 
to rationalize this on the grounds that what is at stake is of such im­
portance to the nation that the end justifies the means.
And both of our great parties have been guilty of such tactics.
In recent years, however, the campaign excesses that have oc­
curred on all sides have provided a sobering demonstration of how 
far this false doctrine can take us.
The lesson is clear. America in its political campaigns must not 
again fall into the trap of letting the end, however great that end is,
justify the means.
I urge the leaders of both political parties, I  urge citizens —  all of 
you everywhere —  to join in working toward a new set of standards, 
new rules and procedures to insure that future elections will be as 
nearly free of such abuses as they possibly can be made. This is my 
goal. Î ask you to join in making it America’s goal.
When I was inaugurated for a second term this past January 20,1 
gave each member of my Cabinet and each member of my senior 
White House staff a special four-year calendar with each day mark­
ed to show the number of days remaining to the Administration.
In the inscription on each calendar I wrote these words:
"The Presidential term which begins today consists of 1,461 
days, no more, no less. Each can be a day of strengthening and 
renewal for America. Each can add depth and dimension to the 
American experience.
" If  we strive together, if we make the most of the challenge and 
the opportunity that these days offer us, they can stand out as great 
days for America and great moments in the history of the world."
I looked at my own calendar this morning up at Camp David as I 
was working on this speech. It showed exactly 1,361 days remaining 
in my term.
I want these to be the best days in America's history because I 
love America. I deeply believe that America is the hope of the 
world, and I know that in the quality and wisdom of the leadership 
America gives lies the only hope for millions of people all over the 
world that they can live their lives in peace and freedom.
We must be worthy of that hope in every sense of the word.
Tonight, I ask for your prayers to help me in everything that 1 do 
throughout the days of my Presidency to be worthy of their hopes 
and of yours.
God bless America. And God bless each and every one of you.
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